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In a broad sense, the states comprising the Commonwealth Caribbean have shared 
a common historical development arguably rooted in their colonial history. The social 
composition of the region is largely cosmopolitan, reflecting a meeting of various races 
and ethnicities, who are mainly the descendants of British and European colonial settlers 
and indentured labourers, African slaves, indigenous peoples and East Indian indentured 
labourers. By the 1950’s the movement towards independence by the British colonies 
gained momentum and these fledgling states with the newly acquired title of being 
independent from Britain were now tasked with the responsibility of creating a framework 
necessary to commence self-rule. Following independence, the majority of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean territories adopted the Westminster modelled constitutions to 
exist alongside a common law legal system which had been established as a result of the 
colonial process. The question remains however as to whether the various legal systems 
of the Commonwealth Caribbean have displayed sufficient adaptability in being able to 
address the intricacies of their diverse societies.  
With regard to the aforementioned, the aim of this thesis is to consider whether 
the rule of law, legal tradition and legal norms of the Commonwealth Caribbean region 
are showing progressive signs to reflect and integrate local customs and traditions. This 
will be weighed against the still predominant post-colonial legacy of the Westminster-
modelled system, which dominates the legal and governance systems of the region. In 
examining the relationship between a dominant Westminster derived system and the 
contemporary situations, the thesis will put forward the idea that legal institutions have 
an important role to play to support a reconciliation between the past and the present to 
ensure post-colonial certainty. Issues of diversity, and how the legal system can integrate 
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and respect the different Caribbean identities and customs is therefore essential to 
understand how the region can move away from a still predominant colonial Westminster 
driven legacy. The outcome of the thesis is therefore reliant on the consideration of how 
the rule of law, as manifested in existing legal norms, treat diversity and differences in 
belief systems, particularly in areas such as land rights, family ties and generally how 
equality is understood in the social and economic spheres.  By looking at these key issues, 
this thesis wishes to evaluate to what extent a specific Commonwealth Caribbean legal 
identity has started to emerge, and how it has departed from the inherited Westminster-
framed legal framework.  
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1. Aims and objectives of the research  
The aim of this thesis is to consider whether the rule of law, legal tradition and 
legal norms of the Commonwealth Caribbean region are showing progressive signs and 
adaptability to the contemporary challenges faced by the Caribbean societies. This will 
be weighed against the notion of whether the nature and design of the prevailing legal 
framework is fostering a regressive environment in terms of a hesitance to depart from 
the Westminster heritage and common law derived legal system.  
The objective of the thesis is to contemplate the notion that the region needs to 
arrive at a position of post-colonial ‘certainty’ and that enabling such discovery requires 
careful consideration of how existing legal norms address diversity and differences in 
belief systems, particularly in areas such as land rights, family ties and generally how 
equality is understood in the social and economic spheres. In this regard, these areas will 
inform the outcomes of the thesis, as determined by overarching issues such as the 
adoption of Westminster modelled constitutions which continue to face operational 
scrutiny, the interplay between state based legal norms and soft law and the influence of 
international law on domestic legal systems will also be considered. 
This work also aims to promote dialogue on controversial areas such as the death 
penalty, reparations for slavery, individual vs. group rights and multiculturalism. The 
thesis proposes to be original in the area of Commonwealth Caribbean legal writing in 
that it will be attempting to interrelatedly look at legal transplant theory in a 
Commonwealth Caribbean context and the effects of this transplant; legacies of colonial 
era legal norms; the state of the Westminster modelled governance system and the 
development of the rule of law within these post-colonial societies. To do so the thesis 
2 
explores how important societal issues such as family ties, land inheritance, and religious 
traditions have been incorporated into, and examined by the legal system.  
The research questions that will be considered within the thesis are: 
(i) To what extent if any, has the Commonwealth Caribbean attempted to re-visit a 
colonial inherited Westminster modelled governance framework? 
(ii) Is there a specific Commonwealth Caribbean legal identity, and to what extent is 
this expressed within the legal framework of the region? 
(iii) To what extent has regional legal norms been influenced by international law? 
 
The research methods employed within this thesis include: 
(i) Doctrinal Analysis – to explore the evolution of judicial attitudes towards 
common law norms, and to determine whether judicial attitudes have changed in 
its interpretation of legal doctrine to accommodate international trends, 
particularly in the area of human rights; 
 
(ii) Jurisprudential Perspectives – to examine in a philosophical context 
jurisprudential approaches to problem solving by deconstructing judicial thought 
and reasoning; 
 
(iii) Socio-Legal Research – to analyse the existing legal system in a social context, 
especially in relation to the extent by which social attitudes have impacted on the 
rule of law and vice versa; 
 
(iv) Comparative Legal Analysis – to examine converging and diverging legal 
practices amongst the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, as well as between 
the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and other jurisdictions as it relates to 
3 
matters such as constitutional developments, treatment of human rights and 
judicial and legal system reform. 
 
Note on Landmark Decisions 
The jurisprudence arising from landmark judgments which are identified and 
discussed in the thesis play a critical role in influencing the evolution of the rule of law 
within the Westminster-modelled framework which still give a prominent place to the 
role of precedents.  The case analysis will also give insight into whether the current 
system has the capacity to seamlessly integrate new directions which are adjudicated by 
the courts, and the role played by court adjudication to reflect changes in society. In this 
regard, it will also be demonstrated that domestic courts are not passive, but instead play 
an important role in determining the extent by which changes in the rule of law ought to 
be influenced by developments at both the domestic and international level.  Moreover, 
key regional and national cases which integrate international law are also important 
markers to evaluate how much the regional has moved away from a U.K.-dominant 
system. The discussion of jurisprudence emanating from the landmark judgments which 
are identified in the thesis is also intended to explore the extent by which the role of the 
courts can be likened to one of a social institution generating law which it believes serves 
the best interest of the public. Furthermore, new directions in the law which are put 
forward by the courts through its decisions suggest that instead of being regarded as 
monolithic entities with a static way of reasoning, these institutions possess the capability 
to function as important actors in bringing about social change. 
2.  Historical Background 
The laws within a society as it exists are arguably a reflection of various fragments 
of the legal history of that society, taking the form of cultural, social and moral practices. 
4 
To understand or explain the behaviour of any society is to engage in discourse on how 
legal doctrine had been rooted within that society. As Simmons explains: 
Legal and political theories are not descriptions of brute facts. Nor are they merely 
postulated ideals or aspirations. Theories reflect and are reflected in our social 
relationships. And the historical development of our social life is itself a part of the 
intellectual evolution of our ideas. And, if understanding a moral or political concept 
is a matter of understanding the ‘form of life’ to which it belongs, an articulation of 
this or that conception may well require attention to its history. Moral and political 
values thus cannot and should not be discussed in isolation from the institutions and 
social histories that shaped them.1 
In a broad sense, the states comprising the Commonwealth Caribbean have shared 
a common historical development from the inception of British rule. For over 350 years, 
the British held absolute control over the Commonwealth Caribbean, commencing in 
1624 with the establishment of the first colonial settlement in St. Kitts.2  Additional 
settlements followed shortly after in Barbados in 1627 and Jamaica in 1655, with the rest 
of the islands of the English speaking Caribbean being entirely under British rule by the 
end of the 18th century.3 The colonial economies of these countries had been founded on 
the production of sugar obtained from the sugar cane crop, a process driven by slave 
labour and the slave trade, both of which are now accepted as fundamental violations of 
the rules of international law which breach jus cogens obligations. 4  The historical 
experience of slavery has been regarded as having a “deep and permanent imprint” on the 
constituents of the region.5 Yet, preceding what Berry describes as the “horrors of the 
                                                 
1  Nigel Simmonds, The Decline of Juridical Reason: Doctrine and Theory in the Legal Order 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 13. 
2  Ezekiel Rediker, ‘Courts of Appeal and Colonialism in the British Caribbean: A Case for the 
Caribbean Court of Justice’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 35 (2013), 213-251, (p. 218). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Enslavement as an International Crime’, New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics, 23 (1991), 445-517. 
5 David Berry, Caribbean Integration Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 17. 
5 
institution of slavery”6 the region was faced with another atrocity evidenced by the near 
genocide of various indigenous ethnic groups. Prior to the arrival of Christopher 
Columbus to the Caribbean in 1492 and the increase in European conquests within the 
region, the countries were inhabited by indigenous peoples such as the Ciboneys, Tainos, 
Arawaks and Caribs whose cultures can be traced to the year 2,500 B.C.7 Indigenous 
populations began to decrease following the arrival of the Europeans as a consequence of 
illness, forced labour, and destruction of their economic and spiritual systems, with 
practices such as capturing natives to be sold as slaves being permissible by law.8  
During the 16th and 17th centuries, the English were able to solidify their presence 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean territories, as well as in Trinidad by 1797. The 
“Triangular Trade” drove imperial interests in the region, with Caribbean ships 
transporting products such as sugar, rum, molasses, indigo and other raw materials to 
Europe, followed by the transportation of finished products from Europe to the west coast 
of Africa. The final leg of the path would see the transportation of slaves from Africa to 
the Caribbean, hence completing the “triangular” journey. At the time, this triangular 
trade between Europe, Africa and the Caribbean made the countries of the region the most 
prized colonial territories of the English and the French.9 Between 1550 and 1950 there 
was a steady increase in per capita sugar consumption and Europeans, regardless of their 
class status consumed candy, coffee, cocoa, jams and tea.10 Undeniably, the enslaved 
labour force was a critical element in the profitability of this enterprise, and the owners 
of the slaves or the ‘planter class’ was strongly represented in the British parliament 
during the 18th and 19th centuries.11 The planter class was able to present to parliament an 
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agenda seeking to legislate for violence as a means of protecting their economic activities 
and maintaining a socio-economic hierarchy. 12  They also provided influential 
justification for a system of oppressive rule based on the common law notion which 
emphasised the protection of personal property, finding congruity with the prevailing 
ideology of slaves being property that could be sold, purchased, rented, mortgaged, 
inherited, willed and used to clear debts.13 
The region experienced another period of substantial transformation to its socio-
economic landscape with the termination of the slave trade by Britain in 1808, the 
abolition of slavery in 1833 and a transitional apprenticeship labour scheme which lasted 
until 1838. Sugar obtained from sugar cane as a commodity for trade could no longer hold 
its profitability, primarily as a result of competition from the production of beet sugar 
within Europe, economic mismanagement of sugar cane estates by landlords appointed 
by ‘absentee owners’ who preferred to be based in Britain, competition from other 
colonies, soil exhaustion and arguably a shift in attention by Britain to its domestic 
industrial development.14 The decline of the sugar industry resulted in a reduction in 
wages and the number of jobs for the masses and by the late 19th century labour unrest 
began to develop.15 In February 1896, workers who were campaigning for higher wages 
began looting shops in Basseterre, the capital of St. Kitts, with labour unrest soon 
spreading to Dominica in 1898, Trinidad in 1902 and Jamaica in 1903.16 As Doumerc 
explains:  
These disturbances were all linked with social inequality, deprivation and the problem 
of land ownership. Indeed in most territories the best tracts of land had remained in 
the planters’ hands and the peasants had had to make do with hillside plots where the 
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15 Eric Doumerc, Caribbean Civilisation (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 2003), 39-40. 
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soil was poorer. In some islands like Barbados the lack of space had meant that the 
best lands were inaccessible for the peasants, whereas in larger islands like Jamaica, 
the problem was not so acute. But, on the whole, the land problem was a major cause 
of the disturbances....17 
The usual response of the British government to disturbances in its Caribbean 
territories was to send a ‘Royal Commission’ but unfortunately their “recommendations 
often remained a dead letter.”18  
The ethnic composition of the regional population, particularly in Trinidad and 
Guyana and to a lesser extent Jamaica was also transformed as a consequence of the 
emigration to the region of East Indian labourers who were employed as indentured 
workers and given the task of replacing the emancipated slaves and reviving sugar cane 
production.19 Other groups of persons who came to the Commonwealth Caribbean after 
the abolition of slavery, and whose descendants now live in the region include the 
Portuguese, Chinese, Lebanese and Syrians.20 
By the 1950’s the movement towards independence by the British colonies within 
the region gained momentum. These states with the newly acquired title of being 
independent from Britain were now tasked with the responsibility of creating the legal 
framework necessary to commence self-rule. Following independence, the majority of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean territories adopted within their constitutions a 
Westminster based political majoritarian system “characterised by the concentration of 
power in the hands of the largest political party elected to power by the voting public”21 
as part of a dual executive power structure, with a head of government and a head of state. 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, 63. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Samuel Bulgin QC, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Original Westminster-Whitehall Constitutional 
Model as exported to the Commonwealth Caribbean’, Conference Paper, UCCI with the UWI (Mona) 
Conference: 50-50 - Surveying the Past, Mapping the Future (March 2012), 2. 
8 
It is along these lines that an ideology developed whereby the rule of law was understood 
as the exercise of state power according to law and the subjugation of state power to the 
constitution. The independent Commonwealth Caribbean states kept with Britain as their 
‘parent’ country, as evidenced in their constitutions recognizing the British monarch as 
Head of State, and governors general acting as personal representatives of the monarch. 
The period closely following independence also witnessed Guyana in 1970 and Trinidad 
and Tobago in 1976 establishing themselves as constitutional republics, with Dominica 
becoming a republic on independence in 1978. The timeline of Independence amongst 
the Commonwealth Caribbean countries are Jamaica (1962), Trinidad and Tobago 
(1962), Barbados (1966), Guyana (1966), the Bahamas (1973), Grenada (1974), 
Dominica (1978), St. Lucia (1979), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1979), Belize (1981), 
Antigua and Barbuda (1981) and St. Kitts and Nevis in 1983.22 
With the exceptions of the Roman-Dutch system of land ownership in Guyana 
and the French Civil Code of St. Lucia which has fused common law and civil law, the 
common law of England remains the common law of the former colonies. For the purpose 
of socio-economic and legal integration, the independent countries of the region have 
organised themselves into a customs union known as the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM). The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), which is the judicial arm of 
CARICOM was inaugurated in 2005, and is empowered to act both as an appellate court 
for those states which have accepted its jurisdiction, as well as a treaty interpreting body 
for those states that are signatories to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC),23 the 
treaty which established CARICOM. 
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3. Diversity and Normative (In) Equality 
An ongoing theme throughout this thesis is the extent to which the various legal 
systems of the Commonwealth Caribbean have displayed any elements of dynamism in 
embracing a diverse society. According to Antoine, plural groups in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean are not given adequate, if any, recognition by the law and legal systems of the 
various states in the region, even where these groups from a significant part of the 
society. 24  The social composition of the Commonwealth Caribbean is largely 
cosmopolitan, reflecting a meeting of various races and ethnicities, who are mainly the 
descendants of British and European colonial settlers and indentured labourers, African 
slaves, indigenous peoples and East Indian indentured labourers who were either of the 
Hindu or Muslim religious faith. If it is accepted that the rule of law within a state ought 
to be shaped by societal considerations, especially in terms of addressing diversity and 
varied belief systems, then the question also arises as to what extent have these identities 
in fact been discovered. Furthermore, the evolution of the law ought to be parallel to the 
discovery of social and cultural identities, and in a post-colonial Commonwealth 
Caribbean context, this remains a work in progress.  
A well-known consequence of British colonisation was the development of an 
economic and labour model by which forced labour and the slave trade was an essential 
cog. The climate in the region as well as its fertile land was ideal for growing profitable 
crops such as sugar cane and cocoa, and as a result, many European colonisers 
transformed the islands into plantation economies dedicated to producing mainly sugar 
and cocoa for European export.25 Mass production required a cheap labour force and by 
the 1750’s it was estimated that almost nine out of ten men and women in the Caribbean 
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25 Ibid. 
10 
islands were slaves.26 In terms of societal structure, a rigid social system was enforced, 
separating white plantation owners and managers from the enslaved Africans. By the 18th 
century, around eighty to ninety percent of the sugar being consumed by Western Europe 
was being produced in the Caribbean.27 This level of production came at a grave human 
cost, as death rates amongst slaves were higher than birth rates, so that the sugar estates 
could only survive through the constant importation of new slaves. 28  The enormous 
profits generated from the Caribbean islands meant that the planter class grew in power 
and stature, and its interest was strongly protected in the British parliament.29 Violence 
against slaves was legitimized as a means to preserve economic profitability and 
protection of the socio-economic order, and justification was embedded in the common 
law, with its emphasis on the protection of personal property.30 
The design of this system however did not acknowledge any notion of it being 
based on discrimination and natural justice violations. As Kedar notes, political regimes 
acting in an ethnocratic structure would construct legal categories and establish systems 
of differentiation which would justify the application of discriminatory rules, without 
admitting that the outcome is one of discrimination.31 The purpose of this is “to attempt 
to contain the loss of reputation caused by the loss of the moral high ground, which is a 
consequence of such an oblique move.”32 In this regard, Antoine ascertains that an entire 
system of laws developed around the central idea of slaves being property and it is 
arguable that “the slave was the premise for the very creation of modern law.”33 Any 
narrative on the poor state of development in the human rights arena ought to include that 
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the modern day persistence with the death penalty and corporal punishment may be the 
reflection of a mentality rooted in colonial tradition. Clause XII Act for the Governing of 
the Negroes (1688) in Barbados for example, legislated that any criminal act which 
caused damages in excess of 12 pence would result in the slave being arrested, arraigned 
and then tried and sentenced by a justice of the peace, with the slave facing the death 
penalty if found guilty.34 Contrary to this, there was minimal or no penalties for offences, 
including murder committed by the white population against slaves. A dualistic system 
was created whereby there were separate courts for slaves, and one set of laws for the 
master and another for the slaves. Critically, the law failed to adapt to address the post-
emancipation landscape and the needs of “newly liberated peoples who were landless, 
powerless, largely uneducated, culturally and psychologically emasculated and still tied 
to the plantation.” 35  A post-slavery pluralistic society with components of 
institutionalised divisions along the lines of class and race was now in its infancy and its 
often unattended and prolonged development has been blamed for “an enduring 
imbalance within the legal system.”36 
What existed at the time was a rule of law defined by racial and by extension class 
divisions as well as a mentality of racial superiority and oversight by the colonizers. 
Loomba for instance shows that colonial administrators hoped for inter-racial mixings 
since it was thought that this would create an ideal colonial subject.37 She quotes Sir Harry 
Johnson, the first commissioner of British Central Africa, who stated in 1894 that: 
On the whole, I think the admixture of yellow that the Negro requires should come 
from India, and that eastern Africa and British central Africa should become the 
America of the Hindu. The mixture of the two races would give the Indian the physical 
development which he lacks, and he in turn would transmit to his half-Negro offspring 
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35 Ibid, 24. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (London: Routledge, 1998), 121 
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the industry ambition, and aspiration towards civilized life which the Negro so 
markedly lacks.38 
Deconstructing modern day racial and ethnic identities and their treatment by the 
law therefore comes against a background of colonial oppression, and racist ideologies in 
a historical context. As will be discussed, there is a strong argument to support the view 
that the islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean were colonized primarily as a colonial 
capitalist venture. Ideologies of capitalism, imperialism and globalization are explicably 
linked and in a climate where these three areas are heavily intertwined, legal rules are 
constructed accordingly as to offer adequate protection to these interests. 
Another issue affecting the development of a rule of law which adequately 
addresses the requirements of a diverse society, as well as the development of regional 
identity in itself is the notion that the colonial capitalist and imperialist framework has 
been supplanted with modern day hegemony driven, as was in pre-colonial times, by 
capital gain. Wallerstein describes this modern day capitalist system: 
The reality of the modern world system, the capitalist world-economy is that it is a 
hierarchical, unequal, polarizing system, whose political structure is that of an 
interstate system in which some states are manifestly stronger than others. In 
furtherance of the process of the endless accumulation of capital, stronger states are  
onstantly imposing their will on weaker states, to the degree that they can. This is 
called imperialism, and is inherent in the structure of the world system.39 
This argument gives credence to the Marxist ideology that economic structures, 
processes and purposes heavily influence social classification. In a colonial context, the 
labour force was appropriated along racial divides and the formation of a privileged 
‘white’ class, and the after-effects of this arrangement still resonate in Commonwealth 
Caribbean society in terms of how persons of different races are perceived. It also goes 
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some way in explaining the manner in which economic disparities amongst different 
racial groups are perceived. Loomba further explores this notion of socio-economic 
divisions along the lines of racial and class divides, stating: 
The ideology of racial superiority translated easily into class terms. The superiority of 
the white races, one colonist argued, clearly implied that ‘the black men must forever 
remain cheap labour and slaves.’ Certain sections of people were thus racially 
identified as the natural working classes. The problem was now how to organise the 
social world according to this belief, or to force the population into its “natural” class 
position: in other words, reality had to be brought into line with that representation in 
order to ensure the material objective of production.40 
The abolition of slavery signalled a disconnect between capitalist interest driven 
by the slave trade and the very legal rules which had previously protected this system. 
However, the case may be made that where the legal system falls short is addressing 
perceptions of identity in the context of social hierarchies fuelled by economic interests. 
Writing in 1980, Rex states: 
When the social order could no longer be buttressed by legal sanctions it has to depend 
on the inculcation in the minds of both exploiters and exploited of a belief in the 
superiority of the exploiters and the inferiority of the exploited. Thus it can be argued 
that the doctrine of equality of economic opportunity and that of racial superiority and 
inferiority are complements of one another. Racism serves to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice......when inequality, exploitation and oppression are challenged 
by economic liberalism, they have to be opposed by doctrines which explain the 
exceptions to the rule. While it is admitted that all men are equal, some men are 
deemed to be more equal than others.41 
Thus, there is compelling reason to show that Commonwealth Caribbean societies 
are still in a transitional search for normative equality in terms of finding its individual 
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and collective identity. As will be discussed, this normative identity would only be 
achieved if barriers which are remnants of a previous rule of law which is limited in its 
scope is completely challenged and revised. 
4. Rule of Law: Theoretical Considerations 
As mentioned previously, and as will be discussed within this thesis, the 
foundations of the rule of law in the Commonwealth Caribbean were arguably built on 
the intention of cementing the presence of colonial power and consolidating the colonial 
state. Jayasuriya in writing on the former colonial regions of East Asia explains: 
....notions of the rule of law need to be understood in the context of notions of political 
authority and rule embedded in the very interstices of the state. In much of East Asia, 
the post-colonial state was trapped in the repertoire of political rule established by the 
colonial state.42 
This viewpoint holds the same for the Commonwealth Caribbean region and the 
question arises as to whether the prevailing legal norms have evolved in a sufficient 
manner to address the needs of a diverse Commonwealth Caribbean society. By this 
measure, it will be discussed that the rule of law principle of equality before the law 
“guarantees consistency, but is entirely ignorant as to whether everybody is able to, in 
fact, benefit from his or her rights.”43 Unger puts forward the argument that the formal 
conception of the rule of law attempted to mask substantive inequalities within liberal 
society, and that in the modern day, this approach is increasingly unattainable.44 As an 
opposite to the formal conception of the rule of law, Dworkin suggests a substantive 
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approach whereby the courts should be adjudicating on cases based on the best theory of 
justice which is applicable to the questions in which it is asked to answer.45 As Dworkin 
points out however, proponents of the formal approach declare that substantive justice is 
an independent ideal which does not form part of the rule of law.46 Nonetheless, Dworkin 
makes the case for a substantive approach to the rule of law whereby individual rights are 
included within the rule of law. Accordingly, he states: 
I shall call the second conception of the rule of law the “rights” conception. It is in 
several ways more ambitious than the rule book conception. It assumes that citizens 
have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights against 
the state as a whole. It insists that these moral and political rights be recognized in 
positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens 
through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is 
practicable. The rule of law on this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate public 
conception of individual rights. It does not distinguish, as the rule book conception 
does, between the rule of law and substantive justice; on the contrary it requires, as a 
part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the rule book capture and enforce moral 
rights.47 
As Dworkin explains, the ‘rule book’ represents an effort to capture moral rights, 
but the ‘rule book’ can be silent in addressing certain areas, or can produce conflicting 
interpretations. Proponents of a formal approach to the rule of law however, such as Raz 
contend that the rule of law is just one virtue by which a legal system may be judged, and 
should not be confused with matters such as democracy, justice, equality and human 
rights.48 However, Allan argues that formal conceptions of the rule of law are actually 
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based on substantive foundations such as respect for the individual and moral autonomy, 
so that it is unrealistic to maintain a separation between form and substance.49 
Despite varying approaches to how the nature of the rule of law is regarded, it 
remains a central principle in the governance of Commonwealth Caribbean societies. In 
applying theories addressing approaches to the rule of law, it will thus be considered 
within this thesis whether the rule of law sufficiently recognises and addresses those 
traditions and belief systems in the region which exist outside the scope of formal law. 
5. Chapter Outlines 
Chapter I will consider the reception and transplant of English law in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean as well as the adoption of Westminster modelled Constitutions 
by states in the region following their independence. In doing so, it will address how legal 
norms have been shaped by the transplant of colonial law. It will also introduce the issue 
of whether regional legal systems adequately reflect the legal traditions of the region.   
Chapter II will consider the importance of the family to Commonwealth 
Caribbean society and how the regional family law jurisprudence is being shaped in its 
emergence from old British legislation. This Chapter will also suggest that the rule of law 
will only benefit where there is compromise between institutionalized hard law and social 
informal traditions, such as those which are evident in customary family practices.  
Chapter III will look at various issues surrounding access to land and tenure 
security in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The shared colonial history of the treatment of 
land in the region is closely linked to problems associated with regional land ownership 
structures. It is from this background that this chapter considers the importance of a right 
to land, and how territories in the region have treated real property rights.  
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Chapter IV will consider how Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems manage 
equality and diversity. It will consider the historical background of regional diversity in 
the region and put forward a case for the departure from elements of homogeneity in the 
law in its treatment of addressing the protection groups of peoples in terms of their varied 
belief systems. This chapter will also propose that in certain situations, the legal system 
ought to look beyond its legal construct of individualism protected through legal 
formalism and make decisions based on broader principles of equality. 
Chapter V will put forward the argument that revisiting the past would enable 
access to a certain degree of post-colonial certainty, which is necessary to ensure the 
development of a specific regional rule of law. Indeed, the consequences of colonialism 
and the residual effects of colonial power have weighed heavily on rule of law 
development in the region. It will be discussed that there exists the need to confront the 
epistemic effects of the colonial process by re-visiting historical injustices which have 
heavily influenced the formation of the dominant economic system and social order.   
Chapter VI will discuss the importance of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) 
as an actor in facilitating rule of law development in the Commonwealth Caribbean. It 
will discuss the background to the CCJ and its structure, as well as certain distinctive 
characteristics of the court. It will also put forward the view that the CCJ is a court more 
understanding of the normative culture of the Commonwealth Caribbean as opposed to 
the London based Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). Diverging attitudes 
towards adoption the CCJ and the threat of politicizing of the court will also be 
considered. Overall, the issue of whether adoption of the CCJ by CARICOM Member 
States is pivotal in any movement towards attaining a regional court which embodies 
principles of collective autonomy and self-identity will be considered. 
  This thesis will then conclude by suggesting that attempts to revisit the 
Westminster framework have been slow and as a result the expression of a 
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Commonwealth Caribbean legal identity is restricted to the extent by which the 
Westminster modelled framework has adapted to become relevant to regional conditions. 
The absence of a lack of a proper foundation for the Westminster modelled constitutions 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean in terms of relevance is suggested to be a troubling 
systematic flaw. In conclusion, it will also be suggested there is the need to re-visit how 
legal relationships are defined between the state and non-state actors, as well as amongst 
non-state actors in terms of how rights are created and granted. In this regard, it will be 
suggested that a shift to a system allowing for decentralised governance, with the state’s 
role being a facilitator of transactions would allow for a more dynamic rule of law which 
is better suited to differences in belief systems. Concluding comments on the value to 
Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems of international law as a decentralised legal 




TRANSPLANTING OF ENGLISH LAW AND THE WESTMINSTER SYSTEM 
Introduction 
This Chapter will consider the transplant of English law and the adoption of a 
Westminster modelled system in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This is important to set 
the basis for the aim and objective of the thesis, as it is from this starting point the 
progression of the rule of law is charted. Indeed, the character of the various legal systems 
of those states with former status as colonies of Britain in the West Indies reflects a largely 
Anglo-centric identity predisposed to jurisprudential thought deeply rooted in the 
common law tradition. In tracing the evolution of the legal system, the Chapter will firstly 
look at the historical reception of English law in the region, followed by a discussion on 
legal transplant theory in terms of its applicability to the Commonwealth Caribbean 
experience. It will then go on to consider the transfer of Westminster ideology by way of 
Westminster modelled constitutions adopted by Commonwealth Caribbean states at the 
time of their independence. Issues arising from the operation of Westminster model in the 
region will then be discussed, as well as concerns surrounding the retention of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) by some states. The progress of economic, social 
and cultural rights in the post-independence period will also be discussed. The Chapter 
will conclude by introducing an area which will be further examined within the course of 
this thesis, which is whether the legal system is wholly reflective of the legal tradition of 
the region. 
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1.  Reception of English Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
A shared colonial history and common law rooted legal system is practically 
synonymous amongst the Commonwealth Caribbean states. By the 17th century, the West 
Indian region experienced colonization by the British, Danish, Dutch, French, Portuguese 
and Spanish who sought to expand their empire and economic capacity.1 During this 
period, the British were able to assume colonial authority over Barbados, Montserrat, St. 
Kitts, Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda through settlement, as well as Trinidad, Jamaica, St. 
Vincent, Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia of whom were ceded by treaty following 
various conflicts.2 In a modern day context, and as a legacy of a shared colonial history, 
the West Indian islands together with Guyana, Bermuda and Belize are titled as members 
of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Other than the mixed legal systems of Guyana and St. 
Lucia, the legal systems of the rest of the island states comprising the Commonwealth 
Caribbean can generally be categorised as falling into the common law tradition. The 
birth of these legal systems as defined by the common law tradition came about through 
a shared colonial experience, which provided the opportunity for the transplanting of 
British law into the region, and by extension served as the basis for the doctrine of 
reception of English law within the colonies.  
The method of reception of colonial law varied across the territories, mainly 
according to whether that particular territory was subject to settlement, as was the case in 
Barbados, Antigua and St. Kitts and Nevis, or whether the territory was subject to 
conquest or cession, for instance in the case of Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago. In the territories that were settled by British subjects, those subjects were 
deemed to have taken English law with them, thereby eliminating the need for statutory 
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provisions which would receive the common law in those territories. The assumption was 
made that those settlers were considered to have imported English law to the land as a 
consequence of their settlement. In the words of Sir William Blackstone, “If an 
uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws 
then in being, which are the birthright of every subject, are immediately there in force.”3 
At this time however, settlers were regarded as only accompanying with them those laws 
that were applicable to their situation, with this importation being dated from the time of 
settlement. As Blackstone observed, those laws should be restricted to the extent that they 
are applicable only to the situation of the settlers and the condition of an infant colony, 
while removed from the “artificial refinements and distinctions incident to the property 
of a great and commercial people” which is  neither “necessary nor convenient” for the 
settlers.4 
With regard to the conquered or ceded territories, the law in force at the time 
remained effective until modified by the action of the Sovereign, thereby giving rise to 
the establishment of statutory reception provisions in order for English law to become 
applicable. The prevailing law remained until the moment where the British Parliament 
enacted new laws for governance under the Royal Prerogative. Prerogative power would 
end at the time when a legislative assembly was established within the ceded or conquered 
territory, with the British Parliament no longer having the prerogative to legislate for the 
colony. This was evidenced in Campbell v Hall5 where the Court of the King’s Bench 
held to be invalid a proclamation by the King imposing an export tax on the inhabitants 
of Grenada, an island which had been conquered from France and was also subject to an 
earlier proclamation granting an assembly to the island. 
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In a modern day context, each of the Commonwealth Caribbean territories display 
a basic common law structure from which generally domestic legislation has been 
established around. The law in these territories holds, according to Carnegie, a “residuary 
base”6 in the common law of England. In 1879, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (JCPC) in Trimble v Hill7 ruled that it was “of the utmost importance that in all 
parts of the empire where English law prevails, the interpretation of that law by the Courts 
should be as nearly as possible the same.”8 The two main exceptions to this are the 
territories of St. Lucia, whose legal system to a large degree is based on French law, and 
Guyana which has largely maintained its earlier system of Roman-Dutch law, particularly 
in the area of land law. An ongoing problem which the region faces, and which Carnegie 
confirms is that “the changes which have taken place in the common law of England have 
frequently not taken place here (the Commonwealth Caribbean), so you will find that the 
law of the West Indian states sometimes represents English law at an earlier stage than 
you will find presently in English law.”9 Commonwealth Caribbean courts have also 
developed a reliance on English jurisprudence, of which Anderson writes: 
The commonplace adherence of courts in the countries of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean to the decisions of the English courts is rooted in profound psychological 
and jurisprudential considerations of colonial domination.  Not only was there the 
historical pre-eminence of English jurisprudence to accompany military conquest or 
peaceful settlement of Caribbean territories, but there was also, prior to the reception 
date, the actual incorporation of English law to constitute the substratum of the 
colonies’ legal systems. Much of the work of Commonwealth Caribbean courts in the 
intervening centuries since the early 1600's has been the refinement of those founding 
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principles in the light of the exigencies of the times.  Judges have therefore followed, 
without inhibition, parallel developments in the ‘mother country.’10 
Antoine adds to this sentiment, writing that the countries of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean continue to display “excessive tendencies of reliance on the form, structure, 
substance and content of the law as expressed in England.”11 The tendency to rely on 
English jurisprudence can be traced to the transplanting of colonial law to the region. The 
impression of settlement followed by the transfer of English rooted law has shaped the 
identity of the region, from its jurisprudence, language, education and political systems.  
2.  Legal Transplant in a Commonwealth Caribbean context 
A recurring theme throughout this thesis is how well have Commonwealth 
Caribbean legal systems, with their foundation in transplanted law, been able to provide 
justice while operating in a diverse society with varied traditions and belief systems. 
Indeed, it ought to be considered whether the method by which the transplant was 
undertaken has also left an imprint in how the society has developed. As Finnis writes: 
It is often supposed that an evaluation of law as a type of social institution, if it is to be undertaken 
at all, must be preceded by a value-free description and analysis of that institution as it exists in fact. But 
the development of modern jurisprudence suggests, and reflection on the methodology of any social science 
confirms, that a theorist cannot give a theoretical description and analysis of social facts, unless he also 
participates in the work of evaluation, of understanding what is really good for human persons, and what is 
really required by practicable reasonableness.12 
Having established that English law as an aftermath of colonization forms the 
foundation for what is regarded as modern day law in the Commonwealth Caribbean, it 
would be important to consider the nature of legal transplants and as an afterthought, 
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whether the form of the law promotes justice and equity in light of the nature of the 
transplant. Ideas pertaining to the use of legal transplant may be traced backed to Plato, 
who suggested that the borrowing of ideas should be considered in order to make a new 
colony successful. In Book III of The Laws, during a conversation among Athen, Clin and  
Megil, Clin advises his counterparts: 
The greater part of Crete, you see, is attempting to found a certain colony and has put 
the Knossians in charge of the affair. The city of the Knossians has in turn delegated 
it to me and nine others. We have been commissioned to establish the same laws as 
the ones there, if we find some satisfactory; but if we discover some laws from 
elsewhere that appear to be better, we are not to hesitate about their being foreign. So 
now let's do ourselves - me and you two as well - this favour: making a selection from 
the things that have been said, let's construct a city in speech, just as if we were 
founding it from the very beginning. That way there will be an examination of the 
subject we are inquiring into while at the same time I may perhaps make use of this 
construction, in the city that is going to exist.13 
In a modern day context, much of the debate about the diffusion of law is centred 
around Alan Watson's legal transplant thesis. Watson defines the term ‘legal transplant’ 
as the moving of a rule or system of law from one country to another, or from one people 
to another.14 Watson treats law to the extent that the law is rules, and only that.15 Watson 
qualifies this by stating that ‘to a large extent law possesses a life and vitality of its own; 
there is no extremely close, natural or inevitable relationship between law, legal 
structures, instruments and rules on the one hand and the needs and desires and political 
economy of the ruling elite or of members of the particular society on the other hand.’16 
It would therefore follow according to Watson that rules are propositions which are not 
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socially connected to different societies and therefore historical considerations or other 
societal habits would neither limit nor qualify their transplantability.17 Watson advocates 
the feasibility of legal transplants by claiming that one’s own legal system may be 
improved through the practicality of borrowing from another legal system.18 Watson’s 
position revolves around two key arguments. Firstly, Watson argues that legal transplants 
are a common practice and that borrowing, albeit with adaptations, has been the norm 
with regard to legal development in the Western world. 19  Secondly, and somewhat 
contentiously, he claims that the transplanting of legal rules is socially, an easy process.20 
By this premise, Watson claims that it would be a relatively easy task to frame a single 
basic code of law to operate throughout the Western world. He further claims that law in 
a comparative context should be regarded as ‘the study of the relationships of one legal 
system and its rules with another’21 and asserts that the concern of the person engaging 
in comparison should solely be the existence of similar rules and not how they operate 
within society. 22 
It is questionable whether Watson’s ideology when applied to the Commonwealth 
Caribbean would indicate that the aftermath of an English transplanted legal system 
largely devoid of addressing a diverse society has produced an inclusive system. The 
exploration of gaps between the law as it exists in the Commonwealth Caribbean and 
what it ought to be in terms of a diversity conscious approach will be continuously 
measured throughout this thesis. The argument will also be developed that a comparative 
and generally slow evolution of Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems has much to do 
with the uncertainty of cutting ties with the prior embracing of an Anglo-centred legal 
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culture. Favour is instead found with the development of a system along Montesquieu’s 
philosophy of social inclusiveness integrated within the form and spirit of the law. 
Regarding the form that law ought to embrace, Montesquieu writes:  
Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth: 
the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which 
human reason is applied. They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for 
whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit 
another. They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each government; 
whether they form it, as may be said of politic laws; or whether they support it, as in 
the case of civil institutions. They should be in relation to the climate of each country, 
to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the 
natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have relation to 
the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, 
to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine, they 
have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and 
to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights 
they ought to be considered.23 
Montesquieu viewed development in a legal system as recognising the variability 
of law and dependent on factors such as climatic conditions, topography and demography 
of a particular society as opposed to historical milestones as indicators of progress.24 For 
Montesquieu, law was a changeable entity because of necessity and would display 
variance according to the society, time and place.25 In this regard, law was considered as 
a necessary component required for the functioning of a socio-political system.26 Hence, 
it is also worth considering the perspective that a transplanted rule of law holds no validity 
when that ‘rule’ was in fact developed to address a different culture. This notion was put 
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forward by Legrand who proposes that at a theoretical level legal rules cannot travel 
across jurisdictions ‘unencumbered by historical, epistemological, or cultural baggage.’27 
Legrand argues that Watson makes no distinction between law and legal rules, and by 
‘legal rules’ he understands Watson to be referring to matters such as statutory 
instruments and judicial decisions.28 Conversely, Legrand claims that a rule is inclusive 
of cultural considerations supported by ‘impressive historical and ideological formations’ 
and of which are socially and culturally significant29 As follows, ‘the imported form of 
the words is inevitably ascribed a different, local meaning which makes it ipso facto a 
different rule.’30 Legrand goes on to state that as the meaning of a rule changes, the rule 
itself changes and therefore in effect a transplant does not happen.31 Kahn-Freund agrees 
with Legrand that most laws fall within a social and institutional framework and that ‘we 
cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable’32, but also suggests 
that some laws which have more autonomy than others could be transplanted across socio-
political barriers.33 
The restrictions of an Anglo-centred transplant to produce a socially inclusive 
legal system for a diverse Commonwealth Caribbean society may also be supported by 
Teubner’s theory that a ‘transplant’ could instead be considered a ‘legal irritant.’ Whereas 
Watson’s theory supports legal convergence as encapsulated in the term ‘transplant,’ 
Teubner makes a distinction between legal convergence as opposed to legal borrowing. 
Teubner, in stating his view on legal transplants being ‘irritants’ to a society elaborates: 
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It is an outside noise which creates wild perturbations in the interplay of discourses 
within these arrangements and forces them to reconstruct internally not only their own 
rules but to reconstruct from scratch the alien element itself. ‘Legal irritants’ cannot 
be domesticated; they are not transformed from something alien into something 
familiar, not adapted to a new cultural context, rather they will unleash an 
evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and 
the internal context will undergo fundamental change.34 
Whether the reception of an Anglo-centred rule of law was a ‘transplant’ as 
expounded by Watson or a ‘legal irritant’ in line with Teubner’s perspective, it is 
suggested that this process has heavily influenced the character of modern day 
Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems. This will now further be explored with 
reference to the use of Westminster modelled post-Independence Constitutions and the 
retention of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) as a final court of appeal. 
3.  The Westminster modelled System 
According to Carnegie, no statement could be more “trite and elementary” than 
the statement that the Constitutions of those states who are members of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean are all, with the exception of Guyana, Westminster modelled 
Constitutions.35 Despite of the constitutional histories of the countries that comprise the 
Commonwealth Caribbean in terms of whether they were settled, ceded or conquered 
colonies, “by the time of their independence each of these countries had been introduced 
to the so-called Westminster model of government and it is this system that was 
incorporated in each of the Independence Constitutions.”36  O’Brien explains that the 
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‘Westminster model’ “is not a legal term of art and it would be wrong to talk about it as 
if it were a single model, but it is, nevertheless, a useful shorthand for describing the 
system of government incorporated in the Independence Constitutions” 37  of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean states, while acknowledging that “we are talking about the 
Westminster model in both the narrow and wider sense of the term.”38  The general 
structure of the Westminster model is explained by de Smith, who states: 
The Westminster model can be said to mean a constitutional system in which the head 
of state is not the effective head of government; in which the effective head of 
government is a Prime Minister presiding over a Cabinet composed of ministers over 
whose appointment and removal he has at least a substantial measure of control; in 
which the effective executive branch of government is parliamentary inasmuch as 
Ministers must be members of the legislature; and in which Ministers are collectively 
and individually responsible to a freely elected and representative legislature.39  
The countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean with Westminster modelled 
constitutions share the constitutional commonalities of providing for fundamental rights; 
a Prime Minister as the head of government; separation of powers amongst the executive, 
legislature and the judiciary; an independent elections commission, public service and 
judicial service and the ability of the Parliament to make laws for the purpose of achieving 
“peace, order and good government.”40 The majority of the Commonwealth Caribbean 
Constitutions post-independence provide for a bicameral parliament which comprises an 
elected lower House and a nominated upper House.41 The British electoral system based 
on the first past the post system which provides for single-member constituencies is also 
adopted, with the exception of Guyana, which instead makes use of a proportional 
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representation system.42 Many of the conventions that underpin the British Constitution 
with regard to relations between the head of state and the head of government are also to 
be found either expressly or by reference in the Independence Constitutions.43 Despite 
the heavy influence of the British version of Westminster governance, several important 
differences exist in the Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional adaptation, such as: 
....the establishment of an independent ombudsman, charged with investigating the 
actions of government departments, their ministers, officers or MPs; the transfer of 
responsibility for terminating a superior judge’s tenure of office from a legislative to 
a judicial forum; and the vesting of full control over the public service and the conduct 
of elections in the hands of independent commissions.44  
Another important difference is that whereas the British Constitution is uncodified 
and based on the principle of parliamentary supremacy whereby “Parliament can make 
or unmake any law whatsoever and no person or body can override or set aside”45 the 
legislation it enacts, the Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions “were codified in a 
single document, which included a Bill of Rights, and which with the exception of 
Trinidad and Tobago, declared that the Constitution was the ‘supreme law.’”46  
Guyana presents a unique case of a departure from the shared constitutional 
heritage of the region, with its 1980 constitution making the declaration of establishing 
Guyana as a co-operative Republic, as well as provision for the appointment of an 
Executive President who would replace the British monarch as Head of State.47 Except 
for Guyana, any deviation with regard to constitutional design between these countries is 
minimal. The structure of the legislature is most significant point of departure, with 
Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines having 
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unicameral legislatures while Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago operate with bicameral 
legislatures. 48  Even though Dominica and St. Vincent are states with a unicameral 
structure, elected members sit alongside appointed ‘senators’ or ‘representatives’ in a 
single chamber, with both the government and opposition responsible for their selection.49 
Several areas of concern continue to be raised in relation to the operation of the 
Westminster system in the Commonwealth Caribbean. In addition to the “absence of 
oversight committees allowing for scrutiny of public officials and ensuring transparency 
and accountability”50, current constitutional arrangements indicate clear centralization of 
power in the hands of the Prime Minister. As Barrow-Giles explains: 
Constitutionally and legally Prime Ministers have the power to select the majority of 
senators in the bicameral legislature and are vested with the power to hire and fire 
ministers of government and appoint a wide ranging number of individuals to 
important political, bureaucratic, and sometimes judicial positions. Further, the 
inherited Westminster arrangements, unlike the American presidential prototype, do 
not provide for strong and effective checks on prime ministerial power. These political 
arrangements do not easily allow consensual government and there is a natural 
tendency for partisan politics to be paramount in a context of both the fusion of power 
and the need of the executive (the cabinet) to maintain the confidence of the 
legislature. It is primarily for this reason that parliament has been reduced to rubber 
stamping the wishes of the executive branch of government.51 
Ten years after independence the government of Trinidad and Tobago set up a 
commission, chaired by a former Chief Justice of the country, Sir Hugh Wooding to 
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review the constitutional provisions of that state. The Wooding Commission also advised 
that the Westminster political system with its powerful executive had a propensity to 
become transformed into dictatorship when transplanted into societies without political 
cultures to support its operative framework.52 For instance, fetters on the Prime Minister 
operating in Britain such as a vigorous press, powerful interest groups and an alert public 
opinion did not operate in Trinidad and Tobago, where political culture was highly 
bureaucratic.53 The colonial tradition of political involvement on the part of the “better 
off” had been replaced by a belief that policy making was for the government, not for the 
people.54  
Furthermore, the senate has been viewed as an avenue that is used by the ruling 
political party as well as the Opposition party to reward their faithful supporters with 
appointments, or through which persons who have been defeated at the polls could be 
facilitated into the Cabinet on the basis of having the technocratic know-how.55 Thus 
questions of relevance often dominate the discourse on how the senate functions, with the 
existing sentiment being that it has failed to operate in the manner intended by the drafters 
of the Westminster constitutions.56  In this aspect, recommendations for reform have 
centred around denying the government the ability to install candidates who have been 
defeated during the electoral process, thereby prohibiting their access to the Executive.57 
A 1998 Barbados Constitutional Review Recommendation Report also suggested that 
although the bicameral structure should be maintained, there should be modification 
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which allows the composition of the senate to recognise Barbados as a multi-party 
democracy.58 
In 2016 one of the “most significant constitutional referendums to be held in the 
region since independence”59 was witnessed with voters in Grenada being asked to vote 
on seven separate Constitution (Amendment) Bills.  These bill sought to “limit the 
number of terms of office a Prime Minister can serve; enhance the integrity of the 
electoral process; guarantee gender equality; and vest ultimate legal sovereignty in a 
regional appellate court, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), to replace the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC).”60 Despite thorough preparation in establishing 
the foundation for the referendum, the constitutional amendment process was 
unsuccessful. As O’Brien explains: 
 
In an outcome that surprised many in the region, including the Government of 
Grenada which had been carefully laying the groundwork for this referendum for 
many years beforehand, not one of the seven Constitution (Amendment) Bills 
attracted the two-thirds majority of voters that was needed to amend the 
Constitution. Indeed, not one of the seven Bills managed to secure even a simple 
majority of the voters in the referendum.61 
 
According to O’Brien, this two-thirds majority requirement was actually designed 
to preserve the Westminster framed system of governance - “the inclusion of such an 
impossibly high threshold was a colonial legacy included in the independence 
Constitution with the intention of preserving in perpetuity the system of government 
inherited from the former colonial power.”62 Commenting on what could have caused the 
failure of 2016 process in Grenada, Antoine avoids blaming the people of that country for 
not wanting constitutional reform, but instead blames the political nature of referendums 
in the region. Accordingly she states: 
I don’t believe that when Grenada voted against the referenda which 
included the right to potable water – that it means that they don’t want potable 
water….Of course they want it. Referenda are…..a very troublesome thing in the 
Caribbean. I don’t think from those experiences [such as the 2016 Grenada 
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referendum] we can take away that the people don’t want more rights in terms of 
economic, social and cultural rights.63 
As such, Antoine argues that the failure of the 2016 constitutional reform process 
in Grenada would have been influenced more by politics than the lack of public will for 
constitutional reform. The referendum process in itself could be a block to constitutional 
amendments, as historically, the region has had a track record of failed results in referenda 
bringing about constitutional reform. Since independence, “only one Government has 
managed to secure the support of a majority of voters in a referendum for constitutional 
reform and that was the Government of Guyana in 1980 in a referendum that was widely 
believed to have been rigged.”64 O’Brien also points out the referendum process being a 
hindrance for the making of important constitutional decisions in the region, such as 
whether to replace a constitutional monarchy with non-executive presidential 
republicanism in Jamaica, as even where there is support by the Opposition party, 
“removing the Queen will involve an amendment of one of the Constitution’s ‘specially 
entrenched’ provisions and will, therefore, require, in addition, the approval of a majority 
of Jamaica’s citizens in a referendum.”65  
 Writing on St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Bishop also alludes to the 
adversarial nature of politics which is “driven by the insular nature of island life” and 
which forms a “vitriolic partisan political system.”66 On this point, he states that this 
situation is not only limited to that country, but to the entire region: 
Although it has often been argued that insularity and the Westminster 
system have also helped to maintain democratic stability in what are intrinsically 
fragile polities…..the ferocious and divisive debate - both within the Houses of 
Assembly and, outside, in the press and among the electorate—has become 
corrosive. Such vitriol conceals often limited ideological differences between the 
respective outlooks of the dominant political parties, and it consequently reproduces 
blind partisanship among the electorate, in turn reducing parliaments to little more 
than ‘vacuous arenas of political conflict’67 
                                                 
63 Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, ‘Conversations on Distinguished Jurist Lecture’, in Judicial Education 
Institute of Trinidad and Tobago (ed.) The Rule of Law v Rulings by Laws: Promoting Development in 
Caribbean Societies: Seventh Distinguished Jurist Lecture 2017 (Port-of-Spain: JEITT, 2018),  41-61, 
(p. 53). 
64  Derek O’Brien, ‘Developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The year 2016 in review’, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, (2017) Vol. 15, No. 2, April 2017, 506–514, (p. 508). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Matthew Bishop, ‘Slaying the “Westmonster” in the Caribbean? Constitutional Reform in St Vincent 




Bishop attributes this practice of blind partisanship as a contributing factor to the 
failure of constitutional change in St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and particularly in 
relation to the constitutional reform process of 2009, where a new constitution was 
rejected at the referendum stage.68 Proposed reforms included the “removal of the British 
monarch as head of state, reform of the legislature, the electoral system, the executive and 
its relationship with the bureaucracy, and a host of other measures related to cleaning up 
finance.”69 A lack of co-operation from the opposition and its suggestion that the reforms 
were being driven by authoritarian tendencies of the Prime Minister, meant that “the 
referendum was being utilised largely as political bellwether for the 2010 general 
elections.”70 Bishop contends that the constitutional reform process in itself transformed 
from one of inclusivity which characterized its early stages, to “a marked narrowness in 
terms of ‘who else’ would have access to power.”71 Bishop felt that while the bill which 
sought to reform the constitution might have helped to improve governance such as 
through the creation of new institutions of government oversight, its provisions were 
“insufficient to alter radically the country’s politics in such a way as to genuinely 
transcend the limitations of Westministerism.”72 
The most recent attempts to reform Jamaica’s constitution have also come under 
scrutiny. The 2011 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms73 (the Charter), has been 
described by O’Brien as “a rather curious example of constitutional reform.” 74  The 
Charter contains what may be regarded as progressive features, such as increasing the 
number of protected rights to include the right to vote, the right to a healthy and 
productive environment, the right to free primary school education, the right to a passport, 
and the right to free, humane treatment.75 It also builds on the protection of already 
existing rights including freedom of the person, property rights, due process, and 
removing the immunity which prohibited constitutional challenges for Acts of Parliament 
which have achieved a special majority.76 However, as O’Brien goes on to explain: 
On the other hand, it contains a cluster of provisions relating to the death 
penalty, equality and laws criminalising homosexuality and abortion, which are 
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profoundly reactionary, not only in maintaining the status quo, but effectively 
entrenching it. Thus, for example, section 13(8) of the Charter provides that neither 
inordinate delay nor the conditions in which a condemned man is detained no matter 
how inhumane, will be sufficient grounds to challenge the constitutionality of the 
execution of a death sentence. Moreover, by virtue of section 13(12) existing laws 
relating to the sexual offences, including those which criminalise homosexuality and 
abortion, are rendered immune from constitutional challenge, while the equality 
provisions contained in Section 13(3) have been drafted in such a way as to exclude 
any possibility of sexual  orientation being a prohibited ground of discrimination.77  
What O’Brien’s narrative suggests is the maintenance of the status quo is 
necessary to maintain political support. On this point, Hope describes the presence in that 
country of a political system with a patron-clientist structure “marked by strong partisan 
party loyalties, garrison constituencies and political violence, particularly among the 
urban poor.”78 She cites Stone’s perspective that the core of this system is “the exchange 
of economic and social favours to a poor and socially fragmented population in return for 
support.”79 According to Stone, efforts by political parties to assert their hegemony are 
mainly successful in areas where “poverty, urban ghetto conditions, careful placement of 
party hard-core through government controlled housing schemes and tight local 
organizations”80 exist, with this hegemony used to establish “a community majority of 
emotionally intense party militants tied to the patron-broker-client machine”81 known as 
the ‘garrison.’ As, such, Hope explains that “any significant social, political, economic or 
cultural development within the garrison can only take place with the tacit approval of 
the leadership (whether local or national) of the dominant party.” 82  In the early 
independence period, attempts were made to reform how the country was governed by 
Norman Manley and his People’s National Party (PNP) government. During the 1970’s 
the PNP under Manley moved away from its centrist views, and adopted a more left-wing 
political ideology. Manley attempted to adopt a governance model of democratic 
socialism, seeking to establish measures to redistribute the economic gains that the 
country had previously made, and end Jamaica’s reliance on foreign companies.83 The 
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PNP proceeded to place “controls on trade, ceased foreign debt payment for a period of 
eighteen months, reduced wage growth and sought aid from sympathetic left-wing 
governments.” 84  Manley’s plan was however largely unsuccessful, and according to 
Hope, his “socialist dream and his ambitious policies failed due to grandiose schemes for 
governmental expansion, external political pressures caused by his socialist rhetoric and 
poor implementation of the proposed programmes.” 85  Hope further explains that 
structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
“heralded the end of the democratic socialist dream pioneered under the 1970’s political 
regime of the Manley government”86 and a provided Jamaica with a “harsh initiation into 
the unequal workings of global capitalism.”87  
 Perkins argues that the collapse of Manley’s vision of democratic 
socialism was not insulated from the effects of the Grenada revolution, with the 
proclamation in Grenada of the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) in 1979, and 
its subsequent coming to an end in 1983.  The Grenada revolution was the first “extra-
constitutional removal of a government in the British West Indies – and therein lay the 
problem.” 88  Whereas most Caribbean governments immediately recognized Maurice 
Bishop’s revolutionary regime, “they wanted it legitimized according to the Westminster 
model” and this was strongly opposed by Bishop.89 As Perkins explains, two centuries of 
“British parliamentarianism had been overturned and perhaps this fact, more than any 
other aspect of the revolution, is what terrified Grenada’s neighbours throughout the 
Caribbean.”90 Perkins suggests that at the time, like Europe and the United States, the 
Caribbean had move to “a kind of neo-Toryism”91 and nowhere “was this more evident 
than in the defeat of Michael Manley’s democratic socialism in Jamaica in 1980.”92 He 
further contends that the subjective conditions of the Grenada revolution were unable to 
be transformed because of the failure of Bishop’s New Jewel Movement (NJM) to resolve 
its internal conflicts, and as a result the working class had felt betrayed by their leaders.93 
Perkins also contends that the objective conditions of the Grenada revolution could not 
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be met – “The duty of the revolutionary party was to accelerate the objective conditions 
for the economic transition to socialism, while educating the masses ideologically to carry 
through the transition.”94 In the absence of these factors, the revolution was unsuccessful, 
and the Westminster modelled system was only temporarily suspended. 
 
The case has also been argued that the constitutional review process has been 
characterized by a lack of political will which has resulted in insufficient public education 
and by extension a lack of public interest. 95  It appears as though comprehensive 
constitutional reform is often met with an abject response by politicians in their efforts to 
maintain power.96 Constitutional privileges enjoyed by those politicians comprising the 
ruling political party would no doubt be uneasily forfeited, even though the provisions 
allowing for privilege may be contrary to the public good. Where constitutional reform 
would result in increased executive power for the state, thereby allowing more control of 
the state, then the political party comprising the government may attempt to encourage 
reform measures.97 Alternatively, where the political party which formed the government 
is ousted and assumes the role of the opposition, then calls for overall constitutional 
reform would be advocated. 98  Indeed, the current position with regard voting 
arrangements is proficiently espoused by Trotman-Joseph, who has stated: 
Taking a hard look at the effectiveness of the Westminster Constitutions adopted by 
the Commonwealth Caribbean states, it may be mooted that the winner takes all 
system is a de facto system of ‘tyranny of the majority.’ But for all this, no 
submissions are being made en masse to regional constitutional review commissions 
that would require that the system be fundamentally changed.99  
                                                 
94 Ibid., 7. 
95 Avril Trotman-Joseph, ‘Constitutional Review in the Caribbean’, European Journal of Law Reform, 
12:1-2 (2010), 134-144, (p. 140). 
96 Ibid, 144. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid, 143. 
39 
A modern day approach to constitutional reform should ideally also concentrate 
on how the language in the document, whereby the “man on the street,” young adults and 
children would be able to understand how the words are put together and what is intended 
to be achieved. Language in many ways a reflection of certain underlying ideologies 
within a society, and it is on this basis that calls have been made for changing the gender 
biased language contained in existing regional constitutions, based on the premise that 
language which excludes females and gives unequal treatment to both males and females 
perpetuates a society in which men regard and treat women as lesser individuals to 
themselves.100  
Both de Smith and Nwabueze regard the failure of Westminster derived 
constitutionalism as not being derived from defects from within the system itself, but 
instead from societal defects which have been responsible for both implementing and 
corrupting the system. De Smith for instance, states that “In developing countries, 
constitutional factors will seldom play a dominant role in the shaping of political 
history.”101 This assertion is based on de Smith putting forward justifications such as 
colonial rule demonstrated that governance could exist without popular consent; the 
temptation of power for nationalists who secured independence; and the divisive nature 
of societies that experienced communal conflicts such as racial, linguistic and religious 
conflict as a result of various groups pursuing a common goal of power.102 Nwabuze 
places more emphasis on corruption and the abuse of privilege by those in public office, 
especially by referring to the creation of a situation whereby the government is the main 
employer of the land, thereby facilitating the opportunity to provide friends and relatives 
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with employment and various other contracts for their monetary and other benefits.103 
Justification along the lines that societal defects have led to failure of the Westminster 
framework may also find support in the notion that the development of a psychological 
dependency as a consequence of colonialism contributed to a complex sentiment of 
inadequacy amongst the former Commonwealth Caribbean colonies. In this context, the 
movement towards independence has been considered as not seeking to inculcate a 
nationalist sentiment and sense of West Indian identity as an alternative to those cultures 
lost during colonialism, but rather a movement to bring about economic independence.104 
Alternatively, the idea that the Westminster model could be transferred and established 
overseas has been rejected by Madden, who argues that “the only true Westminster model 
remained inevitably at home in Westminster” and the intention was never for this to be 
exported, but to strictly “be consumed only on the premises.”105 Although Madden does 
not address the question of what system was indeed exported, he states: 
The new generation of constitution makers in the 1950’s and 1960’s were not 
concerned with creating a permanent instrument for the government so much as a 
device for securing independence which could be altered subsequently at will. 
Something akin to the British model might serve its temporary purpose in allaying 
fears in Britain about transferring power. But it remains to be proved that it is 
appropriate for the tasks of self-government anywhere else than in Britain.106 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that the operation of functions which are predicated 
on the Westminster modelled system has engendered certain deficiencies in its ability to 
address the requirements of the Commonwealth Caribbean society. As Bishop explains:  
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....the end result is poor governance with a range of practical consequences, from an 
inability to safeguard basic principles of democracy, to a state that is ill-equipped to 
construct the kind of institutions necessary to deal with the myriad of problems - 
particularly those emanating from the global arena such as drug trafficking, global 
economic restructuring and environmental degradation - with which tiny Caribbean 
societies today have to grapple.107 
Further to questions of relevance of the Westminster system in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean are also questions of the continued retention of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) by some states within the region. This will now 
be looked at, particularly in relation to its role regarding the understanding of ‘savings 
law’ clauses and the regional death penalty jurisprudence. 
4.  Retention of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council  
In the earlier years of British rule, parties were able to appeal decisions of the 
lower courts by referring the matter to the Sovereign, who would then refer it to the Privy 
Council, a judicial entity formed of legal practitioners and scholars.108 The Privy Council 
found its jurisdiction originating at the time of the Norman Conquest and was based on 
the ideology that “The King is the fountain of all justice throughout his Dominions, and 
exercises jurisdiction in his Council, which act in an advisory capacity to the crown.”109 
As the appeals process evolved, the establishment of a Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (JCPC) in 1833 by the Judicial Committee Act created a dedicated body assigned 
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to handle appeals specifically from the colonies. The 1833 Act defined the Membership 
of the Judicial Committee and sought to regulate its jurisdiction and procedure.  
The continued retention of the JCPC as a final appellate court in all 
Commonwealth Caribbean territories, but for Barbados, Belize and Guyana,110 may be 
likened to an institutional remnant of the colonial era. McIntosh has argued that the 
“continuing presence of the Crown and its Judicial Committee in the post-independence 
Commonwealth Caribbean political order represents a vestigial incongruity, a 
contradiction in the constitutional symbolism of a politically independent sovereign 
order.”111 In a post-colonial situation, the reality remains that retaining appeals to the 
JCPC means keeping hold of an institution in which a diverse West Indian society has no 
influence over matters such as the composition and tenure of judges, rules of the court 
and future plans for the court. Grounds for concern continue to be raised by many, for 
instance Justice Saunders of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) who has commented: 
A remarkable homogeneity has existed among the Law Lords (of the JCPC). Save for 
Baroness Hale who was appointed in 2003, they have all been white and male and 
appointed in their 50’s or early 60’s. They have all been raised in comfortable middle 
or upper middle class backgrounds, all educated privately and the great majority of 
them would have spent their working lives as members of the Bar in London before 
joining the Bench.112 
Retaining the JCPC as opposed to adopting the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ 
raises questions on the self-confidence of states and the absence of realisation of an 
identity of self. McIntosh for instance, laments that the experience of colonial imperialism 
had engrained in the West Indian consciousness a negative perception of self.113 There 
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should be concern that such notion creates discernment outside of the region in terms of 
perceptions of how the regional judicial, legal and governance systems function. Lord 
Anderson of Swansea for instance has stated that the credibility of the CCJ was “enhanced 
by the fact that a British judge and a Dutch judge serve on it.”114 As will also be discussed, 
there exists a conflict between the JCPC and certain Commonwealth Caribbean 
governments over the administration of the death penalty. 
5.  The problem of the ‘savings law’ clause in judicial constitutional review 
The power of the courts when it comes to constitutional review is restricted by the 
inclusion of ‘savings law’ clauses in the Independence Constitutions. Although savings 
clauses may not necessarily be drafted in the same form across the region, its intention is 
to continue with the applicability of specific laws that preceded independence, despite the 
reality that these laws may violate constitutional rules which protect fundamental 
rights. 115  An example is the savings clause which is found in Section 26(8) of the 
Jamaican Constitution, which reads: 
Nothing contained in any law in force immediately before (the date of independence) 
shall be held to be inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Chapter; and nothing 
done under the authority of any such law shall be held to be done in contravention of 
any of these provisions. 
Savings law clauses are of two categories, namely the ‘partial’ savings clause 
which preserve all forms of punishment that were considered to be lawful prior to 
independence and the ‘general’ savings law clause. As O’Brien notes, “partial savings 
clauses can be found in all the early Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions, and it was 
not until the Constitutions of St. Vincent and Dominica were enacted in 1978 that the 
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drafters finally saw it fit to dispense with such a clause.”116 General savings law clauses 
provide an even more extensive protection of pre-independence laws in that they afford 
“immunity from constitutional challenge to all laws that were in force at the time of 
independence.”117 In describing the general idea behind savings law clauses, O’Brien 
explains: 
...the inclusion of a partial savings law clause anticipated a potential inconsistency 
between forms of punishment, such as the death penalty and judicial flogging, which 
were still widely enforced across the region, and the constitutional right not to be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment. 
General saving clauses, on the other hand, were intended to afford a measure of 
stability in the period of transition from colonial rule to independence. Governments 
in the region needed to be sure that they had some laws in place upon which they 
could rely as they embarked upon independence....The Bills of Rights contained in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions were thus intended to guard against the 
dangers that lay in the future; to prevent the governments of these newly independent 
countries from infringing the rights that had been enjoyed by their citizens prior to 
independence. It was not countenanced at the time of independence that their citizens’ 
rights might also be infringed by existing laws or existing forms of punishment.118 
Following independence, a legal fiction relating to a presumption of 
Constitutionality therefore developed. This presumption is that the court, if possible, is 
required to construe the language of a statute “as subject to an implied term which avoids 
conflict with any constitutional limitations.”119 Furthermore, there is the assumption that 
a statute is constitutional unless it has been proven to be unconstitutional “and the burden 
on the party seeking to prove that a statute is unconstitutional is a heavy one.”120 This 
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notion was explained at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in DPP v. 
Nasralla by Lord Devlin, whose judgment stated: 
To obtain redress under Chapter III of the Constitution the applicant has to show that 
his fundamental rights have been or are likely to be infringed and he cannot show this 
if his whole case rests on a procedural fault that could easily be put right.....This 
Chapter, as their Lordships have already noted, proceeds upon the presumption that 
the fundamental rights which it covers are already secured to the people of Jamaica 
by existing law. The laws in force are not to be subjected to scrutiny in order to see 
whether or not they conform to the precise terms of the protective provisions. The 
object of these provisions is to ensure that no future enactment shall, in any matter 
which the Chapter covers derogates from the rights which at the coming into force of 
the Constitution the individual enjoyed.121 
The guidance issued by the JCPC in Nasralla meant that local courts thus adopted 
the position that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution were the same as those which 
had already been secured by existing laws, which were inherently presumed to be 
constitutional. Following Nasralla however, the JCPC in Minister of Home Affairs v. 
Fisher122 attempted to shift from the presumption of constitutionality to a more purposive 
approach. In this case the JCPC upheld a decision by the Bermuda Court of Appeal that 
the word ‘child’ in section 11(5) of its Constitution should be given a broad interpretation 
so as to include both those children who were born out of wedlock, as well as those born 
in wedlock.  Lord Wilberforce, in delivering the judgment of the JCPC advised: 
Chapter I is headed “Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the 
Individual.” It is known that this chapter. as similar portions of other constitutional 
instruments drafted in the post-colonial period, starting with the Constitution of 
Nigeria, and including the Constitutions of most Caribbean territories, was greatly 
influenced by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969). That Convention was signed and ratified 
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by the United Kingdom and applied to dependent territories including Bermuda. It 
was in turn influenced by the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948. These antecedents, and the form of Chapter I itself, call for a generous 
interpretation avoiding what has been called ‘the austerity of tabulated legalism,’ 
suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
referred to…123 
However, despite the suggestion by Lord Wilberforce of this ‘purposive’ 
approach, as Barrow-Giles explains, ‘savings’ clauses in making provisions for 
exceptions to those rights which are enshrined in the Constitution “serve to weaken and 
create ambiguity about fundamental rights under Caribbean constitutions.” In Jason 
Jones v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago124 Justice Rampersad suggested that 
the word ‘presumption’ should be “deleted and totally eradicated from the constitutional 
legal vocabulary.”125 He took the position that instead of starting from a presumption, in 
all circumstances each case should be looked at individually with due consideration to 
the constitutional provisions applicable to that particular case. Furthermore, he suggested: 
it is this court's respectful view that the time has long passed for a review of the 
function of the savings clause in a jurisdiction in which the Constitution is supreme. 
The sad reality, however is that the very noble intention that was intended to be 
addressed by the Constitution has been rendered powerless in the face of the savings 
clause in so far as it relates to provisions falling under that section. Instead, citizens 
are left to the machinations of politics and political expediency and political, rather 
than necessarily constitutional, decisions....126 
In Jones, the Trinidad and Tobago High Court considered the constitutionality of 
the offences of ‘buggery’ and ‘acts of serious indecency’ as defined under the Sexual 
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Offences Act127 of that country. Section 13 of the Act creates the criminal offence of 
“buggery” for which a person is liable on conviction to imprisonment for twenty-five 
years. This section defines “buggery” as “sexual intercourse per anum by a male person 
with a male person or by a male person with a female person.” In addition, Section 16 of 
the Sexual Offences Act legislates that a person who commits an “act of serious 
indecency” is liable to imprisonment for five years. This section proceeds to define “an 
act of serious indecency” as an act, other than  sexual intercourse (whether natural or 
unnatural), by a person involving the use of the genital organ for the purpose of arousing 
or gratifying sexual desire. Justice Rampersad in his judgment conveyed that historically, 
these offences were “born out of the Christian church’s patriarchal moral jurisdiction and 
yielded, and continues to yield, serious consequences statutorily.”128 In considering the 
historical criminalization of same-sex activity by English law, he explained that Trinidad 
and Tobago, like other colonies under British rule, had been subject to transplanted law.129 
In this regard, historical, now archaic English laws which deemed homosexuality to be a 
criminal offence had found its way into domestic legislation during the colonial period, 
and continued to be maintained. In circumventing the application of the savings law 
clause, Justice Rampersad took the position that Parliament displayed a step away from 
the presumption of constitutionality imposed by the savings law clause through changes 
in the Act in the post-Independence period - “sections of the Act afresh in light of the 
Republican Constitution.”130 For example, the old colonial offence of ‘gross indecency’ 
had been replaced by provisions for ‘serious indecency.’ 131  Accordingly, Justice 
Rampersad advised: 
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From the very outset, the legislators have sought not to re-enact, but to repeal and 
replace the laws of Trinidad and Tobago relating to sexual crimes. To my mind, there 
is therefore no need to try to strain the meaning of the words used to bring the 
provisions of the Act under the auspices of the savings clause....If Parliament had 
intended to re-enact the laws, as provided under section 6 of the Constitution, then it 
would not have sought to use the word “repeal and replace” but would have used the 
words “repeal and re-enact.”.... “Re-enact”, in this context connotes a step to re-
establish and recognize as continuing to exist previous provisions relating to sexual 
crimes which are being re-introduced into force by the new Act. On the other hand, 
“replace” connotes something new being introduced and enacted instead of what 
existed before.132 
The court thus suggested that where there is “a radical change in the legislation 
and a deliberate decision to derogate from the rights of citizens as recognized and 
sanctioned” 133  the presumption of constitutionality would no longer be applicable. 
Notwithstanding the judgment in Jones, savings law clauses continue to provide 
protection for the legislative preservation of the death penalty. Arguably, in terms of the 
death penalty, what the savings law clause does is to constitutionally preserve a practice 
that existed pre-independence, with no acknowledgment of human rights standards in a 
modern day context.  
Attempts to enforce the death penalty by regional governments have been met 
with circumventions by the JCPC, and have often created tension, with the jurisprudence 
in this area mainly being defined by the JCPC. In matters relating to the carrying out of 
the death penalty, the JCPC has focused on two procedural issues, being the length of 
time that is allowed to elapse between when the person is sentenced to death and when 
the actual execution takes place; and whether the death penalty is mandatory in instances 
of a conviction of capital murder. Constitutional issues surrounding the death penalty 
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were first brought to the attention of the JCPC in the 1970’s. In De Freitas v Benny,134 
although the death penalty was upheld, the defendant argued that capital punishment 
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and that a substantial lapse of time would 
make it unconstitutional to carry out the execution. The JCPC in Abbot v Attorney General 
of Trinidad and Tobago,135 again upheld the death sentence, but stated that a delay of six 
years between sentencing and execution brought the administration of criminal justice 
into disrepute among law abiding citizens. Although the JCPC did not hold that six years 
would qualify as a substantial delay, the court emphasised that there should not be an 
enormous time lapse between sentencing and execution. Dissenting opinions in the 1983 
judgment of Riley v Attorney-General of Jamaica136 began to pave the way for the JCPC 
to delve deeper into the issue of the death penalty as a matter for constitutional concern. 
While the JCPC in this matter held that delay on its own was not sufficient ground for 
deeming an execution unconstitutional, dissenting judges Lord Scarman and Lord 
Brightman adopted the position that prolonged delay brought about by factors beyond the 
control of the convicted man can render a death sentence as being a form of inhuman and 
degrading punishment.137 
The regional jurisprudence in this area further evolved in the landmark judgment 
of Pratt and Morgan v Attorney General for Jamaica138 where the appellants argued that 
a fourteen year delay during which they were held in subhuman prison conditions violated 
Section 17(1) of the Constitution of Jamaica, which prohibited inhumane and degrading 
punishment. The defendants also were read death warrants on three occasions while being 
moved to cells situated close to the gallows in anticipation of execution. 139  The 
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defendants were able to pursue appeals through various international tribunals such as the 
Inter American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC) which monitors the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).140 The IACHR took the position that unfairly enduring over 
four years on death row violated Article 5(2) of the American Convention which 
prohibited torture and ill treatment.141  The UNHRC found that a delay of forty-five 
months by the Jamaica Court of Appeal in delivering their reasons had amounted to a 
violation of Article 14 para. 3(c) and Article 14 para. 5 of the ICCPR which guarantees 
the right of a person to be tried without undue delay, and the right of the convicted person 
to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.142 
The JCPC appeared to build on its previous jurisprudence by deciding that there was an 
unconscionable delay in carrying out the death penalty which breached Section 17(1) of 
the Jamaican Constitution.143 The JCPC commuted the sentences to life imprisonment 
and established a period of two years for completing the appellate process, with national 
courts having twelve months to hear an appeal following conviction, followed by twelve 
months allocated for an appeal to the JCPC.144 The JCPC also established a five year 
period between sentencing and execution, which would also consider the time taken for 
appeals to be conducted.145 Judgments emerging after the decision of the JCPC in Pratt 
such as in Guerra v Baptiste146 ruled that the five year limit was not restrictive and that 
cases should be considered on an individual basis. In this instance, the delay was four 
years and ten months, but the JCPC still held that this delay amounted to cruel and unusual 
punishment, in violation of the Trinidad and Tobago constitution. Similarly, the JCPC in 
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Henfield and Farrington v Attorney General of the Bahamas147 held that that a delay of 
three and a half years could also violate the constitution of the Bahamas.  
Adopting an exceptionally legalistic approach, various Caribbean governments 
tried to restrict recourse by defendants to international human rights hearings. Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago for instance responded by withdrawing from the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR which allows for the UNHRC to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a 
violation by a State Party. Governments in the region have also sought justification for 
maintaining the death penalty by pointing to Article 6(2) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states, “In countries which have not 
abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious 
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and 
not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgment rendered by a competent court.” Alternatively however, the West Indian 
approach in preserving the death penalty seems archaic and not in alignment with 
international developments. The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) in its 
First General Comment on Article 6 of the ICCPR stated its position that certain aspect 
of that article “strongly suggest that abolition is desirable.” Preceding this was the 
position of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) which had 
frequently passed resolutions calling for states to abolish the death penalty, while drawing 
attention to the fact that an increasing number of states had in fact prohibited this practice. 
Neither have regional government been substantially persuaded by the decision not to 
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incorporate the death penalty as a possible sentence by the International Criminal Court 
under the Rome Statute.  
The United Kingdom has also attempted to exert pressure on regional 
governments to abolish capital punishment. In 1991, Britain abolished capital punishment 
in its five dependent territories in the Caribbean, namely Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, 
the Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Additional pressure 
from the international community followed in 1998 when the European Union (EU) 
prioritized the worldwide abolition of capital punishment as a matter of foreign policy 
importance. The EU attempted to assist with reform and offered funding for a legal 
assistance project aimed towards death row prisoners in the Caribbean. This offer was 
met with united resistance across the region, with CARICOM strongly opposing what 
they viewed as an attempt to link the abolition of capital punishment to the provision of 
monetary aid.148 
 
6.  Progress of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights since Independence 
This section will consider how the rule of law has developed in light of economic, 
social and cultural (ESC) factors operating within the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
Amongst the countries in region, only Belize, Guyana, and Grenada have specifically 
referenced economic, social and cultural rights in their Constitutions. The view exists that 
legal theory arguably faces constraints when it is “entangled with the shifting and unruly 
facts of international politics, economics and social justice.” 149  However, this is 
particularly problematic where the development of the law has failed to address forms of 
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discrimination in the ESC sphere. In the Maya Leaders Alliance case for example, the 
CCJ explained that “the right to protection of the law is “a multi-dimensional, broad and 
pervasive constitutional precept grounded in fundamental notions of justice and the rule 
of law.” …[It] can be engaged by the failure of the State to secure and ensure the 
enjoyment of constitutional rights.150 Nonetheless, as will be discussed, Commonwealth 
Caribbean states have generally avoided expressly incorporating provisions directly 
addressing ESC rights into their constitutions. 
 
Treatment of ESC rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
In 1997 the CARICOM Heads of Government agreed to the Charter of Civil 
Society151, which recognises a wide range of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights. For instance, the Charter inter alia recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples152; 
women’s rights such as the right to equal opportunities for employment and compensation 
as well as legal protection and remedies for domestic violence, sexual abuse and sexual 
harassment153; children’s rights such as protection against economic or other exploitation, 
neglect or abuse including sexual abuse154 and also the right of disabled persons to non-
discrimination and equal opportunities155 as well as the right to access education and 
training including special education for children with  disabilities. 156  While these 
provisions are notable for their attention to ESC rights, compliance is not mandatory, and 
the Charter’s contents are therefore non-binding, As such, Article XXVI  merely states 
that “The States declare their resolve to pay due regard to the provisions of this Charter.” 
In this regard, Berry explains, that “the status of the Charter, despite the strong mandatory 
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language seen in many of its provisions, remains non-binding and this impairs its overall 
effectiveness.”157  
The Guyana constitution is the only Commonwealth Caribbean constitution where 
a range of economic, social and cultural rights are expressly addressed in Chapter II, 
Articles 9-39, which is titled ‘Principles and Bases of the Political, Economic and Social 
System.’ This Chapter of the Guyana constitution focuses on a range of areas relevant to 
ESC rights including the right to medical attention and social care in case of old age and 
disability; duty to improve the environment; right to housing; right to education and 
equality for women and national co-operation for development of economy. Yet, despite 
the existence of these constitutional provisions, Justice Nelson explains the shortfalls of 
the Guyana constitution in its consideration of ESC rights: 
 
Section 39(1) of the Guyana Constitution, however, states that the directive 
principles are for the guidance of inter alia, Parliament, the Government and the 
courts, but have no direct legal force. To add to this cynicism, certain key 
international human rights treaties, including the ICESC, are directly incorporated 
into the Guyana Constitution except where covered by the fundamental rights 
section. The State is only required to take reasonable measures within its available 
resources to achieve the progressive realization of those rights: section 154A(3). 
Faced with an attitude of keeping economic, social and cultural rights at arm’s 
length, one can well expect that judges who are not elected by the people would 
be reluctant to read into Constitutions positive obligations on the State.158 
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Positive obligations on the state in terms of ESC rights are also restricted in the 
constitutions of other countries in the region, although there might exist some hint of it. 
For example, the Constitution of Belize appears to recognize the right to work, with 
section 15 stating that no person “shall be denied the opportunity to gain his living by 
work which he freely chooses or accepts, whether by pursuing a profession or occupation 
or by engaging in a trade or business, or otherwise.” In addition, the Jamaica Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Constitutional Amendment) Act 2011includes the 
right to state funded public education at the pre-primary and primary levels for every child 
who is a citizen of Jamaica.   
Other than the above mentioned provisions, both state and public responses to 
ESC rights have been abject in other countries within the region. In the Bahamas, the 
Constitutional Commission appeared to be averse to recommending any revisions which 
provided for social and economic rights. Accordingly, the commission stated: 
 
The Commission does not recommend the inclusion of social and economic rights 
(so called “second-generation” rights) such as food, shelter, water, work, education) 
among the enumerated rights in Chapter 2. As these rights are universally declared 
to be progressively achievable, or realizable having regard to a state’s resources, 
giving them constitutional enactment would attempt to make justiciable rights which 
might be unattainable, even if legally recognized. However, the Commission does 
think that such rights could be given constitutional recognition in a way that imposes 
a moral and political obligation on the state to use its resources for the welfare of 
citizens.159 
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In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Constitution Bill of 2009 contained a 
chapter relating to its ‘guiding principles’ which addressed the right to work, to wealth, 
to cultural protection and access to legal aid. However, the draft Constitution was rejected 
at referendum. In Grenada, the Constitution Reform Advisory Committee made several 
recommendations for reform of the Constitution, which included broader rights and 
freedoms of the individual, and the associated duties of the state, to be provided for as set 
out in a new Chapter 1A. These rights contained in this new section included the right of 
citizens to a healthy, wholesome environment; and subject to the resources in, and 
available to the state, that citizens have a right to adequate nourishing food, potable water 
and good primary and secondary health facilities. However, similar to what occurred in 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the electorate rejected these expanded ideas of 
fundamental rights. 
The failure to legislate for ESC rights, or to incorporate them into Commonwealth 
Caribbean constitutions begs the question of whether judges are able to influence the 
adoption of ESC rights. According to Justice Nelson, “judges in small societies are likely 
to exercise restraint where they are not assisted by the existence of ordinary legislation or 
the common law in recognizing those rights.”160 Furthermore, judges may feel reluctant 
to enter the policy arena as “they lack the expertise to tackle certain economic and social 
questions.”161 In addition, where the courts order a state to give effect to an ESC right, 
there exists the issue of having to monitor the actions of the state pursuant to the judgment 
being delivered. 162  However, Justice Nelson contends that in accordance with the 
decision of Collymore v AG163, the Supreme Court was the guardian of the Constitution 
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and therefore had the authority to review legislation which was inconsistent with the 
Constitution. As such, he states that “Caribbean judges in construing ordinary legislation 
are also empowered to interpret laws so as to deliver justice by recognizing in appropriate 
cases socio-economic rights of the weak and disenfranchised.” 164  He refers to the 
judgment of the CCJ in the Maya Leaders Alliance case to illustrate his point: 
 
Recently, in The Maya Leaders Alliance and others v Attorney General of Belize 
[2015] CCJ 15 (AJ), the parties recognized that Maya customary land tenure in the 
Toledo District existed and amounted to property rights under the Constitution. In 
effect, the Court ordered the Belize Government to set up a Commission to integrate 
Maya customary land tenure with the general system of land tenure. The Court also 
directed the State to set aside a fund of BZ$300,000 as a first step towards the 
establishment and operation of a Land Commission to integrate the Maya system of 
land tenure with the received British system of land tenure. In effect, what the CCJ 
did was to recognize that the Maya were left out of the Constitutional conversation 
and to invite Belizeans to have a fresh conversation about the rights of the Maya 
people….. Caribbean judges in construing ordinary legislation are also empowered 
to interpret laws so as to deliver justice by recognizing in appropriate cases socio-
economic rights of the weak and disenfranchised. 165 
 
Justice Nelson contends that “Caribbean courts can be innovative, but the other 
branches of Government have exhibited great reluctance in recognizing ESC rights.”166 
He argues that socio-economic rights are “part and parcel of fundamental rights”167 and 
that fundamental rights “when fully realized will lead to development of the human 
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person.”168 However, in acknowledging that the legislative and executive arms of most 
Commonwealth Caribbean states have been reluctant to treat ESC rights as legal rights, 
he suggests that this reluctance “may incline judges to adopt a policy of judicial 
restraint.” 169  He also asserts that Commonwealth Caribbean judiciaries “construe 
fundamental rights too narrowly and that a more expansive view of fundamental rights”170 
should be established. He further argues that “the Executive and the Legislature in the 
Caribbean region have been aware of economic, social, and cultural rights for some time 
but have not warmly embraced them.” 171  Justice Nelson instead calls for broader 
interpretation of the constitution to include ESC rights, stating for example that the 
“argument can readily be made that the right to education, the right to proper healthcare, 
adequate housing, and the right to work underpin the fundamental right in section 4(a) of 
[the Trinidad & Tobago] Constitution to ‘life, liberty, security of the person and 
enjoyment of property…’172 Likewise, Antoine contends that it is inaccurate to suggest 
that Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions do not envisage ESC rights, but instead 
assumptions are to be made about these rights. Accordingly, she states: 
 
In my view, the direction to interpret Constitutions purposively in our struggle to find 
the true meaning of our new Constitutions means more than merely stretching the 
literal meaning of the word. I believe that it speaks to finding the fundamental values, 
norms and aspirations of the Constitution, its raison d’etre – those grounding 
principles that our founding parents were thinking of that would give law substance 
and would finally confirm the capacity of a free people to determine their own destiny 
in a way consonant with justice.173 
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However, such an approach to constitutional interpretation which would 
recognize ESC rights appears to be restricted, and Commonwealth Caribbean states 
continue to display arguably incognizant attitudes towards these rights.  
A lack of emphasis on the implementation of ESC rights has also been noted by 
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its 
concluding observations on periodic reports submitted by Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad 
& Tobago in accordance with their obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Commenting on Guyana, the CESCR 
lamented “the scarcity of official data regarding the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights, as well as the outdated and non-disaggregated nature of much of the 
data provided by Guyana.”174 The CESCR noted discrepancies between official state 
statistics and those provided by the United Nations and expressed its concerns on “the 
absence of an effective data collection system, which hampers the robust analysis of the 
actual realization and progress of economic, social and cultural rights and the 
development of effective policies.”175 The CESCR also noted a lack of free legal aid 
services which “may prevent disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, 
particularly Amerindian people, from claiming their rights and obtaining appropriate 
remedies in case their economic, social and cultural rights are at risk and /or violated.”176 
The Committee further suggested that Guyana take steps to combat corruption 177 ; 
eliminate the causes of ethnic discrimination178; ensure that persons with disabilities have 
access to the required facilities which would allow them to enjoy their economic, social 
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and cultural rights179; provide protection for LGBTI persons against discrimination180 and 
combat gender stereotypes.181 It also noted with concern decreasing enrolment rates and 
high dropout rates in primary school education 182  and limited access to healthcare 
services, including sexual and reproductive healthcare.183  
Reporting on Jamaica, the CESCR urged that country to take effective measures 
to protect traditional knowledge and cultural expression184; ensure access to adequate and 
affordable housing with security of tenure185; intensify efforts to ensure access to safe 
potable water186; combat high levels of violence against women and girls187; legally 
prohibit gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace188 and protect 
persons who are faced with violence and discrimination because of their sexual 
orientation. 189  Commenting on Trinidad & Tobago, the CESCR expressed its deep 
concern that country had not “incorporated or reflected the Covenant or its provisions in 
the domestic legal order and that the State party could not provide information on case 
law in which rights contained in the Covenant were invoked before the courts.”190 The 
Committee also voiced similar sentiments to their views on Guyana and Jamaica in 
several areas. It urged Trinidad and Tobago to adopt measures to ensure better living 
conditions for persons with disabilities191 and to eliminate all forms of violence and 
discrimination against women192, while expressing its concern for the lack of social 
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housing programmes 193  as well as the lack of comprehensive anti-discrimination 
legislation.194 
From the observations of the CESCR, it is suggested that poor data collection 
mechanisms historically has made it extremely difficult to monitor social, economic and 
cultural conditions, and this has hindered the development of policy and legislation to 
address ESC rights since independence. That the CESCR had to remind Trinidad & 
Tobago that once a State Party has ratified an international instrument, “the State party is 
under an obligation to comply with it and to give it full effect in the domestic legal 
order”195 hints at that country being relaxed in its approach to respecting its international 
commitments of securing ESC rights to its citizens. By extension, it also appears as 
though the Commonwealth region as a whole has also displayed a relaxed attitude in its 
treatment of ESC rights. As discussed, both legislative and judicial will in incorporating 
ESC rights into statute and judicial decision making is necessary if the rule of law is to 
be shaped in such a way so as to secure the ESC rights of citizens. At present, there 
however appears to be a slow evolution of the rule of law in recognizing the need to 
address economic, social and cultural conditions under the banner of ESC rights.  What 
the concluding observations of the CESCR indicate is that in the post-independence 
period, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago collectively share similar problems with 
regard to enabling their rule of law to be sufficiently equipped to provide protection to 
those members of society who are vulnerable based on their economic, social or cultural 
standing. As such, there is also slow progress with regard to these states undertaking 
measures such as ensuring that the relevant data is properly collected and aggregated, as 
well as making constitutional and legislative commitments to specifically protect ESC 
rights. 
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7.  Legal Systems, Legal Traditions and Natural Law 
A theme which this thesis seeks to examine is whether the Commonwealth 
Caribbean legal system adequately reflects the legal traditions of the region. Merryman 
defines a legal system as “an operating set of legal institutions, procedures and rules.” 
However, he explains that a legal tradition is a more culturally sensitive notion than a 
legal system. He elaborates by considering a legal tradition to be: 
a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about 
the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and 
operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, 
studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture 
of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system in cultural perspective.196 
Generally, the colonial foundation of the Commonwealth Caribbean legal system 
has meant that its basis is largely in alignment with an ideology of a law centred around 
monistic, statist and positivist principles. The monist nature of the transplanted legal 
system was indicated by the various island-states generally having a singular uniform 
legal system, whilst statist in the sense that control of the law was held by the state. Its 
positivist nature extends insofar as only what was created or recognised by the state as 
law, was in fact considered as law. The core of such an arrangement does little to 
accommodate a plurality-conscious approach. Instead, what the colonies inherited was a 
rule of law and a constitutional framework largely representing Diceyan constitutional 
theory, which is generally taken to “embrace a legal method that is analytical, formalist, 
scientific, mechanical, descriptive and positivist.”197 Arguably, Dicey’s ideologies and its 
influence on the rule of law were based around notions of imperialism and the expansion 
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of empire. Originating from Dicey’s ideology is an authoritative perception of public law 
of which emphasis is placed on the law’s authoritarian qualities, with a disproportionate 
weight of importance given to Parliamentary sovereignty and the functions of arms of the 
state.198 As Glenn explains however, “the growth of the formal law of the state necessarily 
implies a decline in other forms of social cohesion, or glue.”199 As a result, “the small, 
local ways of life - of community, work and play - become subject to legal control and 
inevitably wither.”200 
By subscribing to a Westernised perspective of natural law incorporated into an 
inherited Anglo-centred rule of law, limited regard has been given to diversity when 
conceptualising how the traditional cultural norms are to be integrated into modern day 
regional legal systems. Perhaps this can describe why Commonwealth Caribbean 
societies are socially conservative, especially with regard to giving proper attention to 
how the law in other jurisdictions have adapted to accommodate various segments of 
society. By and large, West Indian communities continue to consider homosexuality, 
contraception and polygamy immoral, and certain traditional religious practices taboo, 
while there has been limited discourse towards any legislative agenda to discuss issues 
such as abortion, prostitution and the decriminalization of marijuana for medicinal and 
religious purposes. This societal thought appears influenced by its own ability to accept 
that the law is harsh, but it is indeed the law, as akin to the belief of legal positivists as 
entrenched in the maxim dura lex sed lex.  
Controversial issues such as the aforementioned may lay claim to being human 
rights issues, and this opens the debate as to whether natural law and human rights are 
one and the same. ‘Natural law’ has been described as something which “provides a name 
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for the point of intersection between laws and morals.” 201  Cotterrell expands this 
description stating that “law cannot be properly understood except in moral terms” and 
notes that the history of natural law extends through at least 2,500 years of Western 
philosophy.202 The origins of natural law theory have essentially been entrenched in the 
assumption that there is a force greater than “man”, by which all human actions will be 
measured. It has been considered as a tradition which has claimed universality for its 
principles and as something which has been a significant precursor to the emergence of 
the nation-state. 203  By the 18th century however, natural law had become visibly 
Christianised, with its proponents advocating its global validity. Kelly has cited Sir 
William Blackstone for instance, who in 1765 wrote that natural law: 
being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in 
obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all such 
times: no human laws are of validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid 
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately from this 
original.204 
Tierney further explains that natural justice is often associated with human rights: 
I use the terms natural law and human rights interchangeably. The term ‘human rights’ 
is often used nowadays to indicate a lack of necessary commitment to the 
philosophical and theological systems formerly associated with the older term, 
‘natural rights.’ But the two concepts are essentially the same. Human rights or natural 
rights are the rights that people have, not by virtue of any particular role or status in 
society, but by virtue of their very humanity.205 
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In theory the Westminster modelled constitutions appear to place emphasis on 
human rights protection, with each containing a chapter on fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Where ordinary legislation gives the state any ability to violate any specified 
rights and freedoms within the constitution, the ordinary legislation would not be able to 
take any effect. The main fundamental rights and freedoms are within the spirit of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)206 and include the right to life; freedom 
from cruel and inhuman treatment; freedom of expression; freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; freedom of association; freedom of movement; the right to a fair 
trial; freedom from arbitrary arrest; freedom from discrimination on specified grounds 
and the protection of the law. Although the fundamental rights and freedoms reflected 
within the Westminster modelled constitutions such as the right to life, to liberty, to 
freedom of speech, to freedom of association and to not be deprived of property without 
due process or adequate compensation generally represent those civil and political rights 
considered as natural rights, there seems to be hesitance in expanding the framework of 
the constitution to include other rights that ideally ought to be afforded to society. 
Compelling to this notion are comments by the present Prime Minister of St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, specifically addressing the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression stated, “Too often Caribbean legislators go beyond the outer limits 
of a person's right to freedom of expression and they are insufficiently reproached by 
Caribbean judges.”207 Neither do the constitutions incorporate any social and economic 
rights, for example as found in the 1976 International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) such as the right to education, work and health. Other 
important rights have also been put forward as worth being constitutionally recognised 
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such as the right to privacy, protection of the environment as well as expanding the 
definition of discrimination to include disability and sexual orientation. 
According to Fiadjoe, one of the dilemmas facing courts generally is whether to 
uphold “formalism” over “justice”, particularly in light of regional judges having been 
trained in the common law, which by its innate character has an inclination to 
formalize.208 Fiadjoe argues that Commonwealth Caribbean courts have tended to be 
excessively formalistic and unduly restrictive in their interpretative constitutional 
functions.209 However he suggests that following the decision in Fisher210, Caribbean 
courts have displayed a slightly liberal shift towards the direction of judicial activism 
especially in human rights matters, while rejecting formalism. In that JCPC case, Lord 
Wilberforce advised that the proper way to construe a constitution based on the 
Westminster model is to treat it not as if it were an Act of Parliament but rather as sui 
generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its own, suitable to its character and 
without necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are relevant to legislation of 
private law. 
Like Fiadjoe, Justice Adrian Saunders has also commented that the domain of 
human rights provides an indication of the way in which the courts have adapted their 
approach to fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the constitutions of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean states in response to new social and political realities. 211 
Justice Saunders suggests that during the immediate post-independence period, 
particularly in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the general  approach of the state to fundamental 
rights and freedoms was conservative, with citizens’ rights being construed restrictively 
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in comparison to modern day standards. However, Justice Saunders describes the post 
Cold War globalization of ‘human rights’ and international jurisprudence brought about 
by the decisions of judges in other jurisdictions as now playing a decisive role in 
influencing the interpretation of constitutional rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean.212 
He argues that capital punishment cases decided by the JCPC such as Pratt213 and Lewis 
v The Attorney General214 which decided inter alia that it was unlawful to execute a 
prisoner while his petition was pending in the Inter-American Human Rights process, 
relies heavily on international jurisprudence. It is therefore suggested that 
Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions have not wholeheartedly embraced natural law 
principles, especially in a human rights context. Undoubtedly, the colonial transplanted 
legal system evolved to the point of leaving the colonies with a remnant of British socio-
political and legal ideologies in the form of Westminster based constitutions in the 
aftermath of their independence.  
Antoine suggests that while the former colonies of Britain in the current day 
English-speaking Caribbean have attempted to an extent to shape new identities in the 
post-independence period, the way that these states express themselves remain largely 
neo-colonial in a British context.215 This sentiment was expounded by Justice Sharma in 
the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal judgment in Boodram v AG and Another.216 In 
his judgment, the learned judge stated: 
even after our independence, our courts have continued to develop our law very much 
in accordance with English jurisprudence. The inherent danger and pitfall in this 
approach is that, since independence our society has developed differently from the 
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English and now requires a robust examination in order to render our Constitution and 
common law more meaningful.217  
Antoine calls for a re-interpretation of the existing legal framework, by 
deconstructing the law to the extent that it becomes transformed from what she views as 
its role of subjugation into an identity of liberation. The outcome of this process would 
be the building of a more just and equitable society, with the judiciary and legislature 
assuming the roles of social engineers and seeking to “decolonise society.” This would 
be achieved not merely by attempting to tailor inadequate laws into a social context, but 
by exercising a conscious impetus to establish new law and if reasonable, new legal 
systems to uphold a more equitable social, economic and political system. 218  This 
approach has however at times not been met by judicial agreement, and judicial opinion 
within the region has been expressed to the extent that where there may be a lacuna in the 
law, or where the law may be contrary to modern day morality, those issues are not within 
the direct concern of the judge, whose function is not that of a social engineer imposing 
his own values by inventive judicial interpretation.219 Yet any process of decolonization 
remains incomplete and somewhat stagnated. According to Girvan, “every single ethno-
cultural group that occupied the Caribbean space did so on terms that acknowledged the 
superiority of the culture of the colonising power; and destroyed or devalued their native 
culture.”220 
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In terms of protecting democracy, the Westminster modelled Constitutions of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean continue to secure the recognition of government which is 
based on universal adult suffrage, and characterised by fair elections which are regularly 
held. However, “the durability of almost every aspect of the Westminster model would 
come to be tested to its limits in the post-independence era.”221 The ongoing critique of 
the constitutions provided to the former colonies by its Whitehall drafters is that these 
constitutions were in no way indigenous to the needs of a diverse collection of people 
who had been relocated to the region from other parts of the world, and in the majority of 
cases by force. It is along these lines that the question arises as to whether these 
constitutions were a true reflection of a localized social contract and a sufficient 
recognition of a “collective self” indicative of the region’s diverse character. The success 
of the constitutional review process may be limited to the extent of the seriousness of 
approach by regional governments, who ideally ought to treat the process as an important 
project of a national interest, with an adequate budget, and strategy which would 
encourage inclusive and comprehensive consultations, defined timelines and specific 
outputs. As will further be discussed in this thesis, situations continue to arise where there 
are conflicts between formal law indicative of the institutions which were formed during, 
and arising from the colonial experience of the region, and ‘soft’ law demonstrated 
through informal practices by those segments of society who maintain an affinity with 
legal traditions outside of the scope of ‘hard law.’ These aforementioned scenarios are 
important in the context of the objective of the thesis, as are important indicators in 
demonstrating whether the rule of law reflects a position of post-colonial certainty. 
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CHAPTER II  
LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN FAMILY 
Introduction 
The consideration of how family law operates in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
is an important aspect of this thesis. This area is important in qualifying the objective of 
the thesis to explore whether the rule of law reflects adequate post-colonial ‘certainty.’ 
Generally speaking, as a result of legal transplant, the substantive principles of family law 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean have been historically akin to those of England, despite 
the existence of family structures which largely do not form part of British society. 
Arising from this arrangement, according to McDowell, the Commonwealth Caribbean 
jurisdictions still face shortcomings in its family law mechanisms, with the criticisms 
directed to the law relating to children in England prior to the United Kingdom Children 
Act of 19891 being equally applicable to the West Indies.2 Of these criticisms was the 
development of ad hoc family law jurisprudence as stated by Bromley and Lowe, which 
McDowell identifies as tantamount to the West Indian position.3 According to Bromley 
and Lowe: 
Before the Children Act 1989, child law, like so much of English law, had developed 
upon an ad hoc basis through both statute and case law and predominantly in terms of 
remedies rather than rights. In the result the law had become complicated and 
technical and had no underlying general philosophy. Remedies and procedure varied 
according to the jurisdiction invoked and the court involved. There were, for example, 
separate statutes conferring different powers on the courts to make orders relating to 
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children in divorce proceedings, in proceedings for financial relief before magistrates 
and in so-called free standing proceedings, namely those solely concerned with 
disputes about children.4 
This arrangement often fell short of adapting to local conditions, and was quite 
evident in several judicial pronouncements in the sphere of family law jurisprudence 
which will subsequently be discussed. It is from this background that this chapter will 
look at the importance of the family to society, and then proceed to defining family law 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. It will consider how the regional family law 
jurisprudence is being shaped in its emergence from old British legislation which made 
its way into Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems.  It will also look at the progressive 
efforts to establish family courts and juvenile courts in various Commonwealth Caribbean 
territories. The impetus placed on reform in the face of commitments to international and 
regional agreements will also be considered. The chapter will end with the conclusion the 
rule of law will only benefit where there is even compromise between institutionalized 
hard law and social informal traditions, such as those which are evident in customary 
family practices.  
1.  Importance of the Family in Society 
The concept of the family is an important element of the way by which society is 
configured. For Grotius, affinity with the family unit results in the creation of a type of 
social human nature that engenders the rationale of civil and political institutions.5 His 
portrayal of the family is one founded by marriage, where husbands and wives educated 
their children in ways which would be becoming of civil conduct.6 For Althusius, the 
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family “is rightly called the most intense society, friendship, relationship, and union, the 
seedbed of every other symbiotic association.” 7  By way of Althusius’s analysis of 
symbiotic association, there is the suggestion of quite a seminal role for the family, which 
Walters further describes: 
Human life and lives are formed within a series of overlapping symbiotic associations. 
The respective rights of these associations are determined by their inherent natures 
and structures. The family is a simple and private association based upon the natural 
institution of marriage, and is the primary association from which all others 
constituting civil society are derived, because of the mutual affection and assistance 
it affords……Families consist of conjugal and kinship associations, the former 
encompassing a covenant between wife and husband, the latter entailing the education 
of children. What is perhaps Althusius’s most perceptive contribution to social and 
political thought is his insistence that the family is a political rather than economic 
institution, for no other private or public association can be ordered properly in its 
absence. Consequently, household governance is foundational to just social and 
political ordering: well-ordered families are a prerequisite for preserving a right social 
and political order, because all symbiotic association is essentially, authentically, and 
generically political. But not every symbiotic association is public. Rather, private 
associations, such as families, are the seedbeds of public association and as such are 
political in nature.8 
Essentially both Grotius and Althusius establish a direct link between the family 
and the social and political order, with the existence of this link serving as evidence of a 
relationship enabled by the law of nature and by a natural right of association. 9 
Alternatively, the argument exists that civil rights are not grounded in natural rights, but 
instead exist because of the consent of parties to a social contract.10 The effect of this is 
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9 Ibid, 66. 
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to discredit the notion of an organic society created by the polarity of human associations 
when the public and private domains are juxtaposed. Instead, the distinction is that in the 
private sphere, such as in the realm of the family, inalienable rights exist and operate only 
by those persons possessing them within that realm, whereas in the public sphere, 
inalienable rights can either be assigned or surrendered by instance of the general will of 
the public. Accordingly, contractarians such as Hobbes describe the family as a “little 
monarchy”11 while Locke, although appealing to a divine ordinance which instructed 
parents to care for their children, concluded that no conclusions of larger political 
implications could be drawn from this relationship.12 
 Yet, even where the inalienable rights of the private domain are separated 
from the inalienable rights of the public domain, there is arguably still association 
between both domains when it is considered that each person within the private sphere 
possesses the birth right which enables a claim to affinity and association with the public 
realm, either apart or congruous with the private domain of the family, with the family 
being the medium by which that person biologically comes into existence. As such, a 
relationship between the nation and the family is suggested by Kant to be connected, in 
that familial affinity and national affinity are equivalent, with the possibility of national 
affinity being greater, since both are established at the time of birth. Accordingly, Kant 
states: 
The human beings who make up a nation can, as natives of the country be represented 
as analogous to descendants from a common ancestry (congeniti) even if this is not in 
fact the case. But in an intellectual sense or for the purpose of right, they can be 
thought of as offspring of a common mother (the republic), constituting, as it were, a 
single family (gens natio) whose members (the citizens) are all equal by birth.13 
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In a sense, Kant’s discourse suggests that there is something resembling a bond 
of obligation between the individuals comprising the family within the private sphere, 
and the larger social contract with the nation of the public sphere. Such a relationship 
makes it imperative that the rule of law is able to allow for congruity across both the 
private and public realm so as to facilitate the portability and recognition of those rights 
established in the private realm into the public realm, if it means that the recognition of 
those private rights actually encourage the fostering of the Republic. In the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, the historical conflict has been between private norms 
brought about by traditional beliefs and practices and public norms largely dictated by 
the formal law. This conflict is no different when it comes to considering the interplay 
between the legal system and the family. It would follow that the way in which the family 
is defined within the Commonwealth Caribbean and by its legal systems needs to be 
considered.  
2.  Defining ‘Family Law’ in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
The concept of the ‘family’ in the Commonwealth Caribbean does not bear a 
straightforward definition in alignment with the common notion of the nuclear family 
consisting a father, mother and children. Family law received from English common law 
into the Commonwealth Caribbean countries has been broadly accepted to be law which 
views the family unit from the perspective of being a nuclear family defined by marriage 
and shared residence. This of course does not recognise the West Indian reality. Keith 
Patchett for instance has argued that the English legal system which was transplanted to 
its colonies makes no concessions to the Afro-Caribbean family structure and that this 
system insists upon principles out of touch with social facts and customarily ignored.14  
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The generally accepted starting point for the definition of Afro-Caribbean family 
structures is the work of British Welfare Adviser Thomas Spensley Simey whose 1946 
publication titled Welfare and Planning in the West Indies 15  considered the family 
composition of 270 Jamaican families. Simey’s classification suggests a four-fold 
approach to defining West Indian family patterns, of which include (i) the Christian 
family defined by patriarchal domestic units based on legal Christian marriage; (ii) 
faithful concubinage which is a patriarchal domestic unit built on a union which is neither 
religiously nor legally sanctioned; (iii) the maternal or grandmother family, which would 
describe female headed households of women, children and grandchildren; and (iv) 
cohabitating unions of less than three years duration, which are also classed as ‘visiting 
relationships.’16 Unlike English common law, the concept of the traditional Christian 
marriage and legal rights originating from such a union is somewhat inconsistent with the 
West Indian reality in the sphere of cohabitational relationships and non-marriage unions. 
According to Michael Garfield Smith in West Indian Family Structure: 
The persistence of high illegitimacy rates, unstable unions, and anomalous forms of 
domestic groups in the West Indies are all due to the same conditions. These 
conditions had their historical origin in slavery, especially the mating organization of 
slaves. West Indian slaves were not allowed to marry but they were free to cohabit 
consensually or to mate extra-residentially as they pleased.17 
Expanding the scholarship of Smith, Welstead and Edwards have observed that 
the Afro-Caribbean family in terms of its often matriarchal structure is a product of the 
experience of slavery as grandmothers and mothers were left to take care of children when 
men were forcibly removed from the family. 18  Marriage of slaves held no legal 
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recognition and traditional marriages were also therefore not given any credence. 
Welstead and Edwards argue that this reality gave rise to a legacy whereby grandmothers 
adopt the central role of the parent in a matriarchal structure, whereas fatherhood for many 
Afro-Caribbean males is a role which is transitory. Similarly, Williams has also written 
that “the insignificance of family connection was consistently achieved through the 
suppression of any image of blacks as capable either of being part of the family of white 
men or having family of their own.”19 
In contrast to the family customs originating from slavery and post-slavery society 
amongst the Afro-Caribbean group are the practices of the East Indian immigrants who 
settled across the British West Indies during, and after the British indentured labour 
schemes. Following the Afro-Caribbean group, the Indo-Caribbean genus is the second 
largest cultural group in the Commonwealth Caribbean, with East Indians comprising 
over 40 percent of the populations of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago.20 The Indo-
Caribbean family structure is often regarded as one of an extended family domiciled 
together through the male lineage and under the authority of the eldest male, thereby being 
patriarchal and male dominant. This tradition is comprehensively explained by Barry 
Chevannes, who writes: 
The marriage ceremony, presided over by the Pandit (Hindu Priest), takes place at the 
home of the bride. Thereafter, the couple goes to live in the home of the groom's 
father, where they and their children come under his authority. In time, a couple will 
go off to live by themselves, but will retain some form of recognition of the principle 
of jointness, for example by working together with the rest of the extended family in 
the rice paddy, as commonly happens in Guyana, or returning to the family home on 
occasion to worship together....[When the eldest male dies] his authority passes to his 
eldest son, on whom falls the obligation of observing certain mortuary rites. Should a 
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family be so unfortunate as not to have a son, a male relative is called upon to carry 
out this duty.21  
In defining and understanding the family structures of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, it is suggested that the real value for the legal system is to take the approach 
of considering what a family does, as opposed to what a family is. By this function-based 
approach, the law would look at defining what ought to be the functions of a family, for 
instance roles such as providing care and security for its members, providing financially 
and raising and socialising children.22 For example the traditional practice of the family 




The term ‘family land’ describes land which is accepted by the family as being 
the property of successive generations of the family. The tradition of establishing family 
land in the Commonwealth Caribbean has been attributed to being developed following 
the emancipation of slaves and as a continuation of customary land tenure based on West 
African practices, which was the region where most of the former slaves would find their 
ancestral heritage. 23  This arrangement has also been attributed to extended families 
combining their resources to be able to afford land following slavery, with the result being 
that the land acquired was regarded as belonging to the family and future generations.24 
This practice was a common response to the restrictive land acquisition policies adopted 
by the colonial island governments following emancipation, with the intention being to 
tie the former slaves to the plantations in order to have ready access to a labour supply 
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for the plantation. By the custom of family land, the land is not solely owned by the 
present family members in a formal legal sense. In applying formal law, the land is instead 
held in indivision by its present occupiers, so that a legal co-ownership or by common 
law, a tenancy in common is created. Formal law would therefore bestow unto the owners 
an extensive range of property rights such as the right to convey title to the property by 
sale, as well as rights to individual family members to be able to sell one’s share in the 
land to another family member or someone outside of the family as well as to pronounce 
a heir to one's share by will. The spirit of the customary system of family land however 
frowns upon family members deciding to resort to formal law, as this would act against 
the purpose of family land as regarded by tradition and custom. 
The notion of family land appears to be a customary practice which indicates the 
formidability of informal law based on historical and traditional experiences in a family 
law context. Its existence may be as a result of a collective belief to keep the land amongst 
the members of the family. Evidence of this strength was observed in St. Lucia by Jane 
Matthews Glenn who has written: 
The inalienability of family land became a concern in the neo-liberal 1980's, and a 
1984 reform package provided that one or more family members could be registered 
on title as trustees having the authority to sell or mortgage the property on behalf of 
all family members. However, little use has been made of this possibility, illustrating 
the strength of the informal law.25  
The importance of keeping the land amongst the family is exemplified by the 
practice in St. Lucia where whilst some family members reside on the family land, those 
who have left the land have the right to return to the land if they wish to do so. This is 
readily accepted by those family members residing on the land, especially where the 
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returning family member is in a situation of financial need, thereby giving meaning to the 
land as being able to provide an economic and social safety net.26 
The way in which the Commonwealth Caribbean family is defined, or at least 
understood by the legal system is therefore an important fundamental for allowing the 
law to evolve into rules which are dynamic enough to recognise and be adaptable in 
understanding different family practices. The next section will consider how the 
jurisprudence in the Commonwealth Caribbean has developed in terms of the aforesaid.  
3.  Early conflicts and evolution of the jurisprudence 
Generally, the three most important features of law in a legal system according to 
legal scholar Joseph Raz is that it ought to be normative, institutionalized and coercive. 
According to Raz, “It is normative in that it serves, and is meant to serve, as a guide for 
human behaviour. It is institutionalized in that its application and modification are to a 
large extent performed or regulated by institutions. And it is coercive in that obedience 
to it, and its application, is internally guaranteed, ultimately, by the use of force.”27 To 
place the notion of ‘family law’ into a court system, the imperative should also be that 
this system is able to display the features of being normative, institutionalized and 
coercive. The challenge however is crafting a Commonwealth Caribbean normative 
which can neglect irrelevant external influences brought about from the region’s early 
historical legal development as well as building those institutions which are responsible 
for adjudication with the capacity to be adaptable in its understanding of what the family 
is in a Commonwealth Caribbean context. The approaches to confronting these challenges 
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will now be considered in terms of the evolution of family law jurisprudence in the region 
and the institutional development of specialized family and juvenile courts. 
 
(i)  Matrimonial Rules 
Special legislation to protect religious forms of marriage amongst the Indo-
Caribbean population had historically been met with problems as a result of conflict with 
English principles. One particular area which led to calamitous results was the inflexible 
application of English matrimonial rules, was seen in Henry v Henry 28 , a decision 
originating from the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal. In this case, the Court of 
Appeal considered an appeal of a husband who was ordered by the Magistrate's Court by 
virtue of the Separation and Maintenance Ordinance29 to pay maintenance for wilful 
neglect of his wife. The couple had been lawfully married in accordance with the 
provisions of the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Ordinance30. At the appeal 
hearing, counsel for the husband submitted that Islamic law did not form part of the 
colony and was highly repugnant to local matrimony law because it may give rise to 
polygamy, while the court also received evidence from an expert witness in Islamic law 
and custom who indicated that Muslim marriages may be polygamous.31 Bearing this in 
mind, the Court of Appeal held that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to make the order 
for maintenance as the wife was not entitled to any remedy 32 . The court therefore 
indicated that only a marriage that is monogamous in the Christian sense of the term may 
entitle the parties to relief provided by the matrimonial laws of England, by which the 
Trinidad and Tobago laws relating to marriage are based. The court commented that was 
a well-established principle of law that the only kind of marriage that entitled the parties 
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thereto to the remedies, adjudication or relief of the matrimonial law of England is a 
marriage that is monogamous in the Christian sense of the term. 33  Referring to the 
decision in Hyde v Hyde 34 , the court pronounced that marriage as understood in 
Christianity was the voluntary life-long union of one man and one woman, to the 
exclusion of all others.35  
In Mohamed v Mohamed 36 , another decision originating from Trinidad and 
Tobago, the court again considered an application by a wife whose marriage was 
registered under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Ordinance 37  for a 
maintenance order against the husband. The court did not depart from its position in 
Henry and held that the wife was not entitled to any remedy, adjudication and relief which 
would be afforded to monogamous relationships by Christian definition, despite being in 
a marriage legally recognised by the laws of Trinidad and Tobago.38 However, the court 
held that she would be able to make a claim for maintenance for their children who the 
court considered as being legitimate39 by virtue of the said Muslim Marriage and Divorce 
Registration Ordinance.40  
Contrasting with the decisions arising out of judicial consideration of the Muslim 
Marriage and Divorce Registration Ordinance41 is that of the court’s position with regard 
to Hindu marriages. Whereas the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration 
Ordinance42 provided for the registration of Muslim marriages and divorces, a significant 
difference was that the Hindu Marriage Ordinance43 stated that a marriage solemnised 
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between persons of the Hindu faith would be valid as if it had been solemnised in 
conformity with the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance44, which was the Ordinance 
that applied to the marriage of persons who followed the Christian faith. This notion was 
considered in Maharaj v Maharaj45, where the issue to be considered was whether the 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to grant a divorce for a marriage registered under the 
Hindu Marriage Ordinance, and therefore whether a Hindu marriage would be able to 
receive any form of judicial remedy or relief. The court held that while Muslim marriages 
were limited under the scope of the Muslim Marriage Ordinance, Hindu marriages were 
not.46 The court commented that in England, Hindu marriages could be polygamous and 
therefore not judicially recognised for the purpose of relief, but in Trinidad and Tobago, 
Hindu marriages were monogamous.47 
An attempt to address the inequitable position in the treatment of Muslim 
marriages took the form of an amendment to the Muslim Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance48, with a section inserted to provide that marriages effected or contracted under 
this Ordinance shall be as valid as if it had been solemnised or contracted in conformity 
with the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance.49 However, no additional amendment 
was made to the effect of the law recognising polygamous marriage. The court in Rafique 
v Rafique50 equated the law of the land as being akin to Christian custom and observed 
that “although the Moslem religion may approve and exalt to equality as wives women 
other than the wife of a valid monogamous marriage, the status of such women in the eyes 
of the law of the land would be no different from that of paramours whose existence is 
condemned by the Christian religion.”51 
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Interestingly, although English matrimonial law was the dominant law across the 
former English colonies in the Caribbean, Guyana maintained the Roman-Dutch notion 
of malicious desertion arising from pre-meditated thought. In Siebs v Siebs52, the Guyana 
Court of Appeal considered the English doctrine of constructive desertion and indicated 
that there was no difference in the state of mind which would give rise to the Roman-
Dutch doctrine of malicious desertion when compared to constructive desertion. 
Accordingly, the judge commented: 
For my part, I can find no difference between the state of mind required to found 
malicious desertion, and that which must exist in the spouse whose conduct leads the 
other spouse to depart from the matrimonial home. The object is the same, the mode 
of achieving that object is different.53 
The Guyana High Court also displayed a flexible approach in its judgment in 
Rahieman v Hack54 where it considered a property dispute between a couple who had not 
registered their marriage although they had been married by Islamic law. The court sought 
to apply equitable principles to provide the female with property rights, while recognising 
that the union was of “some permanence and flows from a marriage in accordance with 
their religion” while commenting that culturally and by way of life of many Guyanese 
citizens, “many persons who are married according to their religion appear not to be 
interested in registering their marriages accordingly.” The decision was subsequently 
upheld by the Guyana Court of Appeal.55 
 
 (ii) Paternity 
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In F v M56 it was held that  in determining paternity, the guiding principle was that 
the best evidence, which is scientific evidence in the form of a DNA test, should be 
obtained to arrive at the truth as to paternity. In this matter, the Barbados Court of Appeal 
appeared guided by the principle established by the English courts which recognised that 
paternity ought to be properly established by science and not by legal presumption or 
anecdotal evidence.57 The court also noted that importance of DNA evidence as the best 
scientific evidence to determine paternity had also been accepted by courts 
internationally, including the European Court of Human Rights.58 Having considered the 
position in the United Kingdom and Europe, the court agreed that reliance was 
increasingly being placed on scientific evidence in proceedings in which the issue of 
parentage arose and that where paternity was disputed, the presumption that a person was 
the father based on the registration on the birth certificate would often in practice merely 
determine the burden of proof.59 In such circumstance, the court therefore observed that 
scientific paternity testing would prevent the need to resort to presumptions.  
Quite interestingly in this matter, the non-scientific evidence surrounding the 
conception and registration of the birth of the child had been weighted heavily in favour 
of the appellant being the father of the child but the DNA evidence had stated that the 
appellant could not be the genetic father of the child. The court agreed that DNA evidence 
was generally conclusive evidence of paternity but the manner of obtaining the samples 
and the procedures for carrying out the tests had to be such that they were beyond reproach 
and not subject to challenge.60 Under existing law, the court had no authority to order that 
samples be provided for a DNA test, but advised parties that the issue of paternity should 
be resolved by a new DNA test, to be properly conducted as agreed by the representatives 
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of both parties to the trial, and as approved by the court.61 Consequently, the court advised 
that with the consent of both parties, it would make an order that samples be taken and a 
fresh DNA test be carried out, and following the results, it would be determined whether 
the existing paternity and maintenance order be set aside.62 
 
(iii) Presumption of Advancement and ‘Illegitimate Children ’ 
In Re Harper (deceased); Brathwaite v Harper63 the High Court of Barbados 
considered the principle of advancement which is an equitable principle whereby in a 
situation where a man transfers money to his wife or child or a person to whom he stands 
in loco parentis, he is presumed to have made an advancement to the other person. In 
such situations there is a clash of presumptions in that the presumption of a resulting trust 
is rebutted by the presumption of advancement, in the event that the transferor intended 
to advance the item as a gift by reason of a special familial relationship. This concept 
resulted to the court raising the issue of how to treat with children born out of wedlock in 
relation to the principle of advancement. The court noted that it had been held in previous 
cases and stated by English textbook writers that ‘child’ means ‘legitimate child’ but the 
presumption of advancement would still operate in a situation where a father stood in loco 
parentis to his ‘illegitimate’ child.64 The court held that in the context of Barbadian 
society where a majority of children are born out of wedlock, it would be incompatible 
with social reality to adopt a narrow interpretation of ‘child’ and instead a liberal, 
purposive interpretation was required.65 Quite progressively, the Barbados court adopted 
the position that a court cannot ignore social phenomena at work within its jurisdiction.66 
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Quoting the Annual Reports of the Registrar of the Barbados Supreme Court for the 
period 1970 to 1980, the court indicated that that 72% of children born in that period were 
born out of wedlock.67 In light of these reasons, the court went on to hold that the 
presumption of advancement applies to all children in Barbados, whether born in or out 
of marriage. Sir David Simmons CJ further justified his decision by stating: 
Of course, I am fortified in this view by two examples of sociological jurisprudence 
enacted as legislation in the early 1980s to improve the status of women and 
ameliorate the status of children born out of wedlock. The Family Law Act, Cap 214 
expressly recognises unions other than marriage and equates the status of such unions 
with marriage if certain preconditions are satisfied. So that, broadly, children of such 
unions are treated in the same way as children of a marriage. The enactment of the 
Status of Children Reform Act, Cap 220 abolished the status of illegitimacy and 
mandated that, after 1 January 1980, all children are of equal status.68 
 
(iv) The Barbados Family Law Act and the Presumption of equal division when 
awarding ancillary relief 
A move away from the commonplace use of English law was indicated in 
Proverbs v Proverbs,69 a case originating from the jurisdiction of Barbados. In this case, 
the Barbados Court of Appeal held that in view of the similarity of the family law 
legislation in Australia and Barbados, Australian precedents should be followed and that 
English case law as a general rule should not be relied upon in applications to the court 
for an alteration of interests in property. The Barbados Family Law Act70 takes as its 
model the 1975 Family Law Act of Australia71, with the long title of the Act explaining 
its intention of reforming the law relating to the dissolution and nullity of marriage, 
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judicial separation and restitution of conjugal rights and to certain other related matters, 
as well as providing for counselling with a view to facilitate reconciliation in matrimonial 
causes and, in relation thereto and for matters connected with the parental rights and the 
custody and guardianship of children. According to the court in Proverbs, there was no 
doubt that the act had radically and fundamentally transformed family law in Barbados, 
eliminating in its wake many traditional concepts, notions and practices. For example, 
divorce based on the concept of a matrimonial offence and the attribution of fault to a 
party “had now been consigned to the pages of legal history.”72 The sole ground for 
dissolution of marriage was now irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Furthermore, 
the court noted that gender imbalance in family law had been replaced by an all-pervasive 
statutory philosophy of gender neutrality and the sociological reality of unions other than 
marriage, popularly called ‘common-law marriages’ was now firmly recognised and 
entrenched in the law of Barbados.73 
The Court then went on to consider that a fundamental aspect of the several 
reforms introduced by the Barbados family legislation was the establishment of a regime 
for the exercise of judicial discretion as it relates to the division of the property of the 
parties to a marriage or union other than marriage.74 The court observed that it was now 
empowered to alter the interests of parties in such property by the application of an 
equitable discretion, guided by specific statutory criteria. On this basis, the court then 
went on to consider the applicability of precedents and whether seeking guidance from 
English cases would be helpful in determining applications under section 57 of the Act 
which gives the court the authority to make an order to alter the interests of the parties in 
the property, such as an order for a settlement of property in substitution for any interest 
in the property or an order requiring either or both of the parties to make, for the benefit 
                                                 
72 Proverbs (see n. 69, p. 86), 96. 
73 Ibid, 115. 
74 Ibid, 97. 
88 
of either or both of the parties or a child of the marriage or union, such settlement or 
transfer of property as the court determines.75 The court went on to hold that Australian 
precedents should be followed and that English cases should not as a general rule be relied 
upon in applications under section 57, although they might be relevant and useful on 
applications under section 56, which addresses the jurisdiction of the court to make 
declarations as to title or interest in property.76 The court showed its inclination to follow 
already established local jurisprudence in justifying its decision by stating: 
This decision was arrived at by considering that two previous Chief Justices, Sir 
William Douglas and Sir Denys Williams, have followed the Australian precedents 
and we see no reason to depart from the view of those distinguished and learned 
judges; see Franklin v Franklin (unreported), Bartlett v Bartlett (unreported), and 
Moseley v Moseley (1986) 21 Barbados LR 14. A little more than a year after the 
commencement of the Family Law Act, Sir William Douglas CJ offered sage words 
of advice in Franklin. He observed: “In dealing with cases under the Family Law Act, 
English cases can provide little guidance because the Act closely follows Australian 
legislation which represents a new departure requiring a different approach from that 
required by the repealed Matrimonial Causes Act.” 77 
The court also acknowledged that House of Lords cases such as White v White78 
referred to leading Australian cases by way of an examination and comparison of the 
historical approaches under English and Australian legislation with regard to determining 
whether there was any legal presumption of equal division when awarding ancillary relief.  
The Barbados court however held that this approach by the House of Lords was as a result 
of that court grappling with the presumption, and moreso because it had strenuously held 
that in property settlement matters the starting point was equality of division, which was 
a view adopted by Australia in the early days of their Family Law Act but was eventually 
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firmly rejected by the High Court of Australia in several cases where it was confirmed 
that there is no presumption of equal division.79 
4.  Family Courts and Juvenile Trials 
Ideally, the widely accepted model of a family court in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean follows the British ideology of a ‘user friendly’ court with the characteristics 
of being able to protect members of a family from physical, emotional or economic harm; 
to assist families which have broken down with adjusting to their new lives after being 
separated; and to encourage and support family life.80 From the perspective of national 
family policy, it should be important to recognise that a family court system ought to have 
the responsibility to help families at the stage prior to problems developing to the extent 
which would lead to irretrievable breakdown of the family unit. Such a system would 
therefore focus on prevention through guidance and counselling, and therefore would 
have a multi-disciplinary approach by merging social and legal services into its functions, 
with the objectives of this approach being the protection of the welfare of family members 
and by extension the prevention of the dissolution of the family. The Chief Magistrate of 
St. Vincent and the Magistrate for the Family Court has also expressed the opinion that 
legal aid should be available even for family court and divorce matters as many couples 
do not consider divorce and continue to live together because they cannot financially 
afford a divorce.81 It appears as though no common regional stance has been taken at 
CARICOM level regarding the necessity to create family courts across the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. The Chief Justice of Barbados for instance has stated that 
because of that country being a small jurisdiction, not enough family-related matters 
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reached the ordinary courts and therefore it would be difficult to justify the creation of a 
specialized family court.82 This position contrasts to that adopted by St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, another small jurisdiction which has established a family court.  
The first family court to be established in the Commonwealth Caribbean region 
was in Jamaica following the passing of the Judicature (Family Court) Act.83 This act 
provided for a specialized court with jurisdiction over all legal proceedings which 
concerned family life, other than divorce proceedings. More recently, a 2004 pilot project 
to set up a family court in Trinidad and Tobago resulted in the permanent establishment 
of a specialized family court in 2011. The Trinidad and Tobago model arguably sets the 
standard for other jurisdictions in the region which hope to establish a family court. The 
court was not established by any legislation, but instead is somewhat of a unified court in 
which judges from the High Court as well as magistrates adjudicate on family related 
matters. Other than judicial adjudication, the court provides in-house services of social 
workers, probation officers and mediators. Judges or magistrates have the option of 
referring parties to the proceedings to these services, and in addition, individual members 
of the public also have access to counselling and mediation services without having to 
initiate court proceedings or employing legal counsel. Rules of Court in the form of the 
Family Proceedings Rules (1998)84 has also been established to govern proceedings. A 
recurring theme in these Rules is that emphasis ought to be placed on resolving disputes 
by mediation and agreement wherever possible instead of resorting to litigation. The 
Rules provide that the Court has jurisdiction to take all practicable steps to encourage the 
parties to reach agreement on any disputed matters and, in particular, may refer the parties 
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to mediation.85 Importantly Rule 14.186 provides that the Court has the ability to actively 
manage cases on a wide range of issues including encouraging the parties to use the most 
appropriate form of dispute resolution including mediation, if the court considers that 
appropriate and by facilitating the use of such procedures in addition to encouraging the 
parties to cooperate with each other as to the parenting of any children and in the conduct 
of proceedings. Authority is also given by the Mediation Act 200487 to the judge or 
magistrate to refer parties to mediation by a certified mediator in any family matter other 
than a criminal matter. Furthermore, under the Family Proceedings Act 200488, a court 
may refer a matter or any aspect of the matter to mediation or to the unit responsible for 
social services in the court, or to a qualified professional. The court has also attempted to 
construct a user friendly environment and one which does not convey the image of an 
institution of adversarial nature. Instead, the ambience of the building is one which aims 
to produce a relaxing effect contrary to the general apprehensions associated with a court 
room. This is well described by former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, Michael de 
la Bastide, who has written: 
In the first place, the interior design, décor and furniture of the building have been 
selected with a view to producing a soothing and relaxing effect. Three pastel colours 
are used throughout the building. The waiting area outside the hearing-rooms on the 
first floor has the ambiance of a garden. There is a profusion of tropical plants in 
planters and seating accommodation is provided by garden benches. The third floor 
on which the social workers, mediators and probation officers are located, is 
particularly light and airy with lots of sunlight entering through large windows and 
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French doors. Indeed there is very little in the building to suggest to the lay users of 
the Court any resemblance to the court-houses with which they would be familiar.89 
Likewise, in Jamaica, the family court is located separately from other courts, 
waiting rooms are equipped with infant beds and provisions are also made for courts to 
be conducted in areas other than the ordinary court rooms. Like the Trinidad and Tobago 
Family Court, persons may engage the court services before deciding on litigation. 
Various support services which the family court and the public have access to as part of 
the court’s operations include the Child Care and Protection Division of the Government, 
the Adoption Board, the Probation Department, Family and Marriage Counselling 
Departments and the Legal Aid Clinic. Belize also has a commendable model, whereby 
under the Belize Family Courts Act90, a person who is appointed as a judge in the family 
court would be deemed to be suitable to deal with family matters by reason of his training, 
experience and disposition.91  
At present, the Commonwealth Caribbean territories which have functional family 
courts are Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia and 
Belize. However, there is currently no regional study which collectively assesses the 
success and experiences of those territories which have established family courts. This 
situation has been well summed up by Antoine, who writes: 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the family courts in the region are functioning well 
and obtaining their objectives. One could argue that the Jamaican court has learnt 
from the mistakes of its counterparts in other jurisdictions, such as Canada, the USA 
and the UK. There, it was believed that the low status and priority accorded to such 
courts undermined their effectiveness. Hence, the Jamaican court has been afforded a 
high enough status and power for it to function effectively and gain respect. But, in 
St Lucia and St. Vincent, the status of the court is that of an inferior court. Note too 
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that in St Lucia, aspects of family law are contained in the Civil Code, as a result of 
St. Lucia’s civil law influences. However, staffing and proper facilities appear to be 
problematic. Further the concept of ‘specialised’ tends to have the disadvantage that 
it creates connotations of an extra-legal character. The Family court has suffered 
somewhat from this stigma. Its sphere of reference, the socio-economic unit of the 
family, tends to exacerbate the image. In St. Lucia, there are already complaints that 
attorneys do not take the court seriously.92 
 
Juvenile Trials 
Across the Commonwealth Caribbean, the procedure following the arrest of a 
juvenile as well as punishment is different from that of an adult offender. The statutory 
definition of a juvenile in Antigua, Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Vincent refers to persons 
under the age of 16 and includes both a ‘child’ and ‘young person.’93 In other territories 
such as the Bahamas, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago, a juvenile 
is defined by law as a person under the age of 18, while in Guyana and Jamaica, a juvenile 
is classified as a person under the age of 17.94 In Grenada, although there is no specific 
act addressing juvenile justice, section 84 of the Grenada Criminal Procedure Code 
defines a ‘child’ as being under the age of 14 years, while a young person is 14 to under 
16, 17 or 18 as the case may be.95 The age of criminal responsibility also varies across 
the Commonwealth Caribbean, with countries such as Barbados, Grenada and Trinidad 
and Tobago maintaining the common law position of seven years, whereas in Guyana it 
is 10 years, and St. Lucia and Jamaica it is 12 years.96 
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The provisions which address the handling of juveniles following arrest are 
generally similar across the region.97 An arrested juvenile is detained separately from 
adults and is prevented from interacting with adult prisoners. Juveniles arrested for 
offences which do not involve homicide and who cannot be immediately be brought 
before the court is required to be released in the care of his parent or guardian unless this 
is contrary to the interest of justice. In the event that the juvenile is not released on bail, 
he his remanded in a children’s home or a detention place for youth offenders, but not in 
a prison.98 The parent or guardian of a juvenile who has been arrested and charged is also 
required to attend court. Juveniles are tried in a juvenile court, with the law in some 
jurisdictions prohibiting juvenile courts from being held in the regular magistrates’ court 
buildings.99 Hearings are held in camera, and the reporting of proceedings as well as the 
names of the offender and victim is not publicised. Generally, the trial procedure at the 
juvenile court is not as stringent as the regular magistrate’s court.100 The parents of the 
juvenile for instance may ask questions of the witnesses, and following the conclusion of 
the prosecution’s case the juvenile is permitted to make a statement instead of giving 
evidence on oath. The court generally also relaxes rules of evidence with the intention of 
making the proceedings less adversarial.  
A child who is found guilty of an offence is not imprisoned, but is instead sent to 
a training school or a place of detention for a period not exceeding three years. A young 
person who is convicted of a criminal offence may generally be imprisoned, but usually 
for a period no more than three months as determined by statute.101 Other than custodial 
sentences, the court may instead chose to appoint a probation officer to supervise the 
offender for up to three years; discharge the offender where he enters in to a recognisance 
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for good behaviour; commit the offender to the care of a fit person; send the offender to 
an industrial school; order the parent or guardian to give security for the good behaviour 
of the child or order the offender or the parent or guardian to pay a fine.102 The court 
would consider the nature of the offence, the age of the offender and the interests of justice 
in determining the punishment for the juvenile.103 
5.  Effects of International and CARICOM Law on regional conditions 
Looking towards the future development of family law, this section will consider 
how Commonwealth Caribbean legal norms may be positively influenced by international 
and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) laws.  
 
(i)  The Convention on the Rights of the Child and its impact on the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. 
International law in the form of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC)104 has placed the onus on Commonwealth Caribbean governments to 
adopt and adapt to human rights progress in the arena of the law relating to children in a 
global context. To highlight the importance of this convention in terms of children’s rights 
within the international landscape, according to UNICEF, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) is: 
the result of 10 years of consultations and negotiations between government officials, 
lawyers, health care professionals, social workers, educators, children's support 
groups, non-governmental organizations and religious groups from around the world. 
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More countries have ratified the convention than any other human rights treaty in 
history.105 
All Caribbean jurisdictions are parties to the CRC. Commonwealth Caribbean 
states have generally taken the stance that the CRC is not justicable before national courts 
as a result of the Common Law position that a treaty does not form part of domestic law 
unless it is incorporated into domestic law by legislation. Where states have signed the 
CRC, the expectation is that they are required to align existing laws with the provisions 
of the CRC. Yet, the importance of the applicability of the CRC principles to the 
Commonwealth Caribbean was evident in Naidike & Ors v. Attorney General of Trinidad 
and Tobago106, where the Privy Council based its decision on Article 3.1 of the CRC 
which states that in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, court of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration. It was from this 
perspective that the Privy Council in Naidike ruled that an immigration decision to deport 
a parent who did not possess a work permit had to be balanced against the impact upon 
family members as required under Articles 3 and 9 of the CRC, as well as the notion of 
respect for family life as expressed by s 4(1) of the Constitution of Trinidad and 
Tobago.107 
The various Commonwealth Caribbean governments which have ratified the CRC 
have in effect declared their interest in promoting and protecting the rights of children, 
despite the fact that express provisions of the convention generally are yet to form part of 
their domestic laws. However, Commonwealth Caribbean countries are internationally 
obliged to implement the legislative and administrative measures which are needed to 
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give effect to the provisions of the CRC within the respective territories. The process of 
ratification involves a widespread review process, as explained by UNICEF: 
When countries ratify the convention, they agree to review their laws relating to 
children. This involves assessing their social services, legal health and educational 
systems, as well as levels of funding for these services. Governments are then obliged 
to take all necessary steps to ensure that the minimum standards set by the convention 
in these areas are being met. In some instances this may involve changing existing 
laws or creating new ones. Such legislative changes are not imposed from the outside, 
but come about through the same process by which any law is created or reformed 
within a country.108 
A UNICEF Report Entitled “The Convention on the Rights of the Child Fifteen 
Years Later - The Caribbean”109  has been extremely critical of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean governments who have ratified the convention, but are yet to put sufficient 
measures in place to see to its incorporation into domestic law. The report observed that 
although countries in the Caribbean have significantly advanced in their recognition of 
the human rights of children, some children continue to frequently suffer violence, 
abandonment, abuse, mistreatment and exploitation.110 The report cited occurrences such 
as the transformation of family structures, migration, reduction of social investment, 
unfair trading agreements and the fragility of new forms of jobs has having severe 
repercussions on the lives of children.111 UNICEF has also argued that the relevance of 
the CRC in Commonwealth Caribbean countries should be reconsidered in light of its 
status in international law to the effect that treaty law and customary law are overlapping 
areas of law, and not mutually exclusive categories112. Consequently, a norm or principle 
may have the effect of being recognized by both treaty law and customary law. Therefore, 
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it is arguable that ratification of the CRC by the majority of states forming the 
international community provides compelling evidence to suggest that it has become 
customary international law. Despite the treaty provisions of the CRC generally not being 
incorporated into domestic law in the Commonwealth Caribbean, customary international 
law forms part of the common law, and therefore can be applied by the courts once 
application is not incompatible with any act of parliament. 
Although Trinidad and Tobago has ratified the United Nations Convention to 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)113, and the CRC, it was 
reported in 2013 that the Government had not sent in the obligatory reports to the UN 
since 1990.114 Professor Cees Flinterman, member of the UN Human Rights Committee 
speaking at a seminar on ‘Human Rights, Women and Children’ held at the Caribbean 
Council of Legal Education, Hugh Wooding Law School in Trinidad commented, “Once 
that state accepted the provision, it is expected to hold them accountable. Children and 
Women’s rights conventions are protected under instruments. These states are expected 
to submit regular reports every four years. They are expected and obliged to submit a 
report on what they have done to the committees.”115 Professor Rhoda Reddock, professor 
of Gender, Social Change and Development from the University of the West Indies 
(UWI) and former head of the Institute of Gender and Development Studies (IGDS) at 
UWI, listed the Marriage Act116  which allowed for the marriage of minors, and the 
inability of a National Gender Policy to be established were two of the major issues that 
affected women and children. The Trinidad and Tobago Parliament has however since 
passed the Miscellaneous Provisions (Marriage) Act No. 8 of 2017 which served as an 
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Act to amend the Marriage Act, Chap. 45:01, the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, 
Chap. 45:2, the Hindu Marriage Act, Chap. 45:3, the Orisa Marriage Act, Chap. 45:4 and 
the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, Chap. 45:51, by raising the legal age of 
marriage to 18, effectively outlawing child marriage. 
Quite disturbingly, reports have pointed to the widespread prevalence of violence 
directed against children across the region.117 A statement issued by the CARICOM 
Secretariat in 2012 echoed its growing concern about the alarming levels of violence 
against young children. The statement referred to a 2003 World Bank’s Caribbean Youth 
Development Report which noted that the Caribbean had the earliest age of sexual 
“debut” in the world with many young persons demonstrating early sexual behaviour as 
a consequence of child abuse from as early as 10 years old, and in some cases even 
earlier.118 More recently, a 2009 UNICEF study on child sexual abuse in the Eastern 
Caribbean indicated that this problem was escalating in the region and identified 
emerging forms of abuse such as the use of young boys in an organized network to 
provide sexual services to cruise ship passengers.119 The Secretariat indicated that the 
most disturbing of the findings common to all the studies was that child sexual abuse in 
the region is shrouded in secrecy, aided and abetted by cultural ‘taboos’ and feelings of 
guilt by victims.120 Added to this the Secretariat noted that sexual violence occurred in 
institutions that are perceived as places of safety such as orphanages, detention centres, 
schools, foster homes and family homes.121 Incest and child molestation committed by 
family friends and figures in authority was often deemed private matters, with the victim 
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often being transformed into the villain, triggering irreparable social and psychological 
damage from having to live in silence  
Indeed, a solemn challenge presently facing the region is an inadequate legislative 
framework and a lack of public policy and programmes to protect children and young 
persons from different types of violence. Furthermore, there also exists the challenge of 
the region’s capacity to combat the widespread occurrence of violence against children 
being limited by a lack of information and data collection mechanisms which would 
inform the planning and implementation of effective violence prevention strategies. Also 
of urgent need is the formation of mechanisms to track, monitor and evaluate CARICOM 
Member States in relation to progress made with regard to their commitments and 
programmes addressing children and youths.  
 
(ii)  Gender based violence and gender equality  
There exists several treaties acceded to by Commonwealth Caribbean states which 
address gender based violence and gender equality The principle of equality of men and 
women is recognised by the Charter of the United Nations which in its preamble states 
its goal “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person and in the equal rights of men and women.”122 The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)123 was adopted in 
1979 and compels State parties in Article 2 “to condemn discrimination against women 
in all its forms and to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating discrimination against women.” The Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (DEVW)124 as adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993 
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states that violence against women is a violation of human rights and recommends 
strategies to be undertaken by member states to eliminate it. Furthermore, the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (“Convention of Belem do Para”)125 has been ratified by the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Article 1 of this convention states: 
For the purposes of this Convention, violence against women shall be understood as 
any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death, or physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private 
sphere.126  
  Furthermore, Article XII of CARICOM Charter of Civil Society for the 
Caribbean Community127, which is a non-binding, regional human rights declaration, 
urges the promotion of policies and measures aimed at strengthening gender equality. 
This article recognises that women have equal rights with men in the political, civil, 
economic, social and cultural spheres, with such rights including the right to legal 
protection and just and effective remedies against domestic violence, sexual abuse and 
sexual harassment.   
Most Commonwealth Caribbean countries are parties to CEDAW and the 
Convention of Belem do Para. Under these conventions these countries have committed 
to undertake necessary measures within its borders to achieve the full realization of the 
rights outlined in the conventions. Such measures include legislative action to prevent 
and punish acts of violence against women, improving access to justice by establishing 
fair and effective legal procedures for victims and establishing the necessary legal and 
administrative mechanisms to ensure that victims of gender-based violence have access 
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to just and effective remedies.128 Guyana has directly incorporated the provisions of 
CEDAW and the Convention of Belem do Para into its domestic law through a 2003 
constitutional amendment, which guarantees the protection of those rights set out in 
human rights conventions to which that country is a party.129  
A particular area of progressive reform has been in the arena of sexual offences 
and corroboration warnings. In Pivotte (Anthony) v R130, Satrohan Singh JA referred to a 
statement in R v Henry & Manning131 which supports a mandatory warning to the jury 
about corroboration in sexual offences cases. In Henry & Manning, the court took the 
position that human experience shows that girls and women sometimes tell an entirely 
false story which is very easy to fabricate, but extremely difficult to refute.132 The Guyana 
Court of Appeal approved the opinion in Pivotte that sexual neurosis, fantasy, spite or 
refusal to admit consent because of shame are some of the reasons given for why women 
and girls lie.133  This position was again adopted by the Guyana Court of Appeal in 
Williams (Eric) and Dindial Khublall v The State 134  with the court approving the 
summation in R v Stewart135 that children and women hallucinate and tend to make up 
stories, so it became the practice over the years to look for corroboration before 
convicting.136 However, this practice requiring the trial judge to give the jury specific 
direction and warning regarding the evidence of the complainant in sexual offences 
matters to the extent that it would be dangerous to convict on uncorroborated evidence 
was overturned by the Privy Council in R v Gilbert 137  where it was held that the 
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mandatory corroboration warning did not contribute to the fairness of trial neither did it 
aid the reaching of safe verdicts, with the judge having the discretion to determine what 
warning, if any, is appropriate. Although legislating for gender equality appears to either 
be weak or missing from regional domestic legislation as well as Commonwealth 
Caribbean constitutions, in some instances regional courts have been able to consider and 
adopt international practices to advocate gender equality.  For instance in Bank Employees 
Union v Republic Bank Ltd,138 the Trinidad and Tobago Industrial Court considered the 
ILO Conventions and international best practice as related to appropriate workplace 
conduct to pronounce judgment that an individual who had sexually harassed a colleague 
should have been dismissed as his actions were contrary to good industrial relations 
practice. 
 
CARICOM draft legislation on issues affecting women 
 CARICOM has drafted model legislation on issues affecting violence 
against women in the areas of sexual offences 139 , domestic violence 140  and sexual 
harassment141. In the area of sexual offences, the model legislation provides for in camera 
hearings with the effect being to encourage victims to report offences of a sexual nature 
and to attend trials.142 While the legislation provides to the public to be excluded during 
hearings the judge has authority to permit the presence of a member of the public where 
that presence is requested by the complainant or the accused.143 The model legislation 
also places restrictions on the reporting of the identity of the accused or the victim 
following the accused being charged with an offence, except in the instance where the 
                                                 
138 Bank Employees Union v Republic Bank Ltd, [25 March 1996] TT Industrial Court POS TD 17/95. 
139 CARICOM, Model Legislation on Sexual Offences (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 1997). 
140 CARICOM, Model Legislation on Domestic Violence (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 1997). 
141 CARICOM, Model Legislation on Sexual Harassment (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 1997). 
142 CARICOM, Model Legislation on Sexual Offences (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 1997), 
Explanatory note. 
143 Ibid, 21(2). 
104 
victim or the accused makes an application to the court to permit such publication, or after 
the accused has been tried or convicted of the offence.144 Any person who discloses the 
identity of the accused or the complainant may be convicted of an offence and is liable 
on conviction to a fine or imprisonment. 145  The model legislation also restricts the 
adducing of evidence as to the sexual history of the complainant as well as empowers the 
court to prohibit the publication of certain details of the alleged act.146 
The draft model addressing domestic violence has been modelled to similar 
legislation in New Zealand.147  It was prepared on the basis that there is a need for 
legislation to deal specifically with the matter of domestic violence and to provide 
remedies for victims of domestic violence to mitigate its effects.148 The model legislation 
addresses men and women who are or have been married to each other or who are or had 
been living together as man and wife, as well as children, with the child being defined as 
a child of both parties to a marriage, a child of an unmarried couple or a child who has 
been accepted as a member of the family or of the couple’s household. In this area, the 
model legislation provides remedies which include the granting of a protection order149, 
occupation order150 and tenancy order151. The court may make a protection order if it is 
satisfied that the respondent has used or threatened to use violence against or caused 
physical or mental injury to a prescribed person and is likely to do so again; or having 
regard to all circumstances, the order is necessary for the protection of a prescribed person 
and the court, may if it thinks fit, attach a power of arrest to the order.152 An occupation 
order may be granted by the court in the instance that it is satisfied that it is necessary for 
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the protection of the prescribed person or that it is in the best interest of the child. The 
occupation order grants an exclusive right to live in the household residence to the 
prescribed person named in the order. That person is therefore entitled to exclude the 
respondent from the household residence.153 A tenancy order is intended to vest the 
tenancy in the applicant for the order, thereby allowing for the exclusion of the 
respondent.154 However, the applicant would be bound by the terms and conditions of the 
tenancy at the time when the order is made.155 Similar to an occupation order, the tenancy 
order would only be made where the court is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection 
of the applicant or it is in the best interests of a child of the family.156 
However, despite the existence of the CARICOM draft legislation, according to 
Margarette May Macaulay157, the domestic legislative provisions existing across the 
region do not grant protection and redress for victims in keeping with Article 2 of the 
Convention of Belem do Para which states:  
Violence against women includes physical, sexual and psychological violence:  
a. that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal 
relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence 
with the woman, including, among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse; 
b. that occurs in the community and is perpetrated by any person, including rape, 
sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, forced prostitution, kidnapping and 
sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in educational institutions, health or 
any other place; and  
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c. that is perpetrated or condoned by the state or its agents regardless of where it 
occurs.158  
Macaulay views the legislative provisions which exist in the region as falling short 
of these provisions, especially in relation to the restrictive definitions of dwellings as well 
as the non-inclusion of other inter-personal relationships independent of parties sharing 
the same residence, as well as the failure of many countries in the region to enact sexual 
harassment legislation.159  
 
Work of the UN Women Multi-Country Office (Caribbean) 
In support of the DEVW, the UN Women Multi-Country Office (Caribbean) has 
encouraged the development of national action plans to address gender based violence in  
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Grenada, Jamaica and St. Kitts and Nevis and the revision 
to domestic violence laws across region in order to respond to gender based violence.160 
According to the UN Women Multi-Country Office (Caribbean) website, its UN Women 
2014-2017 programming is targeted primarily at prevention initiatives that are 
systematically implemented by national and community partners.161 These initiatives are 
aimed at addressing behaviours shaped by gender norms supporting definitions of 
masculinity and sanctioning the use of aggressive and violent behaviour by men and 
which undermine the agency and self-determination of women. 162  In Jamaica, UN 
Women leads the development and coordination of a joint programme on eradicating 
Gender-Based Violence through the implementation of a national strategic action plan to 
eliminate gender based violence, with focus on establishing protocols, data management 
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and required capacities to implement policies and legislation.163 The Governments of 
Belize, Grenada and Antigua and Barbuda have received grants from the UN Trust Fund 
to End Violence against Women to support implementation of these national action 
plans.164 The Jamaica AIDS Support for Life (JASL) project has also received an NGO 
grant to strengthen the implementation of laws, policies and action plans for “Expanding 
Gains to Decrease and Prevent Violence against Women in the Context of HIV and 
AIDS.”165 Following from an on-going Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
CARICOM and in partnership UNDP Sub-regional Office for Barbados and the OECS, 
UN Women has also supported the development of a Caribbean model of Prevalence 
Surveys on Gender-Based Violence based on a global methodology development by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO).166  
Conclusion 
Defining the Commonwealth Caribbean family is arguably an exercise which 
contributes to the further establishment of a regional identity as a result of its unique 
distinctiveness. Measured against the aim and objective of the thesis, it is suggested that 
regional judicial decisions have indicated that judges are willing to consider local 
conditions and regional as well as international norms in shaping their judgments. This is 
important as it allows the rule of law to be adaptable to localized conditions and 
customary traditions. As discussed, regional judicial decisions have indicated that judges 
are willing to consider local conditions and regional as well as international norms in 
shaping their judgments. The establishment of specialised family courts and juvenile 
courts also demonstrates that states in the region have identified the benefits of fostering 






a court system to address family and juvenile matters that is not entirely based on 
adversarial approaches and punitive justice. However, more work needs to be done in 
terms of integrating international treaty commitments into domestic law, as this would 
not only indicate a willingness to meaningfully follow up in international obligations, but 
also give the judiciary a greater sense of empowerment in the exercise of its functions as 
it relates to upholding international human rights norms in a domestic context.  What is 
evident however is the normative experience of the family which might be constructed 
through interaction with informal institutions and custom is influential in determining the 
behaviour of those individuals in the context of their belonging to a society. As Ehrlich 
states, “…the center of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic 
science, nor in judicial decision, but in society itself.”167 Overall, what the rule of law 
should ensure when it comes to the family is that there is no uneven compromise between 
custom and institutionalized law. Where uneven compromise is the case, there is the threat 
of the courts being undermined as the forum for settling family disputes. Such a scenario 
yet again reminds of the problems associated with incorporating transplanted law into a 
judicial system where there is the intent to resolve social disputes according to fixed 
parameters. 
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CHAPTER III 
ACCESS TO LAND AND TENURE SECURITY  
IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
 
I do not think anybody can say: “this land is mine.” Only God can say: “this is 
mine.” What I want to ask the Minister is: “where is the paper of the government that 
says that [the land] is yours?” His answer is going to be: “first, ‘the law is the law’ and 
second, ‘without law there is no order’ [. . .]” That’s what they will say, but I still want 
to ask this question. 
Indigenous villager from Galibi. Personal, communication, March 4, 19991 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to look at various issues surrounding access to land 
and tenure security in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This is important in terms of the 
aim and objective of the thesis as the rule of law has been influenced by the shared 
colonial history of the treatment of land in the region, which in essence, sets a baseline 
for the present-day inadequacies of regional land ownership structures. The shared 
colonial history of the treatment of land in the region in essence sets a baseline for the 
present day inadequacies of regional land ownership structures. It is from this background 
that this chapter will consider how real property rights have been treated in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. It will consider that policy treatment towards matters such as 
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traditional land tenure systems and forced evictions is inadequate and that there is a need 
for reform geared towards the legal recognition of customary land use.  The chapter will 
conclude by suggesting that a hybrid land tenure system is needed to allow for the 
peaceful co-existence of a largely Anglo-derived land tenure structure and customary land 
tenure arrangements. 
1.  Colonial Background and Legacy 
The Caribbean region shares the common history of being “the oldest colonial 
sphere with the most extreme experience of colonisation.”2 The colonial expansion of 
Europe reached the Caribbean as early as 1492 when Columbus arrived in the Bahamas 
during his first of a series of expeditions on behalf of the Spanish monarchy.3 At the time, 
the land across the Commonwealth Caribbean region was mainly settled by indigenous 
peoples of the Lucayo, Taino and Maya tribes.4  The moment of Columbus’s arrival 
marked essentially a land grab as the initial step in a succession of events which 
transformed the various islands into a profit making enterprise for their metropolitan 
owners. The occupation of the islands through the migration of European conquistadores 
indicated that the acquisition of land in the name of religion and expansion of empire was 
of substantial contrast to land being viewed as less of a commodity, but more as a 
spiritual, living entity closely connected to indigenous culture and customary use. 
The origins of modern day land law in the Commonwealth Caribbean territories 
are founded in English common law, with Guyana and St. Lucia also drawing from 
                                                 
2 Jean Besson, ‘History, Culture and Land in the English-speaking Caribbean’ in Allan Williams (ed.), 
Proceedings of the conference on Land in the Caribbean: Policy, Administration and Management in 
the English-speaking Caribbean (Madison USA: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2003), 33. 
3  Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems (New York: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), 188. 
4 Ibid. 
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Roman-Dutch civil law.5 It is from this background that the general treatment of property 
rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean follow a largely positivist approach, in the sense 
that property rights exist only to the extent by which they are recognised by the state. This 
approach follows the perspective of Bentham who has written, “Property and law are born 
together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, 
and property ceases.”6 The territories inherited an Anglo-derived system based on the 
concept of ‘tenure’ which formed part of the feudal system introduced by the Normans to 
England after the 1066 conquest.7 This system dictated that all lands were owned by the 
King, who had the authority to grant lands to his Barons in return for services such as the 
provision of soldiers. The Barons would also be able to grant lands which they received 
from the King to Lords, with Lords also being able to grant sub-tenancies. The number 
of sub-tenancies which could be granted was prohibited by the 1290 statute of Quia 
Emptores, and this restored the position of “the actual occupant of the land theoretically 
holding directly from the Crown, rendering services to no one, and looking to all intents 
and purposes like the absolute owner.”8 Wortley has argued that since land is the only 
indestructible object of property, the ownership of land carries with a special social 
obligation. He explains that this attitude stems from “an accepted truth in feudal England 
when the only absolute title to land was held by the King as parens patriae and apex of 
the feudal pyramid.”9 It is from this basis that Anglo-land law developed, with English 
law, evolving along the lines of recognising estates in land, as opposed to the absolute 
private ownership of land. 10  This approach to land changed in form with the 1925 
Property Acts which provided that there would always be an owner to the land who was 
                                                 
5 Ibid, 58. 
6 Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (New York: Oceana Publications, 1975), 69. 
7 Gilbert Kodilinye, Commonwealth Caribbean Property Law (London: Cavendish, 2005), 3. 
 8Ibid. 
9 Benjamin Atkinson Wortley, Jurisprudence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), 307.  
10 Ibid. 
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capable of transferring his legal interest in the land to a purchaser.11 These concepts of 
land tenure established in the law of the metropolitan travelled with colonisation and were 
implanted into the colonised territories. Furthermore, the principles introduced were 
imposed on the basis that they would override any existing forms of land tenure systems 
in the colonised territories.  
In addition to the positivist approach to land tenure systems in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean during the colonial period, Gilbert notes that by the end of the 19th century, the 
position of international law also embodied the Euro-centric view of the positivist school 
that non-European societies held no sovereign claim over the territories which they 
inhabited.12 In illustrating this, he cites several cases such as the 1847 decisions of R v. 
Symonds where the New Zealand Supreme Court commented that “the right of the native 
title owner is withdrawn, the soil vests entirely in the Crown for the behalf of the nation”13 
and the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Attorney-General v. Brown where it was 
declared that title was acquired by the Crown upon discovery and settlement.14 This 
‘doctrine of discovery’ formed a legal construct which was used as a “basis for the 
recognition of the superiority of their rights of ownership over the rights of the original 
inhabitants.”15 Exclusive title was therefore vested in the ‘discoverer’ and the original 
occupants of the land were deprived of their territorial sovereignty, “leaving them with a 
residual right of occupancy.”16 Indeed, the ideology exists that the material substance of 
colonialism is grounded in dispossessions and repossessions of land. Said in describing 
the essence of colonialism, has written:  
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Underlying social space are territories, land, geographical domains, the actual 
geographical underpinnings of the imperial, and also the cultural contest. To think 
about distant places, to colonize them, to populate or depopulate them: all of this 
occurs on, about, or because of land. The actual geographical possession of land is 
what empire in the final analysis is all about.17  
Colonialism hence forced a reorientation of land and labour away from older 
customary uses. In the Commonwealth Caribbean, control of land ownership through 
colonisation was also connected to the capitalistic enterprise of the sugar trade. As 
discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, the ‘Triangular Trade’ facilitated the exchange 
of products from the Commonwealth Caribbean such as sugar and its by-products such 
as rum and molasses. Control of land was central to economic prosperity of the 
metropolitan in the colonies. According to O’Brien: 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the region had become the ‘hub of the Empire,’ 
with four-fifths of the income derived from Britain’s overseas colonies emanating 
from these so-called ‘sugar colonies.’ At the same time, the sugar industry, with its 
demands for large plantations and a constant supply of fresh slaves, had radically 
altered the composition of the local population, which at the outset was mainly Anglo-
Saxon, made up of the original settlers from England, and indentured labourers 
recruited from England, Scotland and Ireland, to make up for the absence of an 
indigenous population that could be put to work, living on small farms and engaged 
in a mixed agricultural economy. Following the introduction of sugar in the mid 
seventeenth century, however, the composition of this population changed completely 
as large parts of the region were given over to a system of large sugar plantations, 
worked by very large numbers of slaves, transported mainly from West Africa, under 
the direction of a few white men.18 
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18  Derek O’Brien, The Constitutional Systems of the Commonwealth Caribbean: A Contextual 
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Plantations during time of slavery have been described as “total economic 
institutions”19 where there was “virtually no distinction between the organization that is 
the unit of production and the society.”20 As Toppin-Allahar explains, “The essential 
features of plantation economy – mono-crop production and export orientation – were 
therefore the key drivers of land values and land use patterns in the colonial Caribbean, 
both before and after emancipation.”21 The treatment of land by the legal system was 
therefore that of a commodity closely tied to the production of sugar cane, and according 
to Antoine, “The law continued to be unsupportive of the large black masses....mainly 
because it failed to adapt adequately to the needs of the newly liberated peoples who were 
landless, powerless, largely uneducated, culturally and psychologically emasculated and 
still tied to the plantation.”22 Richardson, in considering the report of the 1897 Royal 
Commission which was appointed to investigate the decline of the sugar industry 
similarly noted: 
While British officials were divided as to specific planning techniques or strategies, 
they were unanimous in their opposition to informal settlements scattered throughout 
the hills and mountains; widespread forest hamlets were inconsistent with central 
colonial control and represented locales that could encourage relapse into “African” 
livelihood patterns. Discussions of these points, further, reawakened fears in the 
region that were decades old. Releasing the black labour force from a subservient, 
supervised existence might easily lead to trouble....The problems associated with 
retrogressive “African” customs and behaviour, moreover, had been a staple of the 
testimony gathered by the royal commissioners, particularly in relation to villages in 
remote highland island interiors.23 
                                                 
19 Christine Toppin-Allahar, ‘“De Beach Belong to We!” Socio-Economic Disparity and Islanders’ 
Rights of Access to the Coast in a Tourist Paradise’, Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 5 (2015), 298-317, (p. 
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As evidenced by the colonial sugar industry, it is arguable that the process of 
colonialism was a long-term venture in the conquest of space, and the transformation of 
nature into a commodity, akin to the proclamation by Marx that the soil had become “part 
and parcel of capital.” 24  For Marx, the “wholesale expropriation of the agricultural 
population from the soil....created for the town industries the necessary supply of a ‘free’ 
and outlawed proletariat.”25 Harris, in analysing the work of French philosophers Deleuze 
and Guattari, suggests: 
The spatial energy of capitalism works to deterritorialize people, (that is, to detach 
them from prior bonds between people and place), and to reterritorialize them in 
relation to the requirements of capital itself (that is, access to land conceived as 
resources and freed from the constraints of custom, and to labour conceived as 
ordered, time-disciplined, abundant, and also unencumbered by custom).26  
Within this economic, social and cultural context, the negative impacts arising 
from the colonial treatment of land in the Commonwealth Caribbean are widespread 
across the region, particularly in terms of how land is distributed and who has access to 
the land. For instance, following colonisation, there emerged a large population of 
landless peasants. These “squatter peasantries”27 had been established in opposition to the 
plantations, particularly in the mountainous interior regions of the Greater Antilles.28 As 
Besson explains: 
These early squatter peasants were wiped out by the escalating plantation system and 
replaced by postindentured “early yeomen,” “protopeasant” plantation slaves, 
“runaway peasantries” (escaped slaves or maroons), and postslavery peasants in free 
villages and in posttreaty maroon polities. However, squatter peasants reemerged in 
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the Caribbean region, for example, in Jamaica, Trinidad, and the Eastern 
Caribbean...29 
Beckford and Witter argue that in Jamaica, the peasantry was “born struggling for 
land,”30 with most small farmers in Jamaica still being inhibited by the after effects of 
land distribution as a result of colonialism. Weiss elaborates by stating: 
Nearly 170 years after Emancipation, landed inequities remain staggering, with 
roughly 4 percent of landholders controlling 65 percent of all the agricultural land in 
estates and pastures which form the fertile alluvial plains. The remaining 96 percent 
of landholders (including the 7 percent classed as landless) control only 35 percent of 
the agricultural land in small, hillside farms that average 0.83 hectares. These 
inequities are magnified by the widespread insecurity of tenure, differential land 
quality, and unequal access to irrigation and infrastructure.31 
It can be ascertained therefore that colonialism and its legacy has had an impact 
on how land is treated, in terms of an evolution from its customary value, to that of an 
economic commodity. Despite of this evolution, there are still instances across the 
Commonwealth Caribbean where the consideration of land’s customary value has been 
maintained. The issue which arises in this regard is how policy-makers treat with the 
occupation of land which falls outside the ambit of formal registration systems.    
2.  “Formalizing” Informal Title 
Under the current dominant legal system, access by landless persons to formal 
title rests largely on their ability to make a claim through the doctrine of adverse 
possession. As Kodilyne observes, “the concept of adverse possession is rooted in the 
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theory that the basis of title to land in English law is possession.”32 By this doctrine, an 
individual who is in possession of land as a squatter can obtain formal title if the true 
owner of the land “fails to assert his superior title within the requisite limitation period in 
the particular jurisdiction.”33  In the Jamaican Court of Appeal case of Farrington v 
Bush,34 Graham-Perkins JA confirms that the squatter has to solely have the intention of 
unequivocally excluding the original owner from the land. According to Perkins JA: 
To support a finding of adverse possession, there must be positive and affirmative 
evidence of acts of possession, unequivocal by their very nature and which are 
demonstrably consistent with an attempt, and an intention, to exclude the possession 
of the true owner....an equivocal act means an act of such a nature as to provide an 
equal balance between an intention to exclude a true owner from possession and an 
intention merely to derive some enjoyment or benefit from the land wholly consistent 
with such use as the true owner might wish to make of it. 35 
Likewise, the Trinidad and Tobago High Court in Dolly v Sookoo36 followed the 
judgment in Farrington and confirmed that title through adverse possession could only 
be obtained where it was proven that the squatter was in occupation of the land, and that 
they had the intention to possess, by dispossessing the legal owner of the land. 
Quite absent from the region are active Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
advocating access to land for the landless outside the scope of the existing normative 
rules. Instead, the advocacy of a rights based approach to the treatment of land has been 
left up to those Parliamentary representatives or private citizens who have taken this cause 
upon themselves. Former Trinidadian Member of Parliament, John Humphrey for 
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instance has argued that the right to shelter of the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago was a 
common law right.37 Humphrey has claimed that because the crown acquiesced to former 
slaves settling on state land following emancipation, in order to sustain them from the 
land, this created a common law right to shelter, and to the land. 38  According to 
Humphrey: “The Crown had its marines, it had its constabulary, and could easily have 
gone and removed them, but the Crown accepted them in those conditions. That 
established in the common law a certain right.”39 A major area of concern from a human 
rights perspective is the forced demolition of the dwellings structures of those persons 
occupying state-owned lands. Humphrey has blamed the demolition of squatting 
settlements by the state as an exercise in exhorting power and authority, instead of 
understanding the issues facing landless persons, stating in Parliament: 
Mr. Speaker, I have been arguing for a very, very, long time, that the squatters who 
squat on state land, who cannot do no better for themselves and their families are, in 
fact, not in breach of the laws of Trinidad and Tobago. There is a law governing state 
lands in the statute books, the State Lands Act, which lays out the procedure by which, 
if there is a squatter on state land, the state can remove that squatter. That procedure 
required that a complaint be laid before a magistrate and only the judiciary has the 
power to instruct the removal, the forceful removal, and the demolition. But they (the 
government) do not recognize that. You see, they were the Government, and were big 
and powerful, and they were going to use this big power that they had to do just as 
they pleased.40  
Overall, the general approach of hard law towards securing property rights to land 
is the establishment of a private ownership system through the conveying of title. This 
system largely excludes informal customary practices such as communal tenure 
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arrangements. In the Commonwealth Caribbean, these informal arrangements are largely 
evidenced by the prevalence of squatting communities and family land.  
 
The Sou-Sou Land Initiative in Trinidad and Tobago 
The Sou-Sou Land initiative which began in Trinidad and Tobago in 1983 
provides an example of the landless collectively mobilizing their resources to acquire land 
and build communities.41 The ideology behind the Sou-Sou Land initiative was derived 
from an informal, traditional practice observed in communities throughout the island, 
whereby participants would combine their financial resources in order to achieve a 
particular purpose. The term ‘sou-sou’ was derived from the French patois expression, 
meaning ‘coin by coin.’42 The process is described by Griffith-Charles: 
Participants put small sums of money periodically into a communal fund managed by 
one of the group, and each person in turn would 'draw a hand' or receive all the 
contents of the communal fund, available for a major deferred purchase. The practice 
may have been introduced from West Africa through the slave trade and is used at all 
levels of society. Its advantages are small group sanctions over default, simple 
administration and a flexible participatory scheme. No interest is charged, and a round 
usually covers the year.43 
The Sou-Sou Land movement organized themselves to form the Sou-Sou Land 
Company as a private initiative to acquire land for the landless.44 Fuelling this movement 
was the decision by a landowner, which was a large land development company, to 
demolish the homes of seventeen (17) families who had been squatting on the land.45 
With the assistance of Humphrey, an effort was made to relocate the squatters to another 
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existing squatting settlement.46 However, the existing squatting community protested as 
they believed the increased influx of squatters from the demolished settlement would 
bring attention to their area from the public authorities.47 Interestingly at the time, as a 
result of an oil boom during the period 1973 to 1984, there was the problem of large 
agricultural estates being unable to attract labour, resulting in operations having to cease 
within these estates. Consequently, the owners of the estates could not continue to 
maintain the land and pay taxes, and attempted to sell the land at reduced prices. The 
landless families were encouraged by Humphrey to combine their financial resources to 
purchase a small estate, as well as to invite other landless families to take part in this 
initiative.  During the process it was realized that the contributions were in excess of what 
was required to purchase the land, and families had to be asked for portions of their 
contributions to be returned to them. Within five years, the Sou-Sou Land Company was 
able to purchase thirteen (13) estates.48 These estates were thoroughly surveyed so that 
each participant would know the specific boundaries of the land which was allocated, and 
the land was also partitioned to address both housing and agricultural needs of the 
community.49 
In 1987 the Sou-Sou Land initiative was identified by the United Nations Centre 
for Human Settlements (Habitat) as being one of ten innovative projects for the 
International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, a mere four years after the project had 
been initiated.50 The establishment of the Sou-Sou Land Company was recognised by 
Habitat as being a successful experiment through private initiative of distribution of home 
sites to the homeless, and was hailed as an attempt by a former colonial people to discover 
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a novel method of providing land for the landless by drawing on the wisdom of indigenous 
approaches to self-reliance, and the ability to economise in a situation of limited 
resources.51 The initiative also received endorsement from the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), where it was considered to be a major project cognisant of the Caribbean 
experience and relevant to the region’s shelter problems.52 
Despite of international recognition, the controversial issue which exists to date 
with these Sou-Sou Land settlements is that the communities remain dependant on 
government action to recognise, and regularise their tenure. Griffith-Charles highlights 
the plight and desperation of a resident who was interviewed and commented in local 
dialect: 
We purchase the land already. Is just that we don’t have the final deed. They will have 
to kill me if is anything. I build the house, but the most important thing is to get the 
deed. When you get the deed you more secure.53 
Nonetheless, the Sou-Sou Land arrangement also demonstrated that individuals 
now felt a greater sense of belonging and national pride. According to the president of a 
community group as interviewed by Griffith-Charles: 
I feel secure because I am a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago. Where I was squatting 
before I was asked to locate somewhere else and I did so at that time. I feel more 
secure as the time goes by because my motivation goes a lot of way in this country....as 
citizens of Trinidad and Tobago we have rights. We are not squatters; we are settlers. 
And this is something they have to change in the Act; don’t call us squatters.54 
The main problem with the Sou-Sou Land arrangement was the lands not being 
approved by the state for residential use, as the lands acquired were primarily encumbered 
estates which were remnants of the former colonial period, and were located near to 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Report of the Meeting of CARICOM Ministers of Housing and 
Settlements (Port-of-Spain: Ministry of Housing and Settlements, 1988). 
53 Griffith-Charles (see n. 41, p. 119), 110.  
54 Ibid, 111. 
122 
existing estate villages. The Sou-Sou Land Company was above all motivated by its 
concern with a lack of affordable housing, and as a result acted in contravention of state 
planning regulations. 
 
Jamaica’s Operation PRIDE 
Like Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica has had a long history of squatting which 
dates to the post-emancipation period. In the aftermath of the 1834 abolition of slavery, 
the newly emancipated community began settling on vacant lands belonging to the Crown 
as well as abandoned land arising from encumbered estates.55 This land was used for the 
construction of housing and for subsistence agriculture. The Jamaican government in 
1994 made an effort to establish a state settlement policy based on a philosophy similar 
to that of Sou-Sou land through its Programme for Resettlement and Integrated 
Development Enterprises (also known as Operation PRIDE). Here, the government 
attempted to explore outside the ambit of the already established rigid tenure system by 
establishing its policy objective of making “land accessible to a wide cross-section of 
persons using innovative techniques to ensure success.”56 In essence, it was meant to 
empower Jamaican squatters. Schoburgh and Gatchair have outlined the policy objectives 
behind Operation PRIDE, stating: 
Operation PRIDE was intended to: (a) reverse the socio-economic fall-out that many 
persons in low socio-economic groups had experienced as a result of the economic 
restructuring of the period; (b) set in motion a framework that would support the 
formulation of an appropriate settlement policy; and (c) curb indiscriminate capture 
of government and privately owned land.57 
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Operation PRIDE was essentially formulated to be a joint effort amongst various 
stakeholders which would include the state, private sector, professional bodies, Non-
Governmental Organizations and Community-Based Organizations. Like the Sou-Sou 
Land scheme, PRIDE focused on pooling community finances and resources and using a 
‘self-help’ method for infrastructural development so that essentially as community 
resources increased, the community infrastructure would also be improved. Operation 
PRIDE therefore intended to revolve around mobilizing those persons not forming part 
of the formal land market and then using their capabilities to develop sustainable 
communities. Operation PRIDE essentially represented a focused response to the issue of 
squatting but according to Schoburgh and Gatchair, “it was a victim of a political culture 
that values the spoils system rather than sound policy design and implementation.”58 
As Mohammed argues, Operation PRIDE was transformed into something of a 
political movement rather than one advocating a right to land for landless persons.59 
Whereas it was recommended that a pilot phase of the project be initially established with 
a minimum of six settlements, the Jamaican government attempted to initiate 200 
settlements within the first year.60 This had an adverse effect on the outlook of the project 
as it was initially conceptualized as one which intended to promote organic growth based 
on the level of community and financial mobilization.61 As a result, Operation PRIDE 
became faced with cash flow problems. Not adhering to its initial policy objectives, the 
Operation PRIDE office began hiring consultants to aid with the production of technical 
planning reports which then informed construction work by contractors.62 This resulted 
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in early indications of low community participation and a minimal co-relation between 
actual expenditure on the settlements and the income capabilities of the community.63 
Even in the aftermath of the failed Operation PRIDE, there remains an alarming 
absence of data to effectively inform policy and decision making. A 2007 Jamaican 
Government Report based on a stock-taking study during 2007/2008 advised that there 
was “little concrete information about the extent or nature of squatting in Jamaica” and 
also that “without knowledge of the magnitude of the phenomenon, its growth and the 
potential for upgrading the settlements, it would not be possible to develop a policy to 
manage the existing settlements in a sustainable manner.” 64  It was estimated that 
Operation PRIDE cost the Jamaican Treasury more than Seven Billion Jamaican 
Dollars. 65  Other social problems have also been blamed for the failure of several 
Operation PRIDE settlements. In St. James for instance, residents abandoned their houses 
as a result of them being vandalized, and because of a high murder rate in the area.66 
3. Property Rights and their Constitutional Protection 
Although not explicitly addressing the notion of land rights where occupation of 
the land falls outside formal legal recognition, all Commonwealth Caribbean 
constitutions guarantee the right to protection from deprivation of property. 67 
Interpretation by domestic courts of what this particular constitutional right means has 
produced broad guidelines defined by legal, and in some instances human rights 
approaches. Various judicial decisions, which have considered constitutional provisions 
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guaranteeing the right to property, provide some insight on how land rights might fall 
within the securing property rights from a constitutional perspective. 
One of the important issues emerging from the cases relates to compensation for 
the compulsory acquisition of land by the state. For example, the Court of Appeal of 
Grenada in Grand Anse Estates Ltd. v Governor General of Grenada and Others68 
considered whether the compulsory acquisition was in fact null and void in accordance 
with Section 6(1) of the Constitution of Grenada which reads:  
No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no 
interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, 
except where provision is made by a law applicable to that taking possession or 
acquisition for the prompt payment of full compensation. 69 
In this case, the appellant contended that this constitutional provision was not 
adequately satisfied during the process of compulsory acquisition which took place by 
virtue of the Land Acquisition Ordinance70. The appellant argued that for section 6(1) to 
be satisfied, there were three pre-conditions necessary for the action to qualify as a 
constitutional acquisition and that the absence of any would make the acquisition 
unconstitutional. These pre-conditions were that (1) there had to be a law applicable at 
time of acquisition in existence; (2) a provision for prompt payment in the law; and (3) 
that the compensation payment had to be in its entirety.71 Within this context the appellant 
argued that “full compensation” meant that the value of the land had to be ascertained at 
a rate determined at the time of the acquisition, and not at a rate which reflected the value 
of the land at a date twelve months prior to the acquisition, as was the situation in this 
particular instance. In interpreting what was meant by “full compensation,” the Court of 
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Appeal held that it must mean a just equivalent of the land at the time of acquisition, plus 
any loss incurred by such acquisition plus adequate interest to the date of payment.72 
Providing further clarity to the interpretation of the constitutional provision for “full 
compensation” the Court of Appeal elaborated that there could be cases in which the value 
of the land twelve months before the acquisition would amount to adequate 
compensation, but there may also be instances where within twelve months the value of 
the land in certain areas may increase to a large extent.73 The Court of Appeal went on to 
hold that a provision in Section 19 of the Land Acquisition Ordinance which placed a 
limitation on the value of the land acquired to a value twelve months prior to the date of 
the acquisition was in fact an infringement of a fundamental right to full compensation as 
enshrined in Section 6(1) of the Constitution, and therefore that particular provision of 
the ordinance was ultra vires.74 What this decision indicates is that while the legislature 
is given the discretionary power of establishing principles which govern how 
compensation is to be determined, those principles should also ensure that the 
compensation is just and adequate. According to Allen, the importance of this is that “the 
courts are unwilling to allow the legislature or executive any discretion in making the 
assumptions necessary for determining the market value of property.”75 
The issue of constitutional protection for property rights in the context of housing 
demolition was considered in the Trinidad and Tobago case of Krakash Singh v Attorney-
General of Trinidad and Tobago.76  Here, the applicant filed a constitutional motion 
seeking a declaration that his constitutional right to enjoyment of his property and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law was infringed by agents of 
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the state who destroyed his house which was situated on lands tenanted to him. The 
applicant also contended that the demolition of his house contravened his right to respect 
for his private and family life, as well as his right to equality before the law.77 He further 
argued that State Lands Act78 and the Land Acquisition Act79 gave an expectation to the 
citizen of civil behaviour on the part of the state, and that this was also settled practice.80 
The state however contended that there ought not to be any recourse to constitutional 
remedy since the land under consideration belonged to the state, and that the state was 
therefore exercising its ordinary rights as owner. 81  The state further argued that the 
applicant failed to show that he had a right to possession of the land, as the person who 
he claimed to be his landlord no longer had a right to possession of the land.82  The High 
Court held that the applicant did indeed have the right to protection of the property, of 
which he could not be deprived other than by due process of the law, as outlined under 
Section 4(a) of the Constitution.83 The court further opinioned that the state also neglected 
to follow “settled practice” provided for by the legislation for the removal of squatters as 
contended by the applicant.84   Interestingly, the “settled practice” of the state being 
required to display civil behaviour when removing the squatter from state lands was 
deemed to have existed before the constitution came into effect, but upon its 
establishment, it would now be able to attach itself to the related constitutional right.85 
Another important element of this judgment is that it recognised the enjoyment of 
property as a fundamental right which was more extensive than rights contained in other 
constitutions, such as the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property as espoused for 
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example in the Constitution of India.86 It deemed the enjoyment of property not to be 
limited to rights of property in the strict legal sense, but to be construed with the widest 
possible meaning which was consistent with a free people in a free state and which ought 
to remain unaffected by exhaustive definitions which have sought to circumscribe it.87 
In San Jose Farmers' Co-operative Society Ltd v Attorney-General of Belize88, the 
Belize Court of Appeal held that the Constitutional right of access to the courts to 
establish the right or interest of a claimant in property which was being compulsorily 
acquired by the state should have been expressly included in the Land Acquisition (Public 
Purposes Act) 89  since “questions of rights to land are matters which are properly 
justicable by the Supreme Court.”90 Section 17(1)(b) of the Belize Constitution91 provides 
that any law authorizing the compulsory acquisition of property or an interest or right 
over property must secure to any person who claims an interest in or right over the 
property, a right to access to the courts to establish their rights to the property.  In light of 
this provision, the Court of Appeal rejected submissions on behalf of the Attorney 
General that there was no conflict between the Constitution and the Land Acquisition 
(Public Purposes Act)92, which excluded provisions for access to the courts in the case of 
a compulsory acquisition, and that the law was merely silent on the matter.93 The Court 
went on to state that if it was the intention of the Constitution makers for the provision 
for access to the courts to be contained merely in the Constitution itself, this would have 
been indicated in the Constitution.94 According to Sir James Smith JA: 
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The only right of access to a court is found in section 24 of that Act, which provides 
that an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal against the determination of the Board for 
the Compulsory Acquisition of Land of any question of disputed compensation. This 
section also declares that the determination of that board is deemed to be a final 
judgment or order of the Supreme Court. However, the Court of Appeal has held that 
the board is not a court of law but an administrative tribunal. Therefore there should 
be access to the Supreme Court.95 
 In this judgment we have the Belize Court of Appeal confirming that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction goes beyond disputes over compensation for compulsory 
acquisition, but also extends to questions of rights to land, in the context of constitutional 
protection of property rights. The recognition by the Belize Court of Appeal of the 
existence of land rights in instances of compulsory acquisition is noteworthy, particularly 
considering that this area had not even been contemplated within the legislation. 
4. Addressing Customary Land Use 
 This section will consider the importance of customary land use being 
given legal recognition, despite the customary possession of land falling outside the 
formal land titling system. It will also suggest that a hybrid model be developed which 
will allow the peaceful co-existence of both formal and informal land tenure 
arrangements. According to de Satgé and Kleinbooi, arable and resource rich land held 
under customary tenure systems have “acquired new value as a commodity and is 
increasingly being regarded as a strategic resource and potential source of wealth waiting 
to be ‘unlocked’ by external investors.”96 As a result, tenure and land rights security of 
the poor who fall outside of the formal land registration system “is becoming increasingly 
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precarious and subject to powerful forces within an increasingly globalised economy.”97 
Furthermore, changes “in global resource equations have contributed to a spike of interest 
in arable land and natural and mineral resources by foreign corporations and 
governments.”98 This narrative is not alien to the Commonwealth Caribbean. In Bowen 
v. Attorney General of Belize99 for example, the Government of Belize sought to pursue 
a constitutional amendment bill aimed at altering the constitution to allow state 
exploitation of an oil discovery by removing natural resources such as petroleum and 
associated minerals from the constitutional protection of property rights. The Supreme 
Court of Belize however struck down the amendments, holding that the lawmaking 
powers of Parliament are limited in the sense that it cannot enact laws which are contrary 
to the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution.100 As such, denying access to the courts in 
order to prevent the challenge of alleged breaches of the right to property meant that the 
amendment violated the rule of law, the protection of the right to property and the 
separation of powers, thereby disrupting the basic structure of the Constitution.101 As will 
be discussed, there have been other scenarios which strongly suggest that there exists a 
need for the protection of customary land from both state and corporate actors through 
legal recognition. 
In  Cal and others v Attorney General of Belize and another & Coy and others v 
Attorney General of Belize and another102 the Belize Supreme Court considered whether 
Maya customary land tenure constituted “property” for the purposes  of the Constitution 
of Belize. The claimants who were members of Mayan communities brought proceedings 
against the state seeking redress for alleged violations of their constitutional rights which 
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they contended arose from the failure by the government to recognise, protect and respect 
their customary land rights based on their traditional land use and occupation.103 The 
claimants also asserted that the proprietary nature of these rights was affirmed by Maya 
customary law, international human rights law and common law.104 The court confirmed 
that traditional and cultural interests in land was able to translate into a property right, 
which would thus be subject to protection by the Constitution of Belize. According to 
Conteh CJ: 
I therefore conclude that the claimants’ rights and interests in lands based on Maya 
customary land tenure are not outwith the protection afforded by the Belize 
Constitution, but rather, constitute ‘property’ within the meaning and protection 
afforded to property generally, especial here of the real type, touching and concerning 
land - ‘communitarian property’, perhaps, but property none the less, protected by the 
Constitution's prescriptions regarding this institution in its protective catalogue of 
fundamental human rights. Moreover[…….]that a generous and purposive 
interpretation is to be given to constitutional provisions protecting humans and that a 
court is required to consider the substance of the fundamental right at issue and ensure 
contemporary protection of that right in the light of evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a mature society, I have no doubt that the claimants’ rights 
to and interests in their lands in accordance with Maya customary land tenure, form a 
kind or species of property that is deserving of the protection the Belize Constitution 
accords to property in general. There is no doubt this form of property, from the 
evidence, nurtures and sustains the claimants and their very way of life and 
existence.105 
It was also established by the court that the acquisition or change of sovereignty 
was not able to extinguish pre-existing title to, or interests in the land.106 The defence had 
argued that any claim to the land the claimants might have had was extinguished as a 
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result of British sovereignty over the territory.107 During the colonial administration of 
Belize, grants of land and leases were made under the Crown Lands Ordinance, and this 
practice continued under the subsequent National Land Act of 1992108, following the 
independence of Belize.109 However, According to the Court: 
In particular, I do not think it is logical, reasonable or fair to hold that the 1859 Treaty 
with Guatemala, by extending the southern borders of British Honduras (today's 
Belize) to the Sarstoon River, necessarily extinguished the pre-existing rights of or 
interests of the Maya inhabitants of the area in their lands. The Crown by a 
combination of the various treaties with Spain and later with Guatemala, first acquired 
interests in British Honduras and by effective occupation and administration together 
with the passage of time, gained sovereignty over the territory which it legally passed 
on to independent Belize on 21 September 1981. This sovereignty did not without 
more however, affect or alter or extinguish the pre-existing rights of the Maya people 
to their lands.110 
The Belize Supreme Court in Cal and others111 also recognized the important 
implications of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)112 to 
the Indigenous Peoples in Belize by applying its principles in deciding on Mayan 
customary land rights. Article 26 of the UNDRIP states that Indigenous Peoples have the 
right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess 
by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those 
which they have otherwise acquired. According the Belize Supreme Court: 
Also, importantly in this regard is the recent Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 September 
2007. Of course, unlike resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly 
resolutions are not ordinarily binding on member states. But where these resolutions 
or declarations contain principles of general international law, states are not expected 
to disregard them. This declaration--GA Res 61/295--was adopted by an 
overwhelming number of 143 states in favour with only four states against with 11 
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abstentions. It is of some signal importance, in my view, that Belize voted in favour 
of this declaration. And I find its art 26 of especial resonance and relevance in the 
context of this case, reflecting, as I think it does, the growing consensus and the 
general principles of international law on indigenous peoples and their lands and 
resources.113 
Also instructive from this case is the court’s assertion that the extinguishment of 
rights to, or interests in land should not be lightly inferred.114 In this regard, according to 
the court, there must be clear and plain legislative intent and action to give effect to such 
extinguishment. 115  What is interesting about this point is that it suggests that the 
extinguishment of cultural rights in land cannot be inferred by virtue of legislation which 
provides for formal registration of the land. The court also went further, warning of the 
seriousness of consequences to indigenous inhabitants of extinguishing their traditional 
rights and interests in land by the Legislature or Executive.116 
In 2004, the Inter American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) published its Report 
in the Maya Communities case 117  which confirmed that Maya customary property 
interests were ‘property’ within the meaning of the American Declaration and also found 
that the Maya peoples’ rights to property, non-discrimination and judicial protection had 
been violated by the state of Belize. The Report concluded that Belize had failed to take 
effective measures to recognize, demarcate and title Maya communal property and failed 
to hold effective consultations and obtain the informed consent of the Mayans before 
granting logging and oil concessions to third parties. 118  These actions of the Belize 
government were found to be in violation of the right to property enshrined in Article 
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XXIII of the American Declaration.119 This matter was also heard before the Caribbean 
Court of Justice (CCJ) in 2015 under the title The Maya Leaders Alliance et. al. v the 
Attorney General of Belize.120 The CCJ ruled that Belize breached the Appellants’ right 
to protection of the law in its failure to ensure that the existing property administration 
system which was inherited from the pre-independence colonial system, recognised and 
protected Maya land rights. 121  Importantly, the CCJ further emphasised that the 
protection of the law is linked to fairness and the rule of law and that it was necessary for 
Belize to take positive steps to secure and protect constitutional rights122 in addition to 
honouring its international commitments, such as its obligations to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples.123 
 
Claims to land as an Usufructuary Right 
Usufructuary Rights confer upon the occupants of the land the right to use (usus) 
the land and enjoy the ‘fruits’ (fructus) of the land.124 These rights include “the right to 
occupy the land, farm, hunt and fish thereon, and to take for their own use and benefit the 
fruits and resources thereof.”125 In the Privy Council matter of Amodu Tijani126, Viscount 
Haldane acknowledged that there was a divide between how land is conceptualized by 
English jurisprudence as opposed to its treatment by various forms of native jurisprudence 
within the British colonies.127 He further explained that it would be wrong to try to 
understand customary title in terms only suitable to English law.128 This lack of symmetry 
however according to the learned judge did not mean that English law erased beneficial 
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customary rights attached to the land, despite the Sovereign claiming interest in the land 
as its legal estate. Accordingly, the Privy Council observed: 
Their Lordships make the preliminary observation that in interpreting the native title 
to land, not only in Southern Nigeria, but other parts of the British Empire, much 
caution is essential. There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render 
that title conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have 
grown up under English law. But this tendency has to be held in check closely. As a 
rule, in the various systems of native jurisprudence throughout the Empire, there is no 
such full division between property and possession as English lawyers are familiar 
with. A very usual form of native title is that of a usufructuary right, which is a mere 
qualification of or burden on the radical or final title of the Sovereign where that 
exists. In such cases the title of the Sovereign is a pure legal estate, to which beneficial 
rights may or may not be attached. But this estate is qualified by a right of beneficial 
user which may not assume definite forms analogous to estates, or may, where it has 
assumed these, have derived them from the intrusion of the mere analogy of English 
jurisprudence ... In India, as in Southern Nigeria, there is yet another feature of the 
fundamental nature of the title to land which must be borne in mind. The title, such as 
it is, may not be that of the individual, as in this country it nearly always is in some 
form, but may be that of a community. Such a community may have the possessory 
title to the common enjoyment of a usufruct, with customs under which its individual 
members are admitted to enjoyment, and even to a right of trans-mitting the individual 
enjoyment as members by assignment inter vivos or by succession. To ascertain how 
far this latter development of right has progressed involves the study of the history of 
the particular community and its usages in each case. Abstract principles fashioned a 
priori are of but little assistance, and are as often as not misleading.129 
There have been some echoes to this approach in contemporary jurisprudence of 
several courts across the globe. For example, the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Kerajaan 
Negeri Selangor v Sagong bin Tasi130 accepted the views of the Privy Council in Amodu 
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Tijani131 as being the definitive position at common law on the issue of customary claims 
to land in light of claims by the state. According to Gopal Sri Ram JCA: 
... the fact that the radical title to land is vested in the Sovereign or the State (as in this 
case) is not an ipse dixit answer to a claim of customary title. There can be cases where 
the radical title is burdened by native or customary title. The precise nature of such a 
customary title depends on the practices and usages of each individual community ... 
What the individual practices and usages in regard to the acquisition of customary 
title is a matter of evidence as to the history of each particular community ... it is a 
question of fact to be decided ... by the primary trier of fact based on his or her belief 
of where on the totality of the evidence, the truth of the claim made lies.132 
The principles adopted in Amodu Tijani 133  and Kerajaan Negeri Selangor v 
Sagong bin Tasi134 were applied in the case of Cal and others135, where Conteh CJ 
acknowledged that Mayans of the Toledo District possessed rights of an usufructuary 
nature arising from evidence of their customary land tenure and communal rights to the 
lands. What these cases seem to suggest is that the establishment and recognition of 
usufructuary rights by formal law could well assist in providing a harmonious solution to 
any incongruities which may arise from the interplay between hard law and customary 
norms. There is thus ample judicial evidence to suggest that there may be situations from 
which land can be claimed as usufructuary rights where customary use of the land has 
given rise to the manifestation of a communal title.  
 
Family Land and Land Occupied by the Descendants of Self-Liberated Slaves 
Family land is considered something of a Commonwealth Caribbean cultural 
tradition representing a customary resistance to the existing land tenure system which was 
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borne as a remnant of an oppressive colonial land regime.136 According to Besson, family 
land “is a dynamic Afro-Caribbean cultural creation by the peasantries themselves in 
response and resistance to the plantation system”137 and “both in origin and persistence 
the institution may be seen as a strategy for maximizing freehold rights in the face of 
plantation engendered land scarcity.”138 It also “symbolizes the identity of family lines, 
the significance of which can only be fully understood in the context of the history of 
former, kinless, slaves.”139 
Essentially within the family land arrangement, the family members hold a 
collective right to a single parcel of land for their common use and enjoyment.140 The 
chain of succession is outside the scope of formal law, with the land being ‘passed on’ 
from generation to generation when the older family members become deceased. 
Therefore, there is no evidence of legal conveyance, administration of estate or testacy 
attached to the land. Family land is a common occurrence in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean and its existence illustrates how a traditional arrangement operates parallel to 
hard law. In St. Lucia, family land is estimated at 45 percent of all land holdings, 
including the majority of agricultural holdings.141 In Grenada, 15 percent of the land is 
classed as family land and 11 percent in Dominica.142 In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
the percentages for family land are unknown as it is classed as land which is held in 
‘owner-like’ possession.143 This expression describes those lands which are occupied by 
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individuals with a beneficial interest in the land, which has not been transformed into a 
legal interest due to the absence of legal title by the occupants.  St. Lucia may well provide 
a model for other Commonwealth Caribbean territories as to how legislators should treat 
with family land. The high percentage of family land holdings in this territory may partly 
be explained by virtue of inheritance laws being based on its French inherited Napoleonic 
Code, whose custom provides for the entitlement of family members to shares in inherited 
land.144 Under formal law, the current owners would be regarded as holding the land in 
indivision, that is, the land is essentially co-owned in an arrangement resembling a 
common law tenancy in common. By this recognition, the owners either acting 
collectively or individually would be granted extensive property rights. This would 
include the right of collective owners to sell the land, or the right of an individual family 
member to sell his individual share, to end the co-ownership by partition or to choose his 
heir by will.145 The contradiction of this arrangement with informal law however was 
evident in the lack of response by those persons residing on family land to reforms 
providing for the granting of title to one or more family members as trustees who would 
have the ability to sell or mortgage the property on behalf of the entire family.146 
A landmark decision by the IACHR was delivered in the case of Saramaka People 
v Suriname 147  which considered the occupation of land without formal title by the 
Saramaka people who were actually a product of the colonial experience of Suriname. 
The Saramaka people are descendants of self-liberated African slaves, much alike the 
Maroons of Jamaica, who had been living on their traditional territory since the early 
1700’s. 148  Their relationship with the land which they use for fishing, hunting and 
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woodworking is not only economic, but also spiritual and cultural.149 In 1986, a revised 
Surinamese Constitution specified that all non-titled lands and natural resources belong 
to the state,150 and by the 1990’s Suriname issued logging and mining concessions to 
private companies to undertake operations within the traditional territory of the Saramaka 
people without their prior consultation or consent.151 The IACHR decision in this matter 
was significant as for the first time, it ruled that a non-indigenous community would also 
be able to enjoy rights akin to those afforded by indigenous peoples and also be 
considered as a tribal community protected by international law if they shared similar 
characteristics such as spiritual connections with the land, a distinct culture, language and 
traditions.152 In this regard, the Saramakas were viewed by the IACHR as being entitled 
to the recognition of their communal property, with the court also confirming the 
existence of a right to property in certain circumstances, despite the non-existence of an 
official title.153 Another important point addressing land rights which arises from this 
decision by the IACHR is that the court confirmed a link between land and the survival 
of a community in the situation where the land is used for economic, social, cultural and 
religious purposes.154 
 
Addressing customary land use through hybrid systems 
As discussed, the Commonwealth Caribbean region has experienced a situation 
of land tenure systems being inherited from the British colonial administration co-existing 
with customary arrangements such as family land, squatting and forms of indigenous 
customary land use. Practically, it would be very difficult to entirely remove land 
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classification systems brought about by the legacies of colonialism and begin with a new 
classification system which would address how land is used by the plural Commonwealth 
Caribbean Society. In this regard, a hybrid arrangement whereby formal registration 
systems and customary and informal land arrangements would be able to co-exist may be 
the best arrangement in satisfying the economic, social and cultural rights of the region’s 
inhabitants. 
There are some lessons to be learnt from other regions which have witnessed the 
imposition of colonial rules on land rights but have maintained a more plural approach to 
land tenure systems.  For example, in Madagascar a system exists whereby customary 
land holdings operate alongside the statutory Torrens system, which was imposed by its 
French colonists to protect their interest in the land. By virtue of the Torrens system, the 
individual could only obtain secured tenure through the registration of land rights via a 
centralized land registry. In describing the Madagascar land tenure reforms, Kleinbooi 
explains: 
In 2003, civil society initiated national debate about the two parallel land tenure 
systems (privately and traditionally held tenure). It intensified the appeal for a revised 
and simplified registration approach that acknowledges land rights based on local 
allocation practices, which ensured secure tenure on land held under customary 
systems. A new land policy in 2005 proposed a decentralised land management 
system. This aimed to promote secure access to land by creating a more efficient legal 
and institutional environment. The land decree (2005-019, 17 October 2005-
commonly referred to as the land policy letter) was promulgated, which changed the 
principles of the statutes governing land in Madagascar.155 
By way of this process, Madagascar introduced new land legislation geared 
towards land tenure decentralisation which provided for the recognition of localized land 
rights. This process was facilitated through “the creation of local land offices with 
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representation of elected villagers and a municipal appointed official, who are responsible 
for registering non-titled private property and legitimising customary holding of land.”156 
Mozambique land legislation also provides for the recognition of customary land rights 
and mandatory community consultations aimed at facilitating community “participation 
and negotiation between local people and outside interests, and providing for the 
devolution of important land and natural resources management functions to ‘local 
communities.”157 Where an investor is interested in occupied land, the investor is required 
to initiate a process that commences with a community consultation. 158  Where the 
investor is met with local approval, the state provides the investor with a Direito de Uso 
e Aproveitamento da Terra (the right of use and benefit from the land).159 If the local 
occupants need the land themselves or disapprove of the investor, there is no legal 
guarantee that the process will be met with local approval.160 
Understanding claims to land by marginalised communities and examining their 
relationship with natural resource management, whether positive or negative, would be 
an important foundational aspect of developing a hybrid arrangement. In terms of how 
customary rights to natural resources are treated by the state, the view exists that present 
day perceptions were formed under the influence of colonial rule.161 By such means, any 
attempt by the colonial authority to codify customary law resulted in “a highly fluid set 
of practices” being made static, and representative of a political and economic context 
which embodied the nature of the law during the colonial period.162 To re-consider this 
position, there should be a movement towards examining the development of 
marginalized communities in terms of their claim to property within a framework looking 
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at their historical development and their management of natural resources. In relation to 
agriculture for instance, the absence of permanent tenancy for squatters has meant that 
there is no incentive to practice soil conservation, and farming is largely characterized by 
‘slash and burn’ methods on high elevated land with steep slopes. Crops are planted 
according to market demand instead of land stability.163  
A pivotal area of divergence between state and non-state actors that needs to be 
addressed is dissimilarities in how property regimes are regarded and the way by which 
land is acquired. Whereas stemming from colonial administration and permeating into the 
practices of the present day state is the view that property regimes are to be treated as 
homogenous entities, in practice, marginalized communities have divergent perspectives 
on land security and their relationship with real property. On the other hand, since the 
emergence from colonialism, marginalized communities exposed to state based norms 
would have gone through a process of being reconfigured through prevailing socio-
political and economic conditions. Based on experience in Malaysia, Dolittle further 
explains this concept by stating that “access to resources and the transformation of 
property rights is shaped by both internal village conflicts over cultural meaning, social 
identity, and power and also by the incorporation of rural areas into the colonial and 
national political economy.”164 
An exploration of notions of community and custom would need to be understood 
by policy makers in order to devise a rights-based land arrangement which could exist 
harmoniously with existing state based tenure systems. Development of a hybrid model 
would therefore need to look at how marginalized communities put land and natural 
resources to use. According to Brosius et. al., “advocates have found concepts of 
indigenous, community, custom, tradition and rights useful in promoting possibilities for 
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local empowerment in national and transnational policy discussions.”165 Consensus on 
any arrangement between the state authority and marginalized communities should be 
“conceptualized as mutually constitutive and deeply intertwined” 166  as opposed to 
succumbing to a rhetoric of domination and resistance. Within this context, Doolittle 
suggests pursuing an understanding of the relationship between state and society “by 
looking beyond the notion of a colonial government that imposed legal structures on a 
pliant and unresisting subject population.”167 Instead, what is essential is looking at the 
role of negotiation, understanding and a general sentiment of co-operation between state 
actors and marginalized groups. Part of this process would be to “examine the nature of 
the negotiations between colonial administrators and local leaders, and explore what 
creative forms of state control developed and what new forms of local autonomy emerged 
from these state-society interactions.”168 
The emergence of hybrid legal arrangements in terms of land classification could 
only have a positive contribution to the development of an inclusive, syncretic 
environment. A legal landscape which allows this may well contribute to the enabling of 
a normative shift towards a more rights oriented society in the context of how land is used 
and otherwise regarded. Ideally a hybrid system would be able to traverse both how the 
formal and informal treat the land, in order to produce a rights oriented perspective on 
how the land ought to be regarded for whatever particular purpose based on the 
surrounding circumstances. The development of a rights based hybrid system may also 
protect the region from forms of “new-age colonialism” such as corporate land grabbing 
and the general exploitation of land and natural resources by commercial interests. An 
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important process in the establishment of such a safeguard is for regional governments to 
be able to understand and express at a policy and legislative level the impact of customary 
and informal land holdings on notions of statehood and national identity. 
Conclusion 
Tenure security in the Commonwealth Caribbean remains largely influenced by 
positivist-framed legislation which largely neglect other rights based approaches. At the 
domestic level, state actors need to examine various ways to treat with customary and 
informal claims to land which do not fit in with land titling mechanisms inherited from 
the colonial era. International law has somewhat influenced the regional jurisprudence in 
its recognition of claims to land by marginalized groups against the state authority, 
particularly in terms of customary and collective land rights as evidenced in Cal and 
others v Attorney General of Belize and another & Coy and others v Attorney General of 
Belize and another 169  and Maya Leaders Alliance et. al. v the Attorney General of 
Belize.170 Looking forward, Commonwealth Caribbean states may be able to facilitate a 
harmonious relationship between hard law and customary claims for land through the 
development of hybrid systems. Ideally, this would mean the building of relationships 
between state actors and marginalized groups to arrive at a syncretic situation. Such 
arrangement between the normative and the informal would bode well for the future 
development of rights based approaches towards the treatment of land. While at the 
international level there remains to be consolidation of the linkages amongst land and 
other rights such as housing, evictions, food, water and cultural rights, the notion of land 
rights as part of human rights law is expanding.171 There however remains to be seen a 
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massive impact of international law on the region in terms of the evolution of domestic 
legislation aimed at addressing customary land use. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL SYSTEM RESPONSES TO DIVERSITY AND EQUALITY IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
Introduction 
The Commonwealth Caribbean society comprises a myriad of diverse groups and 
various belief systems, notably various individual, religious, cultural and political beliefs. 
In re-iterating the objective of the thesis, the intention in this Chapter to consider legal 
system responses to diversity and equality in terms of the interplay between state based 
legal norms and soft law, as well as and the influence of international law on domestic 
legal systems.  
A ‘belief system’ is defined by Converse as a “configuration of ideas and attitudes 
in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional 
interdependence.”1 In the sense of this overarching notion of belief systems, this chapter 
will look at how Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems manage equality and diversity. 
It will consider the changing landscape of diversity in the region during the post-
emancipation period and establish a case for the departure from elements of homogeneity 
in the law in its treatment of addressing the protection groups of peoples in terms of their 
varied belief systems.  
At the heart of the discussion on the role of law to support diversity of belief whilst 
also supporting equality reside the different approaches to equality. The complexity of 
how equality within society as a normative principle should be understood by the legal 
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system is evident in the conflict of approaches when it comes to deciding whether to adopt 
a position of formal equality espoused through legal formalism as opposed to other 
approaches to equality. While formal equality captures the traditional approach of 
Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems, which is essentially viewing the concept of 
equality as being determined through a system of formal rules, the substantive equality 
approach for instance suggests that the emphasis should instead be on equality of 
outcomes. These two approaches will be discussed in terms of how either would benefit 
or constrain Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems. This chapter will also propose that 
in certain situations, the legal system ought to look beyond its legal construct of 
individualism protected through formalism and make decisions based on broader 
principles of equality and recognise some collective and group rights. 
1. Legal Approaches to diversity in the Region 
This section will consider the background to regional diversity within the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. It will then look at several decided cases which show how 
formalism might not always produce an equitable outcome in terms of providing a legal 
space for the protection of a belief system.  
 
Background to regional diversity 
Following the conclusion of slave emancipation by 1838, new ethnic groups were 
introduced to the Commonwealth Caribbean region, with one intention being to address 
the shortage of labour on the sugar plantations brought about by the termination of 
slavery. As Clarke elaborates: 
The first indentured labourers were Chinese, but they rapidly gravitated into the 
grocery trade, and Indians, known in the Caribbean as East Indians, soon became the 
staple of indentured immigration. Many Chinese quickly converted to orthodox 
Christianity, but most East Indians, where they formed large demographic 
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components, retained ancestral commitments to Hinduism and Islam, though some 
Hindus converted to Catholicism or Canadian (Mission) Presbyterianism. In British 
Guiana East Indians eventually became the majority of the population, but in both 
Trinidad and Dutch Guiana they formed large minority segments standing outside the 
Creole colour-class stratification of whites, browns and blacks.2 
By the late 19th century, the Syrians began establishing themselves in the region 
as traders and by the 1950’s, Jews, Syrians and Chinese who were largely involved in 
trade “occupied status gap positions between the two upper social strata, and had 
converted to the elite religions of Roman Catholicism or Anglicanism.”3 Their social 
position contrasted to that of ethnic groups which had descended from runaway slaves, 
like the Maroons of Jamaica and the ‘Bush Negroes’ of Dutch Guiana or those 
Amerindians who still had communities in places like Dominica and Guyana.4 As Clark 
notes, despite these groups having long histories in the Caribbean which could be traced 
back to slavery and past, by the post-emancipation period they remained considered as 
“outcast groups.” 5  The ‘Bush Negroes’ and Maroons retained significant African 
elements in their religious beliefs and practices, although Clarke asserts that while the 
‘Bush Negroes’ claimed their religion as African, it was actually created in a post-
plantation context by the runaway slaves.6 
Indian migrants, or ‘East Indians’ as they were commonly referred to, also largely 
retained their ancestral religions, which were mainly Hinduism and Islam. In Trinidad, 
the first group of Indians arrived in 1845 as indentured labourers who were contracted for 
a five-year period to provide labour on the plantations.7 During a period of seventy years 
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of the indentureship scheme, 144,000 Indians arrived in Trinidad, with only 33,000 
persons returning to India at the end of their contract.8 Of the East Indians, Clarke writes: 
Fewer than 15 percent of Trinidad’s East Indian immigrants were Muslims. Among the Hindu 
majority a wide range of castes was represented in the records. Agricultural castes were greatly in demand 
for work on the sugar estates, and together with the low castes and outcastes formed over two-thirds of the 
immigrants. A large number of Brahmins and Kshatriyas – many of them cultivators – also immigrated, 
and together accounted for more than 10 percent of Hindus. Members of the Brahmin caste, in particular, 
were crucial to the maintenance of the Hindu priesthood, Hindu rituals, and Hindu family structures and 
rituals, as indenture ended in the early 1920s and a rooted East Indian community came to be formed.9 
Commonwealth Caribbean societies are therefore very much heterogeneous in 
terms of ethnicity, religion, culture and belief systems. Antoine in her book 
Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems10 argues however that despite there 
being varied ethnic and religious groups within the Commonwealth Caribbean, the law 
and legal systems of the region do not capture this reality. Antoine suggests that not 
enough is done in the Commonwealth Caribbean to protect ethnic groups and there is an 
overall failure of the law to reflect minority interests. She states that “in the eyes of the 
law they are all uniform subjects”11 and that the prevailing norm is legal conformity “to 
a uniform, majoritarian, ideological position based essentially on an Anglo-Saxon, 
Christian type of morality and governance.”12 Antoine further argues that the value of a 
constitution is lacking where there is an absence of protection for religious freedoms and 
other freedoms involving differences from majority interests.13 She strongly suggests that 
the prevailing law has lacked indication of evolution and dynamism to confront those 
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spaces created by multiculturalism, whose roots can be largely traced to the colonial 
period.14 On this point, Antoine states: 
The societies in the Commonwealth Caribbean have often been described as 
‘pluralistic.’ This is taken to mean that there are several diverse ethnic, religious and 
class groups existing within these societies. While these groups make up one society, 
their cultural and social differences can still be identified.  Despite this sociological 
classification, with few exceptions, such pluralism is not evident within the law and 
legal systems of the region. From a legal perspective, the Commonwealth Caribbean 
can be seen as a homogenous entity, joined by strong British legal ties. The major 
deviations are the hybrid legal systems of St. Lucia and Guyana....Yet even these 
hybrid systems do not seriously challenge the homogeneity of Commonwealth 
Caribbean law and legal systems. Within each country's legal system, homogeneity is 
also evident.15 
This assertion of homogenous legal systems trapped in a position of mimicking 
the form of its English predecessor is quite a strong claim as it puts forward a 
representation of laws which remain strongly tied to a colonial common law that centres 
around Anglo-Christian values, and is unable to accommodate the legal affairs 
surrounding the progression of a diverse society. The adoption of this Anglo-centric 
institutional background is somewhat elaborated by Goulborne, who writes: 
[The] absence of natives has had a profound impact on West Indian sociopolitical 
thinking. It accounts in part for the further absence of any militant nativism in the 
politics of most of the societies in the region. Perhaps more importantly, however, it 
has meant that West Indians have seen themselves as just claimants to the 
Westminster/Whitehall political model of politics, government, administration and 
judicial institutions. In the not too distant past the essentially British foundations of 
major institutions meant that people also carried their British status in much the same 
sense that other settlers in the Americas have seen themselves as English, French, 
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Dutch and so forth. After all, the West Indies fell somewhere between being what 
Best calls colonies of exploitation and colonies of settlement (Best, 1968).16 
It might be inferred from Goulborne’s claim that a perception of entitlement in 
the early use of the Westminster model had shaped what now seems to be slow tendencies 
by regional legal systems to confront homogeneity in the law’s treatment of diversity 
interests. In any event, static law which fails to address diverse populations is something 
which can undermine the rule of law, and Commonwealth Caribbean populations are in 
fact, diverse. Although the region has such a diverse constituent, judicial approaches 
suggest that the objective of the rule of law is to focus on formal interpretation and 
application of the law based on system of precedents as established during the colonial 
period. Such an approach based on formalism will now be considered looking at two 
issues that have formed an important issue within the jurisprudence, namely (1) the 
treatment of religious beliefs and (2) the issue of sexual orientation.  
 
Treatment of religious beliefs by the courts 
A substantial example of religious freedom being displaced by the demand to 
adhere to a legal, formal tradition was evident in Enyahooma et al v Attorney General of 
Trinidad and Tobago.17 In Enyahooma, the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago was 
asked to make a determination on whether the applicant’s constitutional rights to freedom 
of religion and equality were breached when a Magistrate requested that the applicant, 
who was dressed in a jilabba and a tajh, was asked to leave the court if he did not remove 
the tajh from his head. The appellant in his deposition stated: 
I told the Magistrate that what we were wearing were not hats but Tahjs (sic) which 
constitute part of religious garments. The Magistrate replied, “Well take it off or get 
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out of the Court.  I then replied, “I am here for a matter” and the Magistrate and the 
Prosecutor shouted aloud to us “to get out of the Court.”18 
 
The Magistrate, in his response to the applicant, stated his position, saying: 
I noticed that a man remained seated at the back of the court with headwear…As 
presiding Magistrate I ordered that he either remove his headwear or leave the court 
as previously requested by the police officers. He rose and proceeded to leave without 
replying.  It is not true that that person or anyone spoke to me and told me that he was 
wearing a tajh or that it was a religious garment and I deny that I made any reply...19 
The Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal took the position that the magistrate 
bore no responsibility of having to enquire about the nature of dress of the applicant.20 
Instead the court held that the burden of proof was on the applicant to demonstrate the 
religious significance and beliefs associated with his way of dress and that there was no 
duty on a magistrate to ascertain the connection between a person’s dress and his religious 
beliefs. Instead, the applicant, by the court’s reasoning, ought to have provided the 
magistrate with the facts surrounding his way of dress in order for the magistrate to decide 
whether it was a genuine case of dress based on religious belief.21 Accordingly, the Court 
of Appeal stated: 
The power of magistrates in sections 24 and 25 of the Summary Courts Act Chap 4: 
20 to punish summarily disobedience to any direction, ruling or order is based on the 
premise that magistrates are entitled to make orders regulating proceedings in their 
courts.  This power magistrates have enjoyed even prior to independence. Magistrates 
may prima facie exclude a member of the public from a court for refusing to remove 
headwear. Removal of headwear in the case of males is usually a sign of respect for 
the magistrate and a mark of the solemnity of the occasion.  For the same reason, 
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however, judges and barristers used to don wigs in the Supreme Court. If a member 
of the public raises a religious or other objection to a magistrate’s order or direction 
it does not follow automatically that the magistrate must waive his or her order as 
regards the objector. Facts would have to be laid out before the magistrate to persuade 
him or her of the nature and quality of the objection, and, above all, to enable the 
magistrate to assess whether even if the objection is genuine, in his or her residual 
discretion the objector should be permitted to remain in court in the interests of the 
administration of justice.22 
What is interesting from this passage is the reference of a power derived from a 
pre-independence tradition which vested in the magistrate the ability to make an order to 
regulate proceedings in the court, without the magistrate actually having any onus to make 
further enquiries as to what might be the beliefs of a person; and despite the possibility 
that those beliefs could have an influence on that person’s behaviour or appearance in the 
court. A contentious area arising from this reasoning is whether in the interest of justice, 
magistrates should instead be more encouraging of dialogue in the process of making 
orders to regulate proceedings when it comes to recognition of behaviours shaped by 
religious and cultural beliefs. Dialectically, the challenge with the reasoning of the Court 
of Appeal is that it refused to explore the possibility of magisterial pro-activism in 
recognizing diverse beliefs within the courtroom which might be manifested in how those 
present inside the court respond to certain situations, or present themselves to the court. 
In Sumayyah Mohammed v Moraine and Another23 the High Court of Trinidad 
and Tobago again showed its approach of taking a “non-committal stance on the issue of 
religious plurality or discrimination.”24 In this case, the applicant and her parents who 
were Muslims brought judicial review proceedings challenging the decision of her school 
not to permit her to wear a hijab while at school. The school, which was established in 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Sumayyah Mohammed v Moraine and Another CA.CIV.5/1995, (1995) 49 WIR 371. 
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1902 and had become a public school under the Education Act of Trinidad and Tobago25 
followed school regulations made in accordance with the Act which inter alia required 
pupils to wear the school uniform.26 The applicant’s parents requested that the school 
permit the applicant to wear the hijab but the principal of the school and its board of 
management refused to allow any exemption to the uniform, despite accepting the 
sincerity of the belief of the applicant and her parents that the student was required by the 
Islamic faith to wear the hijab.27 The principal and board of management informed the 
parents that if an exemption were allowed, other parents would also seek exemptions and 
that the uniform was a useful tool in administration, was conducive to good discipline, 
and created a sense of unity and of family.28 The applicant proceeded to attend the school 
wearing a modified version of the school uniform which conformed to the hijab but she 
was prevented from attending classes, thereby effectually being suspended. 29  The 
applicant then instituted proceedings for judicial review of the decision to suspend her 
and also claimed redress for contravention of her constitutional rights under the 
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago,30 in particular those under section 4(a), the right to 
enjoyment of property, 4(b), the right to equality before the law and 4(d), the right to 
equality of treatment by public authorities.31 The High Court held that the regulations 
regarding the dress code which were provided for under the Education Act were inflexibly 
applied by the respondents, and that the school should have taken into account the 
psychological effect on the student of refusing to allow her to wear the hijab.32 The Court 
further held that there was no evidence to support the respondent’s plea that the hijab 
would be conducive to indiscipline, threaten the traditional sense of loyalty to the school 
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or highlight differences between students from affluent and non-affluent homes.33 The 
Court however held that there was no breach of the applicant’s constitutional rights. The 
Court took the position that the ability to attend the school of one’s choice did not fall 
within the meaning of ‘property’ for the purposes of section 4(a) of the Trinidad and 
Tobago Constitution and deprivation of such right accordingly was not subject to 
constitutional redress.34 Furthermore, it was held that in the absence of bad faith or hostile 
intention on the part of the respondents, the applicant's claim that section 4(b) (right to 
equality before the law) or section 4(d) (right to equality of treatment by a public 
authority) had been contravened had not been established.35 In general, the approach by 
the court appeared to be reluctance in adopting a definite position on whether dress based 
on religious belief should be constitutionally protected.  
Another instance where the courts have preferred a conservative and formalistic 
disposition in its consideration of a situation where religious freedoms might have been 
infringed is the case of Re Orisa Movement EGBE 36 . The Orisa Movement, also 
commonly known as the ‘Spiritual Baptists’ or ‘Shouter Baptists’ is a Yoruba derived but 
somewhat syncretic Afro-Caribbean religion based on communotheism whereby a 
community of various interdependent and interrelated gods are collectively unified by a 
common ontological source. In this particular case, the Orisa Movement brought an action 
before the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago in which they claimed that the broadcasting 
of a television programme on their religion by the state sponsored national television 
company had portrayed their group in a negative manner. In denying their claim, the High 
Court held that the national television company was an autonomous body which was not 
subject to constitutional litigation.37 As Antoine explains, one of “the arguments raised 
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against their action was that as a corporate body, they could not enjoy freedom of 
conscience.”38  
In Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha of Trinidad and Tobago Inc. and others v 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago39 the appellants sought declarations that the 
national award of Trinidad and Tobago known as the Trinity Cross of the Order of Trinity 
breached the constitutional rights of non-Christians to equality, equal treatment and 
freedom of conscience and belief.40 The name of this award was essentially a product of 
the colonial experience.41 By Letters Patent dated 26 August 1969 a ‘society of honour’ 
was established by Her Majesty the Queen in Trinidad and Tobago by and with the advice 
of the Cabinet.42 The purpose of this was to give recognition to those “citizens of Trinidad 
and Tobago and other persons who had rendered distinguished or meritorious service or 
for gallantry.” 43  The appellants contended that as a Hindu and a Muslim, and as 
representative organisations of Hindus and Muslims existing in a multi-cultural and 
multi-religious society they were unfairly and discriminately encumbered in their ability 
to nominate persons, or to be nominated for, or accept the award because of its distinct 
and preferential recognition and depiction of Christian symbolism, theology and values.44 
They argued that Trinidad and Tobago embodies a unique historical, religious, cultural, 
and sociological background and therefore the continued existence of the award was 
discriminatory.45  
From a constitutional perspective, section 4 of the 1976 Constitution, which 
enshrined fundamental human rights and freedoms and provided for their protection, had 
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replaced section 1 of the 1962 pre-Republican Constitution.46 Section 6(1)(a) of the 1976 
Constitution provided, inter alia, that nothing in Section 4 was to invalidate an existing 
law, that is, any law that had effect as part of the law of Trinidad and Tobago prior to the 
commencement of the 1976 Constitution.47 ‘Law’, defined in Section 3(1), included any 
enactment, and any Act or statutory instrument of the United Kingdom that before the 
commencement of the 1976 Constitution had effect as part of the law of Trinidad and 
Tobago.48 The 1976 Constitution also contained a number of transitional and savings 
provisions. 49  Section 18 for example addressed enactments which had a narrower 
meaning than the word ‘law’ as defined by section 3(1) of the 1976 Constitution.50 This 
section provided, inter alia, that enactments which were made under the 1962 
Constitution and not declared void by a competent court on the basis of inconsistency 
with that Constitution would have full force and effect as part of the law of Trinidad and 
Tobago immediately before the commencement of the 1976 Constitution.51 This would 
be the case even if such enactments were inconsistent with any provision of the 1962 
Constitution.52 On this basis, at the High Court it was held that: 
…the creation and continued existence of the Trinity Cross, given the historical, 
religious and sociological context of Trinidad and Tobago, combined with the 
experiences, as well as the religious beliefs of Hindus and Muslims, amounted to 
indirect adverse effects discrimination against Hindus and Muslims. However, by 
reason of the savings of existing law provision in the 1976 Constitution, the Letters 
Patent establishing the Constitution of the Order of the Trinity and the Trinity Cross 
were deemed to be existing law and therefore could not be invalidated for 
inconsistency with the s 4 rights and freedoms under the 1976 Constitution.53 








53 Ibid, 379-380. 
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The High Court took the view that the Letters Patent which established the award 
meant that the name of the award was protected by virtue of the savings law clause. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, following which an appeal was made 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). At the JCPC the issue for 
determination was whether the Letters Patent which established the award was in fact part 
of existing  law within the scope of Section 6(1)(a) of the 1976 Constitution.54 The JCPC 
held that the appellants were entitled to a declaration that the name of the award breached 
their constitutional rights to equality and freedom of conscience and belief.55 According 
to the JCPC, Letters Patent were “an ancient form of law-making under the Prerogative”56 
and the Committee doubted whether the Letters Patent could be saved as an existing law 
under the 1976 Constitution because it could not be considered an enactment within the 
meaning of section 18 of the 1976 Act.57 The JCPC further stated that even if the exercise 
of Prerogative constituted to law-making, the issuing of Letters  Patent in 1969 was 
limited by section 2(1) of the 1962 Constitution which provided that no law was to 
authorise the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms 
declared  in section 1 of that constitution.58 The patent itself according to the JCPC was 
therefore unconstitutional. Accordingly, it was held: 
…that the appellants were entitled to a declaration that creation of the Trinity Cross 
of the Order of Trinity established by the Letters Patent given on 26 August 1969 
breached their right to equality under s 4(b), their right to equality of treatment under 
s 4(d) and their right to freedom of conscience and belief under s 4(h) of the 1976 
Constitution, provided that nothing therein should be taken to apply to any awards of 
that high honour that were made under the system that the Letters Patent had 
established before the date of the Board’s judgment. [Accordingly], the appeal would 
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be allowed and a declaration of invalidity to be applied prospectively would be 
made.59 
In this regard, the JCPC concluded that the award was “an infringement of the 
rights and freedoms of members of the Hindu and Muslim communities in Trinidad and 
Tobago.”60 What is quite unfortunate about this case is that Trinidad and Tobago, after 
many years of being a Republic, had to make its way to the JCPC for a determination on 
whether the Letters Patent was protected by savings law provisions. 
 
Gender and sexual identity on the courts  
At the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) level, there appears to be some 
apprehension by the court to indicate a definitive judicial position on the issue of Lesbian, 
Gay Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights. This was evident in Tomlinson v the State 
of Belize and the State of Trinidad and Tobago61 where the claimant was a Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) national from Jamaica and a lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
and intersex (LGBTI) activist. In his capacity as a LGBTI activist he regularly travelled 
throughout the Caribbean region.62 He had travelled to Belize on two occasions and 
Trinidad and Tobago on four occasions and had never experienced any difficulties at the 
ports of entry, nor been asked by an immigration officer about his sexual orientation nor 
told an immigration officer that he was homosexual.63  He claimed however that the 
defendants had prejudiced his enjoyment of his CARICOM right of free movement by 
virtue of legislative provisions in their immigration laws which expressly prohibited the 
entry of homosexuals.64 Tomlinson referred to section 5(1) of the Belize Immigration 
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Act 65  which states: “…the following persons are prohibited immigrants…(e) any 
prostitute or homosexual or any person who may be living on or receiving or may have 
been living on or receiving the proceeds of prostitution or homosexual behaviour…” and 
section 8(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Immigration Act66 which states: “…entry into 
Trinidad and Tobago of the persons described in this subsection, other than citizens and 
residents, is prohibited, namely…(e) prostitutes, homosexuals or persons living on the 
earnings of prostitutes or homosexuals, or persons reasonably suspected as coming to 
Trinidad and Tobago for these or any other immoral purposes.”  
Tomlinson, although not denying that both defendants appeared to have adopted 
a policy or practice which allowed homosexuals to enter their territories, contended that 
he had been prejudiced in the enjoyment of his right to free movement because there was 
genuine legal uncertainty surrounding what would happen on each occasion that he 
sought entry into either Belize or Trinidad and Tobago.67 Additionally, he sought an order 
that the defendant states amend their immigration laws so as to remove homosexuals from 
any class of prohibited immigrants.68 
The CCJ dismissed Tomlinson’s claims against Belize and Trinidad and Tobago 
and refused the requested remedies. The Court recommended that CARICOM Member 
States should endeavour to ensure that national laws, subsidiary legislation and 
administrative practices are consistent with, and transparent in their support of the right 
of free movement of all CARICOM nationals.69 The CCJ felt that this was a necessary 
aspect of the rule of law, which is the basic notion underlying CARICOM.70 The CCJ 
also stressed that the rule of law requires clarity and certainty and therefore any discord 
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between administrative practices and the apparent meaning of legislation is undesirable.71 
However, the CCJ held that Tomlinson was not in danger of being prejudiced by the 
Immigration Acts of Belize and Trinidad and Tobago. It held that the wording and context 
of the provisions of section 5(1)(e) of the Belize Act indicated that homosexuals are only 
prohibited from entering the country when they are seeking financial gain either by 
offering sexual services themselves or if they are profiting from those performed by 
others.72 The CCJ further held that this section is to be considered in the context of the 
CARIOM treaty responsibilities of Belize, with section 3(2) of the Caribbean Community 
Act73 making reference to section 64(1) of the Belize Interpretation Act74 which states 
that when determining the meaning of any provision of an Act, consideration is to be 
given to “any provision of the Caribbean Community Treaty and any Community 
instrument issued under the Treaty, where relevant.” The Court found that the practice of 
the administrative and executive arms of the state of Belize was to adhere to their treaty 
obligations.75  
With regards to the Trinidad and Tobago legislation, the CCJ noted that the 
wording of section 8(1)(e) was different from that of Belize since it regarded 
“homosexuals” separate and apart from “persons who live on the proceeds of 
homosexuals.” 76  Homosexuals were therefore a category of prohibited persons and 
therefore Tomlinson would appear to be prohibited from entry to Trinidad and Tobago. 
However, the CCJ felt that the approach of Trinidad and Tobago was a more liberal 
interpretation of the law, and despite the formal prohibition the CCJ found that Tomlinson 
has never been, and could never have been prejudiced in entering that country since its 
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Immigration Department does not apply the prohibition to CARICOM nationals who are 
homosexual. 77  The CCJ essentially took the view that this administrative practice 
amounted to an expression of official policy. The CCJ also found that Tomlinson enjoyed 
a legal right of entry under section 3 of the Immigration (Caribbean Community Skilled 
Nationals) Act 78 , which requires immigration officers to allow skilled CARICOM 
nationals who hold a ‘skills certificate’, entry into Trinidad and Tobago, notwithstanding 
any other written law.79 The CCJ felt that the practice of admitting homosexuals of other 
CARICOM states is not discretionary but instead legally required by Article 9 of the 
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC)80  as an “appropriate measure” to ensure the 
carrying out of obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by 
CARICOM.81 In this regard the CCJ decided that the inclusion of this Treaty provision 
into the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago, through its Caribbean Community Act82 
meant that this legal requirement equally exists within the domestic legal system of that 
state, notwithstanding any contradictory provision in the earlier Immigration Act.83  
In essence, the CCJ’s reasoning in Tomlinson steered clear of any attempt to 
consider the historical development of laws criminalizing homosexuality in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, and international developments which have strengthened the 
case for legal rights being afforded to the LGBT community in the region. Following the 
decision of Tomlinson however, the Trinidad and Tobago High Court in Jason Jones v 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 84  declared that country’s ‘buggery’ laws 
unconstitutional and adopted the view that sexual orientation is an essential attribute of 
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privacy, which is intrinsically linked to human dignity.85 Accordingly, Justice Rampersad 
stated: 
To this court, human dignity is a basic and inalienable right recognized worldwide in 
all democratic societies. Attached to that right is the concept of autonomy and the 
right of an individual to make decisions for herself/himself without any unreasonable 
intervention by the State. In a case such as this, she/he must be able to make decisions 
as to who she/he loves, incorporates in his/her life, who she/he wishes to live with and 
not have to live under the constant threat, the proverbial “Sword of Damocles”, that 
at any moment she/he may be persecuted or prosecuted.86 
From this passage, the court suggests a relationship between safeguarding the 
rights of an individual and the protection of a larger group. In a sense, Jones signalled a 
departure from a formal approach in its recognition that the existing law had the 
propensity to marginalize homosexuals. Despite the decision in Jones however, generally 
the Commonwealth Caribbean jurisprudence suggests that the approach is one of judicial 
formalism in regard to how an understanding of equality should be constructed. The cases 
and related social issues serve as a microcosm of larger problem in terms of how the legal 
system intertwines with belief systems, with that problem being a conflict in the operation 
of practical knowledge and formal procedure. Scott, in referring to the concept of mētis 
which is the type of practical knowledge that the ancient Greeks believed carried 
Odysseus through his adventures, argues that formal epistemic knowledge is too 
particularistic and simplifies social realities. 87  The core conflict is that practical 
knowledge and formal knowledge are very opposite in their characteristics and operation. 
Whereas formal knowledge is more explicit and general, practical knowledge tends to be 
local and implicit. According to Scott, through formal knowledge, the social reality is 
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reduced to standardized facts and written documentary which are more of a static and 
aggregate character.88 The outcome is that a system based on a mapping of social reality 
through standardization cannot justify its rationality because it is unable to address 
complexities in natural and social processes.89   
2. Inadequacies of formalism vs. other approaches to equality 
A formal approach to equality in a sense suggests an interpretation of laws within 
a realm which is suspended from things such as judicial activism or further enquiry 
beyond the scope of legal doctrine. Instead the focus is on the law itself, and how it should 
be interpreted with itself. According to Atiyah:  
Formalism really represents an attitude of mind rather than anything else; the attitude 
is that of the judge who believes that all law is based on legal doctrine and principles 
which can be deduced from precedents; that there is only one “correct” way of 
deciding a case; that it is not the function of the judge to invoke policy considerations, 
or even arguments about the relative justice of the parties' claims; that the reasons 
behind principles and rules are irrelevant; that the role of the judge is purely passive 
and interpretive; that law is a science of principles, and so on.90 
Atiyah goes on to describe the growth of formalism: 
From 1850 or thereabouts, the phenomenon of formalism took an increasing hold 
upon English legal thought.  I have sketched above the principal characteristics of 
formalism as it affected English law, in particular, it involved rejection of the law-
making power of the judge, rejection of the relevance of policy issues to legal 
questions, belief that law was a deductive science of principles, and that the one “true” 
answer to legal questions could be found by a strictly logical process.  It involved also 
a belief in the objective reality of legal concepts, so that, for example, lawyers came 
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to see the answer to legal issues as depending on the “true” delineation of concepts 
such as offer, acceptance, consideration, estoppel, and a variety of others.  The notion 
that legal concepts and categories were merely tools by which the lawyer could arrive 
at a range of justifiable decisions was not so much rejected, as simply not entertained 
by most English lawyers. And inextricably involved in this development was the 
gradual decline of the influence of external factors or bodies of thought on the law.  It 
was, indeed, partly because lawyers could no longer find their answers in broad 
theories about society, or political economy, or moral principles, that they 
increasingly turned inward to the law itself.91 
It is challenging to argue however that in a common law system, formal law as it 
exists provides a level playing field when it comes to access to diversity rights by groups 
within the society. This is explained further by Pejovich who states: 
As an outgrowth of the hand of the past, common law has never emphasized social 
justice, the common good or other vague terms legislators and bureaucrats use as the 
façade of words hiding their preference for top-down regulations. The focus of 
common law has always been on the protection of individual freedom, free exchange 
and private property rights. And the consistent protection of individual freedom, free 
exchange and private property rights means that common law has been in tune with 
the capitalist culture that emphasizes self-interest, self-determination and self-
responsibility.92 
It would be unfair however to blame the current Commonwealth Caribbean legal 
systems which are of the common law tradition as lacking morality because of their 
apparent withdrawal from social justice issues brought about by formal approaches to 
legal interpretation. Admittedly, however, the common law enables a capitalist culture of 
which moral interests do not feature at the forefront of the system. Although Weber’s 
classification of legal systems characterized by formal rationality carry with it the weight 
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of being voided of considerations of social justice, the common law actually incorporated 
customs and traditions up to the beginning of the twenty-first century. Accordingly, 
Pejovich writes: 
Moreover, common law is not amoral. Only informal rules that meet a shared notion 
of ethics can survive the test of time. Common law precedents have passed the test of 
time, not because they were reasoned to be socially just or politically correct, but 
because they subsumed customs and traditions. Hence the moral context of the hand 
of the past is implicit in common law precedents. To say that common law is 
institutionalized tradition and customs requires an explanation. Translating informal 
rules into formal laws is not analogous to putting a dime in the machine and getting 
out the written version of informal rules. Different judges have different subjective 
perceptions of prevailing informal rules. Their understanding of the basic legal 
principles is not necessarily the same. It is, then, fair to say that, while the process of 
creating formal rules in common law countries subsumes the hand of the past, it also 
bears the imprint of actions by common law judges.93 
The legitimacy of the common law was thus founded on informal rules in the form 
of local customs and traditions which were actually linked to rising individualism in 
England. The difference in the Commonwealth Caribbean however is that the link 
between individualism within an informal system which subsumes the customs and 
traditions of diverse groups, and formal law is yet to be rationalized.  
Despite the common law being informed by custom and tradition, the notion of 
collective rights is actually counter intuitive to that of capitalism in terms of concepts 
such as methodological individualism and classical liberalism, which are both features of 
capitalism and the legal systems which protect it.94 The rationality of how individualism 
in general works is that humans are able to come to certain resolutions based on their 
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individual assessments of knowledge acquired through their human experience. 
Accordingly, Pejovich states:  
Individualism means that human action is the result of emotions, desires, preferences 
and evaluations that only the individual can develop and appreciate. Decisions made 
by governments, parliaments, corporations and other organizations are actually 
decisions made by individuals. Individuals conceive ideas, invest time and effort in 
formulating policies, convince others to accept their ideas and bear the risk of 
failures.95  
Pejovich further describes the ideology behind individualism, stating: 
The culture of individualism rewards competitive performance, promotes risk taking 
and views income inequalities as desirable results of entrepreneurship and free trade. 
It sees the community as a voluntary association of individuals who, in the pursuit of 
their private ends, join and leave the community by free choice. Holding the 
individual to be superior to any group encourages behaviour based on the principles 
of self-interest, self-responsibility and self-determination.96 
In its classical sense, moral justification for individualism in the West was found 
in the concept being rooted in theological approaches centered on the Christian value that 
God created individuals and not collectives. 97  Individualism assumes a direct link 
between the individual and God, and the effect is that the individual holds the knowledge 
of what is good for himself, and therefore has the ability to make choices based on this. 
The ability to make ethical decisions therefore comes from within – the sacred self. The 
idea of individualism has been confronted by events such as the Enlightenment, the 
French Revolution and ideologies such as socialism, which sought to challenge the idea 
of individual liberty with that of a common good which is defined by the elite. 98 
Defenders of methodological individualism argue however that it is meant to be removed 
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from political or ideological motivation, with Weber cautioning that “it is a tremendous 
misunderstanding to think that an ‘individualistic’ method should involve what is in any 
conceivable sense an individualistic system of values.”99 
Like individualism, classical liberalism also gives priority to individual freedom. 
In explaining, classical liberalism, Pejovich states: 
Classical liberalism is about individual liberty, openness to new ideas, tolerance of all 
views, private property rights, the rule of law and the freedom of contracts. Individual 
liberty, openness to new ideas and tolerance of the values held by others create an 
environment in which individuals are free to pursue their private ends. In a classical 
liberal society individuals are expected to tolerate one another’s preferences, while 
the state is expected to protect those preferences from external interference (including 
by the state itself).100  
The way in which classical liberalism and individualism has been incorporated 
into the capitalist system, which as discussed, appears to be protected by legal formalism, 
has taken different forms in England and Continental Europe. Whereas Continental 
Europe leaned towards collective rulings on social issues, liberalism in England favoured 
“piecemeal resolution of social issues via voluntary interactions among freely choosing 
individuals.”101 The English form of classical liberalism is in a sense demonstrated in 
Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems, which allow for formal rules that enable 
individuals the freedom to pursue their private ends and to form contractual relationships. 
The formal system under this approach therefore seeks to provide a framework to 
facilitate the objectives of individual interaction instead of being concerned with seeking 
specific outcomes. In a sense, the European approach theoretically suggests a method 
which addresses diversity and a unified society. It is based on the assumption that a just 
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society exists, and that formal rules which achieve that just society is discovered by 
human reasoning. From these assumptions, a raison d’être for the support of social 
engineering is established, as well as a political justification for governments to pursue 
it.102 The difference between the Continental approach and the English and American 
approach is that the role of the powerful state has never been seriously questioned as the 
state is embraced as overseeing all individual action, including those in the economic 
domain.103 There is a mistrust in the economic system being left to organize itself, and 
undiluted capitalism is thought to be unfavourable.104 
The most famous assault on formalism was led by the Legal Realists of the 1920’s 
and 1930’s who attacked the core of formalism, which was the argument of judges being 
constrained by understanding the logic of highly abstract legal principles.105 What the 
legal realists did was to challenge the concept of law being regarded as an autonomous 
system of rules and principles which was fluid enough in its operation so as to enable the 
legal system to arrive at outcomes which captured judicial objectivity, since the system 
allowed for judges to reach decisions which were discernible and politically 
independent.106 If the system was not as objective as formalism actually proposes, it 
would suggest operational flaws and inconsistencies in decisions caused by subjectivity 
created by the political, social and moral inclinations of judges. If this were actually the 
circumstance, then it would give rise to a question of judicial legitimacy and whether 
judges are attempting to play the role of technocrat. 
The view also exists that the suppression of collective rights can actually be 
counterintuitive to the protection of the freedom of the individual. Kymlicka explains that 
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the fear exists that collective rights “demanded by ethnic and national groups are, by 
definition, inimical to individual rights.”107 However, he goes on to list three types of 
group-differentiated rights which help to “reduce the vulnerability of minority groups to 
the economic pressures and political decisions of the larger society.” 108  These are, 
“special group representation rights within the political institutions of the larger 
society” 109  which makes it less likely that a national or ethnic minority will be 
marginalized in the country-wide decision making process; “self-government rights”110 
to devolve powers to smaller political units to protect the minority group from being 
“outvoted or outbid by the majority on decisions that are of particular importance to their 
culture” 111 ; and “Polyethnic rights” 112  which would “protect specific religious and 
cultural practices which might not be adequately supported through the market”113 or 
which might be unintentionally disadvantaged by existing legislation. Kymlicka further 
interestingly argues that “minority rights are not only consistent with individual freedom, 
but can actually promote it.”114  He contends that the modern world is divided into 
‘societal cultures’ typically associated with national groups, which through its practices 
and institutions “cover the full range of human activities, encompassing both public and 
private life.”115 He further contends that individual freedom is “intimately tied up with 
membership in these cultures.”116 Accordingly, freedom is dependent on the presence of 
a societal culture, and therefore it “matters that national minorities have access to their 
own culture.”117 In essence, Kymlicka states that there are certain cultural preconditions 
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that need to be satisfied in order to achieve freedom of choice, and therefore issues of 
cultural membership need to be incorporated into the liberal principles which focus on 
individualism.118 
3. Philosophical and Legal underpinnings of the existing system 
 The Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems seem to be dominated by an 
environment of formalism in how the law and equality is understood and administered 
harboured a conservative environment in the transition from colonialism to independence. 
It is debatable as to whether this was an intended design. Yet, operationally conservative 
mechanisms within the political and legal frameworks of Commonwealth Caribbean 
societies in the aftermath of colonialism suggests an ideal approach to preserving legal 
norms and preventing revolutionary Marxist/Leninist challenges from within the society 
on how the society and rule of law should be structured. Weber explores the relationship 
between formalism and capitalism in Economy and Society119  where he places legal 
systems into various categories, with one being ‘formal rationality.’120  According to 
Weber, legal systems falling into this category display the characteristic of judges who 
apply highly abstract rules through a process he describes as the “logical analysis of 
meaning”121 which is essentially the formalistic approach. Weber posited that the “logical 
analysis of meaning” approach produced outcomes which voided considerations of justice 
from the legal decision making process.122 On this point, Kennedy explains:  
Logically formal rationality is most definitely not necessary in order for the mode of 
authority to be ideal-typically legal. All that is needed is that the mode of lawfinding 
to be sufficiently “formal” - that is, rule-bound - so that lawfinding is plausibly 
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impersonal. For example, there are types of formal legal rationality that are not 
“logical,” including particularly the English common law.123 
This form of law and legal interpretation according to Weber was unique to 
Western legal systems and enabled the rise of capitalism in that part of the world.124 
Essentially, it excluded morality as an appropriate legal consideration, consequently 
allowing for the legal system to develop a structure which facilitated the free market 
economy. Raban explains this further in stating: 
So long as morality was allowed to impact legal resolutions, the legal rules that allow 
capitalism to thrive were often sacrificed for justice; only when morality was out of 
the way could the legal system provide the necessary legal underpinning for a truly 
free market economy. For example, allowing property rights to drive the destitute 
from land they had occupied for generations, or enforcing a contract even if it spelled 
ruin to one of the parties, or exempting commercially beneficial activities (like newly 
developed railways) from compensating for injuring they had caused absent a 
demonstration of negligence, are all results that may appear unjust but may be 
essential for a successful market economy.125 
This claim puts forward a view of a tension between conservativism and popular 
justice because of the conservative penchant for formalism. However, as Raban also 
discusses, the tension might not mean that one group has a higher claim to morality than 
the other. On this point, Raban states: 
But why think that conservative positions are less moral than liberal ones? The answer 
cannot be based, à-la Weber, on a conservative belief in capitalism, since American 
liberals are also advocates of a free market economy. Liberals are capitalists too—but 
they are no formalists. In any event, conservative formalists surely believe that their 
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substantive positions are the moral ones, and that the liberal agenda (abortion rights, 
welfare rights, criminal defendants’ rights, strong federal power at the expense of 
local democracy, etc.) is the one in conflict with popular morality.126 
Notwithstanding this debate on morality, Commonwealth Caribbean states have 
historically displayed reactionary tendencies which lean towards preservation of the 
status quo. Reactionary responses by Commonwealth Caribbean policy makers were 
evident during the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, where citizens of 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries played a part in the call for racial de-segregation and 
legal recognition of the rights of African Americans. 127  At the same time, in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean itself, the ‘Black Power Revolution’ in Trinidad and Tobago 
witnessed both Afro-Caribbean and Indo-Caribbean individuals marching together for 
socio-political change. Then, in Grenada in 1979, Maurice Bishop and his New Jewel 
Movement lead an armed uprising in response to what he thought was the failure to create 
a system of ‘grassroots’ democracy in that country.128 Bishop was seen by the United 
States as a threat to their hegemony in the region, particularly because of his 
Marxist/Leninist beliefs and his ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. 129  He was later 
executed in 1983 following an invasion of the island by the United States Army. What 
would have been ideal opportunity for legal reform across the Commonwealth Caribbean 
instead developed into a situation where regional governments viewed rights-based 
activism and calls for social reform as a threat to the state, and associated it with a type 
of socialism which would endanger the Westminster tradition. According to Goulbourne: 
In the West, including the Commonwealth Caribbean, governments were afraid of the 
new wave of militancy emanating from the United States as a result of the civil rights 
movement and the opposition to the war against Vietnam. In the English-speaking 
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Caribbean the black power slogan which West Indians had helped to proclaim in the 
USA appeared to pose a threat to regimes. For example, Stokeley Carmichael (now 
Kwame Ture), himself a Trinidadian by birth, was refused entry into the country by 
Eric Williams. Walter Rodney’s ban in Jamaica was part of the response of the state 
to this general situation in the region as a whole. But there were other developments. 
Leading academics such as George Beckford had their passport confiscated, thereby 
restricting their movements. Guyanese academic and intellectual, Clive Thomas, and 
Ken Post the outspoken British political analyst, were also denied entry into Jamaica. 
Moreover, following the Grenada invasion in 1983, which he supported, the prime 
minister of Jamaica, Edward Seaga, brought to parliament a list of names of well-
known Jamaicans who had apparently visited either Havana or Moscow. These 
people, by virtue of having been to these two cities were, by implication, dangerous 
to the welfare of the country.130 
Lent contends that the three Commonwealth Caribbean states that adopted 
socialist governments in the past - Grenada, Guyana and Jamaica, witnessed difficulties 
in government-media relationships primarily because of a fundamental distrust of 
socialism by conservative media which are tied to big business interests131: 
In both Jamaica and Grenada, much of the protest against the governments' media 
tactics came from the big business sector, which, in the name of press freedom, 
protected its vested interests by denouncing socialism. In Jamaica especially, once 
Manley steered his government to the socialist position, there was very little he could 
do that was right in the eyes of the Gleaner. If, as reported in Jamaica and Grenada, 
the CIA supported local media in plots to overthrow the leaderships, then this itself is 
a very serious infringement of a right-the right to national sovereignty.132 
It is arguable that preservation of the status quo as evident by the reactions of 
Commonwealth Caribbean territories enables legal certainty in the sense that all 
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normative institutions and values are also being preserved. According to Weber, this type 
of legal certainty created by legal formalism was essential for the functioning of 
capitalism. 133  Kennedy believes that conservativism and formalism share a similar 
rhetoric and also links them through the notion of legal certainty as both concepts trust in 
the absolute importance of a defined legal order which is also predictable.134 Preserving 
legal certainty therefore meant protection of the Westminster system and a trust in the 
model of a unitary state governed from the centre by virtue of an executive who in the 
national interest pursues policies applicable to all sections of the society that they believe 
amount to a public good. 
It is somewhat difficult to argue that the best means for constitutional change 
should be by way of revolution. Likewise, it is also challenging to assert that gradual 
changes over a period of time is the better process to accomplish constitutional reform. 
Nonetheless, revolution is generally considered as a catalyst for constitutional change, as 
influenced by changes in the social, economic and political approaches to configuration 
of the state. While it has previously been discussed that constitutional change in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean appears to be slow, and gradual, it was also discussed with 
reference to the Grenada revolution that the process of constitutional change could also 
appeal to revolutionary approaches.  
Revolution has often been synonymous with a resistance to the established 
political and socio-economic order by persons who feel in a disadvantaged position. 
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara for instance developed the foquismo or ‘foco theory’ which 
proposed that revolutionary guerrillas “should move to immediately launch a guerrilla 
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war on regular armies in countries with high levels of rural poverty and repressive 
states.”135 As Arana, May and Schneider explain, 
The foco theory makes the claim that revolutionary guerrillas could 
successfully leverage their strategic advantages by appealing to oppressed 
campesinos, and carrying out acts of sabotage on regular armies in remote regions of 
poor countries where regular armies would be unfamiliar with the terrain…..The most 
important element of foquismo was the idea that the popular will for revolution could 
be created by a popular insurrection. This eliminated the need for potential 
revolutionaries to organize a revolutionary vanguard, or even to do massive peasant 
or worker organization and education campaigns…..This foco would eventually (and 
inevitably) grow into a regular army capable of defeating the forces of oppression. 
What this meant for social activists in other poor and less developed countries, 
particularly and explicitly the other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
was that revolutionary armed struggle could be initiated immediately.136 
It is from this context that one ought to consider what exactly would bring about 
this type of revolutionary attitude, and whether it can be legally justified. According to 
Tushnet, a constitution reflects the will of the people, with the constitution containing 
provisions which are considered at the time unamendable.137 However, he argues that 
there can exist ‘unconstitutional’ constitutional amendments, and this would bring to the 
forefront deep questions about the constitutional foundation. Under these circumstances, 
Tushnet claims that revolutionary actions can adopt a legal form, and in explaining this 
process he writes: 
 Suppose that the people at time-two want to replace the unamendable provision. 
They are given authoritative legal judgments—by the courts or by their legal 
advisers—that they cannot use the ordinary methods of constitutional 
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amendment to do so. They then nonetheless deploy the methods they believe 
authorized by law to replace the existing constitution: They use public resources 
to conduct a referendum in which the constitutional change they seek receives 
substantial popular approval. They again receive authoritative legal judgments 
that such methods cannot be used to put in place a constitution that omits the 
unamendable provision, and that the purported amendment is not part of the 
nation’s constitution. They then declare that they have “altered and abolished” 
the government created by the existing constitution and put a new one in place.138 
 As such the citizens would have “accomplished a legally effective 
amendment of the unamendable provision, by exercising their right of revolution.”139 
However, Tushnet views such a process as being equivalent to a pro tanto constitutional 
revolution which can be actualized without resort to the type of violence that is often 
associated with revolutions in politics.140 Tushnet also asserts that revolution in itself 
cannot be proceduralized – “we would gain nothing by saying that a set of events that 
actually transformed a nation’s constitutional identity did not count as a revolution 
because, for example, it occurred without substantial violence.”141 Accordingly, not all 
constitutional revolutions may be considered violent, and can sometimes be realized by 
utilizing existing legal forms.142  
The need for constitutional change might not also be a sole factor in harnessing a 
revolution. Meeks for instance argues that revolutions should be delinked from 
teleological notions of history as they are instead “highly complex events located in a 
particular time and place, each in turn influenced and transformed by the preceding 
accumulation of revolutionary experiences.”143 This was demonstrated in Grenada for 
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example with the formation of the revolutionary New Jewel Movement (NJM), which 
was a combination of the Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP) and the 
Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (Jewel). Meeks demonstrates that 
Jewel had close ties to the “rural pulse and possessed a far more black-power, self-reliant 
tradition, drawing freely on the evangelical, almost mystical view of black liberation 
which was an important trend in the Trinidad black power movement.”144 However, 
MAP’s appeal was with its “well-connected and economically independent core of 
lawyers and its more developed ideological platform” 145  which was based on their 
interpretation of C.L.R. James’s concept of Marxism.146 Following the establishment of 
the NJM however, Meek argues that the party displayed a shift away from the previously 
dominant Jamesian model and instead adopted a Leninist philosophy.147 
If one agrees with Meek’s expansive spatial description of what contributes to a 
revolutionary movement, one can contended that there might be no definite or correct 
answer as to whether constitutional change in the Commonwealth Caribbean could be 
more appropriately achieved by means of revolution, instead of through gradual changes 
in the rule of law as time passes. While certain unique conditions might give rise to an 
armed revolution, by virtue of Tushnet’s argument, through the utilization of public 
avenues such as referendums and legal proceedings, the rule of law can be utilized in a 
revolutionary manner to bring about changes without having to resort to violence. 
 
Detraditionalisation and Institutional influences  
Detraditionalisation is based on the argument that capitalism and its associated 
mass consumer culture undermines the value of traditional culture, thereby making it lose 
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aspects of its normative qualities. 148  Heelas for instance argues that while culture 
represented a moral authority to set apart what is important from what is not, this process 
is now being weakened.149 Accordingly, Heelas states: 
…people have to turn to their own resources to decide what they value, to organise 
their priorities and to make sense of their lives. That is to say, the weakening of 
traditional bonds to cultural values, social positions, religion, marriage and so on, 
means that people find themselves in the position where they have to select from those 
packaged options or styles to which the cultural realm has been reduced in order to 
construct their own ways of life.150 
In a sense, individualism can be considered as something which enables a positive 
action of allowing individuals to live without being restricted by norms which reflect 
tradition and therefore allows the individual autonomy to contemplate and achieve their 
full human potential. However, Lõhmus explains that individualism actually is shaped by 
institutionalized influences.151  Lõhmus suggests: 
....the claim to autonomy and self-realisation has been increasingly made into 
something of an institutional demand – an expectation set by media, the capitalist 
economy, and legal regulations, demanding that individuals present themselves as 
being flexible, active, inventive, resourceful and willing to develop themselves if they 
wished to achieve success in their profession or in society. What is demanded is a 
vigorous model of action in everyday life, which puts ego at its centre. 
“Responsibility” means now, first and last, responsibility to oneself (“you deserve 
this”, “you owe this to yourself “), while “responsible choices” are, first and last, those 
moves which will serve the interests and satisfy the desire of the actor. To 
individualism corresponds the liberal virtue of independence – the disposition to care 
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for, and take responsibility for oneself and avoid becoming needlessly dependent on 
others. If you are poor or unemployed, it is because you are lazy or lack willpower.152 
It is in this context that Lõhmus puts forward the view that demands for self-
sufficiency suggests that persons will behave self-servingly instead of caringly, and that 
there is an absence of trust. This element of trust is actually a feature of traditionalism 
and is linked to certainty in the sense that the liberal, autonomous individual who is 
moving away from rules which form traditional norms is now responsible for discovering 
certainty and inventing rules. This in itself creates chaos because those reference points 
for what might have been considered authoritative behaviour are now voided. 
 
Utilitarianism and group rights 
Utilitarianism promotes group rights above individual rights in the context that 
individual rights can be protected by empowering the group.153 Although the ultimate 
objective of formal approaches is to protect the individual, this paradoxically can be 
accomplished by favouring the group over the individual. In a sense, this approach 
suggests that there is subjectivity in the sentiments which are understood to constitute 
individualism. 
Bentham discusses the subjectivity of individualism in the context that if one 
individual does not consider a particular act as being pleasurable, this does not mean that 
another person or group of persons should be prohibited from engaging in the act, as 
different individuals possess varying susceptibilities in terms of their perceptions of 
pleasure and pain. Accordingly, Bentham writes: 
To every man what is the greatest pain? That which in his own judgment, assisted by 
his own memory, and through that printed upon his own feelings, is so. Reader, 
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whoever you are, ask of yourself and answer to yourself these questions: Is there—
can there be—that man who knows or who can know as well as yourself what it is 
that has given you pleasure or what it is that has given you most pleasure? Of these 
observations what is the most obvious practical conclusion? That, being the best judge 
for himself what line of conduct on each occasion will be the most conducive to his 
own well-being, every man, being of mature age and sound mind, ought on this 
subject to be left to judge and act for himself: and that every thing which by any other 
man can be said or done in the view of giving direction to the conduct of the first, is 
no better than folly and impertinence.154 
This type of subjectivity also influenced Bentham’s view that each individual had 
an equal right to the total happiness which his nature allowed.155 Although Bentham 
considered that every individual on each occasion pursued his self-interest with his 
conduct being subject to the limitations of his motives, this did not mean that the 
individual on every occasion ought to pursue his own interests.156 The legislator would 
therefore lack absolute and certain knowledge of the feelings of others, despite of being 
asked to take account of them. 157  The utilitarian legislator however, although 
acknowledging that there might not be certainty that a particular decision would promote 
the greatest happiness, would still be prepared to give reasons to justify the measures 
which he has decided on.158 Bentham also criticised the common law incorporation of 
natural law through the epistemological argument that the concept of natural rights in a 
metaphysical sense is absurd because of the question of access to the metaphysical realm 
on the basis that either the this realm does not exist, or it cannot be perceived.159 
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Formalism as a valuable good, but not as a universal human good 
According to Tamanaha, when the rule of law is approached as one of formal 
legality, it is a “supremely valuable good” but not necessarily a universal human good.160 
Tamanaha’s view is that rules, which are the embodiment of formal legality, should not 
be thought to dominate in all circumstances.161 While formal legality might be good in 
addressing legal limits on government and security of transactions, it is “counter-
productive in situations that require discretion, judgment, compromise or context-specific 
adjustments.”162 This is an important issue for Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems 
to consider, as contemplating the limits of discretion in determining the scope of 
compromise or context-specific adjustments in the judicial decision-making process 
might conflict with judicial perceptions of being bounded by a tradition of formal legality. 
Yet again, this conflict can be attributed to a largely unrevised historical progression of a 
formalistic-viewed rule of law from the moment of its transplanted origin, particularly in 
relation to claims for religious, cultural or other collective or individual rights either based 
on the belief that the right ought to exist, or because that right actually exists in another 
jurisdiction, or within the international human rights system. The risk of this type of 
formalism which has arguably become somewhat of a norm because of a continued 
ideologically entrenched, uniform approach in following its methods, is the legal system 
generating counter-productive outcomes in the sense that its methods threaten the spatial 
existence of communitarianism and traditional and other localized or syncretic systems 
which have developed within its own realms. As such, Tamahana states: 
Often orientations other than formal legality will be less disruptive of existing 
relationships and social bonds. Strict adherence to the dictates of formal legality can 
be alienating and destructive when it clashes with surrounding social understandings, 
                                                 
160 Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law (see n. 105, p. 169), 139. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid, 140. 
183 
particularly when there are strongly shared communitarian values and when everyone 
expects justice to be done. An emphasis on formal legality potentially creates 
particular difficulties in situations where a substantial bulk of the law and legal 
institutions is transplanted from elsewhere, as is common in post-colonial societies, 
for the reason that the legal norms and institutions may clash with local norms and 
institutions.163 
In a slight departure from Tamanaha’s analogy, what is interesting about the 
Commonwealth Caribbean is that the local norms and institutions prior to colonialism 
would have been limited to those of the indigenous peoples of the region. However, as 
previously discussed, a multicultural environment became a product of the colonial 
experience. Hence, what the region faced was a fusion of varying belief systems from 
different societies now establishing a presence in the region, but subject to a unified legal 
system which was primarily based on colonial perspectives of the rule of law and certain 
precepts of Anglo-Christian values prevalent at the time.  
 
Substantive Equality 
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Withler v Canada (Attorney 
General)164: 
Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, rejects the mere presence or absence of 
difference as an answer to differential treatment. It insists on going behind the facade 
of similarities and differences. It asks not only what characteristics the different 
treatment is predicated upon, but also whether those characteristics are relevant 
considerations under the circumstances. The focus of the inquiry is on the actual 
impact of the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, economic and 
historical factors concerning the group. The result may be to reveal differential 
treatment as discriminatory because of prejudicial impact or negative stereotyping. Or 
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it may reveal that differential treatment is required in order to ameliorate the actual 
situation of the claimant group.165 
Substantive equality recognises that laws may appear to be non-discriminatory 
but may not address the specific needs of certain groups of people. In certain instances 
they might actually be indirectly discriminatory by creating systemic discrimination.166 
McCrudden states that substantive equality is furthered through the securing of basic 
social protections - “A vital way in which equality guarantees are underpinned is by 
ensuring that basic social protections for the most vulnerable are secured, such as housing, 
food, and education. To the extent that such protections are provided to all, substantive 
equality will be furthered.”167 Similarly, Fredman has argued that social rights might 
provide “a better route to substantive equality”.168 
A main objection to formal equality when contrasted with substantive equality is 
that it has the capacity to disallow measures which are actually designed to promote 
equality. Accordingly, Wesson states: 
For instance, by insisting that individuals should always be treated alike, regardless 
of attributes such as race and sex, a formal approach appears to preclude positive 
action in the form of, for instance, affirmative action. Policies such as these recognise 
that disadvantage frequently tracks characteristics such as race and therefore takes 
these into account rather than ignoring them completely. What formal equality fails 
to recognise is that it is only in certain contexts that such characteristics are irrelevant 
and detrimental. Substantive equality, in contrast, takes account of the position of the 
individual in society and the impact that the measure is likely to have upon her. In 
particular, government action that entrenches pre-existing disadvantage is unlikely to 
be upheld, whereas measures that promote disadvantaged groups are likely to be 
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endorsed. Unlike formal equality, substantive equality therefore authorises, although 
it does not require, positive action. ….A key feature of substantive equality is 
therefore its commitment to bettering the position of worse-off sectors of society.169 
Fredman presents a four-dimensional conception of substantive equality, which 
postulates that an equal society will ensure equality in each of the four dimensions for all 
people.170 First, under the redistribution dimension, the cycle of economic disadvantage 
suffered by members of out-groups will have been broken, so that no groups are 
systematically excluded from material wealth. 171  Secondly, under the recognition 
dimension, all people will receive equal recognition of their dignity and worth.172 Thirdly, 
under the transformative dimension, society’s institutions will have been adapted to 
facilitate diversity so that members of different groups are accommodated rather than 
required to assimilate to dominant norms.173 Fourthly, under the participative dimension, 
society will have developed to the point where members of all groups will have the 
capacity to participate fully in society, both socially and politically.174   
An effective system of substantive equality would need a mechanism which 
legitimizes policy making powers of judges and enables it to withstand any inclination of 
arriving at outcomes which are influenced by personal views. It ideally ought to be 
characterized by judicial methodology which prevents the transposing of value judgments 
into the decision making process.  
 
 
Substantive Equality by building on ‘first order’ norms 
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Essentially a legal claim needs to be backed by a legal right, and that legal right 
invokes a normative framework which supports the protection of the right. Bhamra 
suggests a normative framework which accommodates the specificities of diversity 
should be constructed on a platform built on first order norms.175 She refers to first order 
norms as those which form part of ‘official law’ such as legislation or case law. Bhamra 
states: 
For example, a claim under anti-discrimination legislation appeals to the normative 
priority of a society of equals, whilst a freedom of religion claim is grounded upon 
the idea, inter alia, of liberal individual autonomy and the open choice of each 
individual’s conception of the good life. It is assumed that these first order norms are 
largely already settled in their content....I believe the first order norms in case law can 
be found in the landmark judgments of the upper courts. By this I mean those 
judgments that have become strong precedents and which capture or clarify the spirit 
behind official law in that particular area. I do not mean to suggest that the ratio 
decidendi of such a case represents first order norms; rather, that such judgments 
move from these first order norms in order to reach their factually specific 
conclusions.176 
What Bhamra suggests is that ‘official law’ promises three main first order norms 
which can be constructed as a response to diversity, although conceding that they do not 
necessarily constitute an actual normative foundation of the response.  The first norm is 
that official law promises equality177 , a feature which is present in Commonwealth 
Caribbean Constitutions. Bulkan in his article, the Poverty of Equality Jurisprudence in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean178 discusses the regional constitutional outlook on this 
protected characteristic of equality in writing: 
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Almost all the constitutions of countries making up the Commonwealth Caribbean 
commence with some introductory commitment to the principle of equality, even if 
only by implication. The preamble to the Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, for 
example, captures this ideal through its acknowledgement of respect for “the dignity 
and worth of the human person” and the entitlement of “all persons” to fundamental 
rights and freedoms. It then goes on to espouse the commitment that “there should be 
opportunity for advancement on the basis of recognition of merit, ability and 
integrity”. These or similar aspirations are echoed in the preambles of all of the other 
constitutions, with some even expressing respect for equality in more direct and 
forceful language. The “newer” constitutions of Belize and Guyana are the best 
examples of this directness, with robust declarations in their preambles that speak to 
“equal and inalienable rights”, the “elimination of economic and social privilege”, 
and policies which ensure gender equality.179 
Although the right to equality is classed as a constitutionally protected right, 
Bulkan argues that when the substantive enacting provisions of the regional constitutions 
are examined, there is actually a lack of reference to equality.180 Bulkan sees this as an 
inadequate way of legislating for equality, and accordingly writes: 
All but one of the five earliest independence constitutions contain no general right to 
equality, and guarantee instead protection against discrimination on certain specified 
grounds. The “newer” models tentatively changed this, but even these confined any 
mention of the term “equality” to their preambles. Like the “older” model of 
constitutions, what was actually guaranteed in the bills of rights was simply protection 
against discrimination on certain specified grounds. Thus of all the territories, it was 
initially only in the unconventional Trinidad and Tobago bill of rights that a general 
guarantee of equality was included within the substantive provisions – this being the 
right of the individual to equality before the law and “equality of treatment from any 
public authority”. Since then, however, more general guarantees of equality have been 
included in the constitutions of Belize, Guyana and Jamaica. The significance of this 
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feature is that in the majority of Caribbean constitutions, equal treatment is only 
guaranteed in the negative (as in protection from discrimination) and then only on 
very restricted bases.181 
In considering this first order norm of equality which formal law promises, 
Bulkan’s narrative alludes to Bhamra’s suggestion that the assurance of equality by 
official law is in effect only a promise and that its fluidity is restricted by its inability to 
on its own function and respond as a normative foundation.  
Bhamra goes on to discuss a second first order norm, which is that norm promised 
by the response of official law to diversity in identifying the merit and value of religion, 
culture and ethnicity – “Official law implicitly suggests that these aspects of our identity 
add value to our lives and should therefore be treated as Rawlsian primary goods.”182 In 
a Commonwealth Caribbean context however, the cases previously discussed have 
indicated that measures specifically aimed towards protecting diversity and minority 
groups appear to generally be absent from the legal system. On this point, Antoine 
comments: 
Thus, while the societies of the region may be termed ‘pluralistic’, they are not 
generally recognised as containing clearly identifiable minorities. Groups which can 
be identified in the society and, to a limited extent, under the law, include religious 
and ethnic groups such as the Muslims and Hindus. These groups have a strong 
presence in Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. Two other religious-social groups are 
worthy of mention. These are the Rastafarians and the Shango Baptists or Orisha 
followers. The other identifiable grouping is the indigenous peoples, often called 
Amerindians, the original peoples of the region…These plural groups are not, 
however, given any or adequate recognition by the law and legal systems, even where 
they form significant groups in the society.183 
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Based on the aforementioned, the argument exists that despite the value of those 
primary goods associated with diversity being theoretically recognised by the state as a 
first order norm, the legal culture of the region is not one which has sought to actively 
facilitate the promotion and protection of equality and diversity.  
 The final first order norm according to Bhamra is that relating to nation-
building strategies which seek to encourage national cohesion.184 Bhamra suggests that 
in a traditional sense such strategies aim to invoke commonalities and homogeneity with 
the intended outcome being to promote solidarity amongst citizens.185  The difficulty 
however is that “plurality and the one-ness attributed to a loyal citizenry seem antithetical 
to each other.”186 The Commonwealth Caribbean region ought to be mindful that attempts 
to promote commonalities and homogeneity should not be at the expense of marginalizing 
the cultural, economic and social beliefs of citizens. Gilbert and Keane discuss this notion 
of equality versus fraternity in the context of France, where its Constitutional Court 
interprets the principle of equality as a rejection of minority rights.187 They suggest that 
‘fraternity’ could actually be interpreted in a sense of enabling a pathway towards 
minority recognition.188  However, they allude to an invisible nature of discrimination 
within French society which has been created by an approach of protection from 
discrimination based on the individual right to equality instead of racial, ethnic, religious 
or linguistic group belonging.189  The result of this approach is that measures aimed 
against discrimination focus on socio-economic criteria instead of racial, ethnic or 
religious identity.190 Accordingly, this means that “only the individual equal citizen is 
protected against discrimination, not the group”191  thereby rendering “discrimination 
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faced by minorities specifically due to racial, ethnic, or religious affiliation, to the extent 
that this is discernible, invisible.”192 Gilbert and Keane suggest that a desired approach 
might be akin to that of the Indian constitutional method which seeks to enable ‘fraternity’ 
as being linked to ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ which would allow for the purpose of 
democracy to be achieved.193 In the Indian context, this constitutional approach sought to 
address caste-based discrimination, and accordingly Gilbert and Keane in recognising 
that in “India, inequity crystalizes around divisions on the basis of caste” state that “India 
emphasizes that fraternity should be a term of constitutional significance to respond to 
deep inequalities that undermine the social and democratic order.”194 In a sense, it is 
arguable that enabling the concept of fraternity within a constitutional context gives rise 
to claims for substantive equality. 
Conclusion 
A most challenging area of how law operates within the society is developing the 
legal system to a point of configuration which enables the discovery of axiomatic 
safeguards to facilitate a seamless interaction among concepts such as religion, culture, 
identity and the overarching state power. The realization of such a configuration might 
conceptually propose that all groups within the society hold an unwavering claim to 
constitutional recognition and protection of their beliefs and values. Idealistically this 
suggests that each individual would be guaranteed the protection of the law in terms of 
their personal or collective construct of fundamental rights and freedoms which speak to 
their belief system. Such a configuration also conceptually suggests a conflict-free 
society, but there is also the likelihood of groups competing with each other to secure 
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legal guarantee of those rights and freedoms which they are pursuing.  It is suggested that 
the Commonwealth Caribbean considers a re-configuration of its legal approaches geared 
towards managing diversity and equality. There is the need to build on first order norms 
established through precedents which protect individualism, and to consider how the rule 
of law can be crafted to be more dynamic in terms of providing protected legal spaces for 
a fluid operation of more localized, group-specific human rights based on determinants 
such as practical knowledge, tradition and belief systems. Any such change would 
however mean a radical departure from the orthodox understandings of the conventions 
underpinning the Westminster framed constitutions and legal systems of the 





POST-COLONIAL CERTAINTY: REVISITING THE PAST TO ENSURE A 
COMMON FUTURE   
Introduction 
The consequences of colonialism and the residual effects of colonial power have 
weighed heavily against the development of local and regional rule of law in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. An important element to support this development arises 
from the need to confront the epistemic effects of the colonial process and consider 
historical injustices which are still at the heart of the dominant economic system and 
social order.  It is suggested that the starting point of this process involves revisiting the 
past in order to comprehensively grasp the interplay between discursive formations which 
emerged from the colonial period and those persons who are involved in discursive 
resistance through their participation in informal systems not recognized by ‘hard’ law. 
This chapter argues that revisiting the past would enable access to a certain degree of 
post-colonial certainty, which is necessary to ensure the development of a specific 
regional rule of law. It will be discussed that revisiting the past enables the consideration 
of the socio-legal impact of colonisation on present day Commonwealth Caribbean 
society. Another aspect of revisiting the past to bring about post-colonial certainty 
involves the case for reparations for slavery, which will also be considered. The chapter 
will conclude by considering the idea of re-examining what it means to be sovereign in 
the context of utilizing access to local knowledge, and suggest that the rule of law should 
be built around local knowledge. 
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1. Revisiting the Past: An exploration of the socio-legal impact of colonisation 
 A recurring theme throughout this thesis is the suggestion of placing 
events in a historical context to determine how to resolve disconnects in ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
law. An issue of importance arising from this context is whether there is sense in 
continuing to largely maintain congruity with Anglo-centred inherited legal and 
governance structures. As discussed in previous chapters, the outcomes of maintaining 
congruity have produced outcomes which tend to conflict with the belief systems of 
varying Commonwealth Caribbean cultures. In terms of the evolution of the legal system 
therefore, progression should lend itself to a shift from its Anglo-based foundation, and 
possibly altogether abandoning it in pursuit of a more collective regionalist structure 
amongst the Commonwealth Caribbean territories. Although this requires a level of 
regional contribution going beyond nationalistic agendas of individual states, one united 
factors is embedded in the communal legal colonial legacy.  Each individual state’s 
contribution to this regional structure would embody a form of civic nationalism in terms 
of societal inclusiveness instead of nationalism based on superiority. The post-
independence Commonwealth Caribbean has had to struggle with a one-sided ambivalent 
relationship between itself and its former metropolitan. This is often evident for instance 
in varied public opinion regarding enforcement of the death penalty which is essentially 
a legacy of colonial rule. So too, the mixed sentiments of entirely abandoning judicial 
recourse to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reflects this one-sided 
ambivalence as the issue of trust in the region’s own judicial institutions is weighed 
against the ability to obtain legal guidance from an institution which contentiously still 
has bearing on the region’s rule of law development. The point is that a sense of confusion 
rears itself when it comes to the region’s own understanding of how historical ties should 
be severed, and to what extent. This sentiment of ambivalence may actually be better 
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understood and resolved through reciprocity in understanding the pre-independence 
ambivalence by the metropolitan.   
According to Antoine, the historical dimensions of colonial law “continue to be 
reborn in the legal decision making and institutions of the region.”1 She attributes the 
process of colonisation as akin to a huge tidal wave which has covered the land and 
submerged the natural lives of the people. 2  She goes on to state, “Whether we are 
discussing precedent, custom, the Constitution, or the wider society at large, for which 
law must function, the underlying notions of dependency and inequity are still present in 
many areas.”3 Interestingly, Antoine further speaks of a lingering psychological impact 
arising from the Commonwealth Caribbean states being “brutal slave societies” which 
encourage “feelings of insecurity and even self-hate in our societies and legal systems 
today.” 4  In many ways, Antoine’s arguments largely speak out against discursive 
formations whose resonance can be found in the rhetoric of colonialism, the effects of 
which she describes by saying: 
Another relic of our historical architecture is that the law is accused of being alien. 
This is perhaps because it is identified with the elite and imperial oppression. Our ex-
slave society may thus be described as apathetic in its attitude to law, as a result of 
the enduring alienation that Caribbean peoples, the governed, feel with those who 
govern. There is a sense of disconnect, a feeling that we do not and cannot control our 
own destiny and that our voices are not heard.5  
Perceptions of discursive formations as a legacy of colonialism was of course not 
a phenomena confined to the Commonwealth Caribbean, but instead something which 
echoed across those geographic areas which were held under the British Empire. 
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Anthropologist and historian Bernard Cohn for instance examined the political 
implications of what he considered to be a colonial sociology of knowledge by 
demonstrating how legal codes and institutions, land tenure and revenue arrangements as 
well as colonial governance were fundamental to Britain’s conquest and rule of India. 
Cohn states: 
The orientalists and the missionaries were polar opposites in their assessment of 
Indian culture and society but were in accord as to what the central principles and 
institutions of the society were. They agreed that it was a society in which religious 
ideas and practices underlay all social structure; they agreed in the primacy of the 
Brahman as the maintainer of the sacred tradition, through his control of the 
knowledge of the sacred texts. . . . There was little attempt on the part of either to fit 
the facts of political organization, land tenure, the actual functioning of the legal 
system or the commercial structure into their picture of the society derived from the 
texts.6 
A similar process was in place in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and there is 
presently the need for a contemporary analysis of the colonial development of the rule of 
law. Assuming that the process of decolonization has not yet been completed, a possible 
avenue towards postcolonial transformation could be not only through an analysis of the 
postcolonial, but also by examining the plight of those people who are in discursive 
resistance through their struggles for those rights and freedoms which are yet to achieve 
a constitutional construct or which fall outside the scope of the legal system. A process 
of discursive resistance would therefore mean that the individual would need to discover 
adequate warranty to narrate and in a sense obtain permission to narrate. Such permission 
to narrate would in a way be heavily influenced by the willingness of the legal system to 
accommodate departure from its discursive norms shaped by Anglo-derived traditions. 
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From this basis it should follow that there ought to be found some sort of value in 
revisiting the past in order to, in a sense, self-determine. The difficulty however is the 
problem of obstacles leading to the actual discovery of certain truths as brought about by 
distortions in understanding the congruity between tradition and truth discovery. This 
concept will further be considered in the next section. 
2.  Certainty and the Rule of Law 
For the Commonwealth Caribbean to not only understand, but actualize and 
consolidate the constituents of its regional traditions as a vehicle for moulding a native 
identity in its jurisprudence, socio-political and even geo-political identity, there is the 
necessity to separate itself from claims which lack warranty and prevent access to the 
domain of truths. On this point, Feyerabend explains:  
Statements composed of concepts lacking in details could be used to build new kinds 
of stories, soon to be called proofs, whose truth “followed from” their inner structure 
and needed no support from traditional authorities. The discovery was interpreted as 
showing that knowledge could be detached from traditions and made “objective”.7 
One such way to re-examine historical narratives which have shaped social 
administration is through looking at the characteristics of the rule of law in its present 
form and determine whether the region has been holding on to its formalistic, instrumental 
aspects, as opposed to using the rule of law as an evaluative tool to shape institutional 
reform and empower local communities to influence how rules relating to economic, 
social and cultural rights are crafted.  
Questions of how effective post-colonial transitions have been in terms of moving 
towards achieving post-colonial certainty need to be looked at if there is to be any 
conviction that the Commonwealth Caribbean region’s development is not encumbered 
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by an invariant process of decolonization.  Encompassed in the course of realizing 
certainty in terms of the region’s legal, social and political arrangements would be the 
exploration of how operational was the transition of power from the ‘hegemonic’ to the 
‘subaltern.’ According to Gramsci, the subaltern classes “by definition, are not unified 
and cannot unite until they are able to become a State.”8 To say that the process of 
decolonization is slow, and its outcomes uncertain would in a sense unfairly undermine 
those efforts made to establish good governance and secure individual and collective 
rights and freedoms within the region. However, despite whatever positive developments 
have been achieved, the underlying actuality is that the structures which have been 
institutionalized to oversee social administration neither show profound signs of 
discontinuity nor uniqueness in its evolution from the colonial tradition. This is not to say 
that the underlying objective should be absolute discontinuity, as coming to terms with 
certain aspects of continuity would suggest a maturity of the state to learn from the 
experiences of the former colonizer from the perspective of having a foundation which 
‘mimics’ that of the hegemonic norm.  
In order for the regional legal systems to lay claim to a space that allows it to 
foster a unique identity, a process of truth discovery is necessary, as this would lead to a 
point which enables the realization of absolute certainty. Knowledge of the absolute truth, 
and by extension, the achievement of certainty would require establishing a basis of 
warranty that can be relied on, should one be required to defend a claim of certainty. At 
present however, there appears to be some disconnect between what might be embraced 
or perceived as a position of truth in the absence of warranty, as opposed to the ability to 
rely on some form of warranty which is already established. It is this Hegelian approach 
which dictates the necessity for the region to re-visit the historical narrative and enable a 
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process of discovery by turning to not only how the legal system is constituted but also 
how systems of governance and production work, and their interconnections. According 
to Flay: 
...if one is to offer a systematic account of the ultimate nature of reality - and this was 
Hegel's main task - then one must first show one’s indubitable right to make truth 
claims of an ultimate sort or, in more traditional terms, one must first show that one 
has access to that domain in which such ultimate truths are found. The problem is to 
establish warranty for one’s certainty of access, rather than merely professing such 
certainty.9 
An important aspect of re-visiting the colonial process in order to arrive at a stage 
of certainty therefore is confronting the separation of two elemental questions. These are 
the question of justifying the right to make and defend claims of access to an ultimate 
truth, as separated from the question of articulating and defending the truth. Previous 
chapters looking at issues such as the operation of the Westminster system, and how the 
legal framework within the region is progressing in relation to guaranteeing certain rights, 
particularly in the areas of family law, land rights and cultural rights suggest that our legal 
framework needs to conceptualize what constitutes adequate warranty to make claims to, 
and defend the ‘truth.’ This process should not be seen as an afterthought of legislative 
and judicial reasoning, but instead as a foundation which goes to the root of enabling 
certain rights and freedoms which may have been silenced as a consequence of forced 
narratives that have shaped how certain truths are perceived and defended, albeit without 
discovering substantial warranty.  
A suggested method to initiate discovery is to ask questions about what is, and 
then follow this up by asking questions about what ought to be. Are we still experiencing 
residual effects of a rule of law previously rooted in authoritarian colonial culture? Is the 
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legal framework’s progression encumbered by politically driven legislatures which are 
more reactionary, and less proactive? Do our Westminster moulded constitutions 
genuinely afford binary congruity between the safeguarding of fundamental rights and 
freedoms and the functioning of state authority? Essentially, the objective should be to 
ensure that our existing normative is not driven by irrational beliefs as this poses a danger 
to realizing true freedom, and by extension certainty of truth. The importance of this ought 
not to be downplayed, especially in the context of empowering individuals to experience 
freedom through which social utility could be positively influenced. Chomsky for 
instance believes that human beings function at their best in conditions which provide 
maximum freedom, and should therefore have the opportunity to experience that 
freedom.10 There should be freedom from authority in the field of ideas and freedom of 
expression is to be defended, and production is established through free association.11 
Paramount to freedom actualization through escaping irrationality is the enabling of 
creativity by virtue of access to knowledge obtained from a standpoint from which claims 
to the truth could be warranted. This standpoint encapsulates Hegel’s absolute idealism 
as “the standpoint from which we can, with already demonstrated warranty, articulate the 
truth about ultimate reality.”12 Knowledge acquired from this perspective of rationality 
would be able to shape the rule of law to guarantee inclusiveness, and rights-based 
approaches to problem solving. The importance of knowledge is described by 
Feyerabend, who writes that it is “a local commodity designed to satisfy local needs and 
to solve local problems; it can be changed from the outside, but only after extended 
consultations that include the opinions of all concerned parties.”13 The deconstructing of 
‘knowledge’ from a historical perspective within the Commonwealth Caribbean however 
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brings with it the unfortunate, and unavoidable encounter of re-visiting a colonial past 
which involved the practice of colonial historical violence as part of the legal and 
economic process. 
3.  Confronting historical injustices through a process of reparations  
Generally, “reparations” are defined as “payment[s] justified on backward-
looking grounds of corrective justice, rather than forward looking grounds such as the 
deterrence of future wrongdoings.” 14  In addition to accountability, an argument for 
reparations exists in terms of social transformation. Following the emancipation of 
enslaved persons in 1833, Britain raised the present day equivalent of 17 billion Pounds 
Sterling in compensation money which paid to 46,000 of Britain's slave-owners for loss 
of human property. 15  The socio-political and economic legacies of slavery and its 
abolition have been well documented in a database complied by University College 
London, entitled “Legacies of British Slave-ownership.”16 In pure economic terms, Great 
Britain was built on the basis of slavery and colonialism, with conservative estimates 
indicating that between 10% and 20 % of current Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be 
linked to slave labour.17  
The issue of restitution gained noticeable momentum upon CARICOM agreeing 
to establish a Reparations Commission in July 2013, with the commission given a 
mandate to establish a moral, ethical and legal case for payments by former European 
colonizers to the states and people of CARICOM for “native genocide, the transatlantic 
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slave trade and a racialized system of chattel slavery.”18 Affirming the argument that the 
societies within the region have been built upon the transatlantic slave trade and chattel 
slavery which have been declared by the United Nations as Crimes Against Humanity 
(CAH), the committee has advocated the view that these societies “are uniquely placed 
to advance the global cause of truth, justice, and reconciliation, within the context of 
reparatory justice for the victims and their descendants who continue to suffer harm as a 
consequence of these crimes.”19 
The work of the Reparations Commission is ground breaking in the sense that 
through CARICOM, it has made an official statement on the region’s position that its 
various states have collectively agreed that slavery is to be blamed for many socio-
economic problems which currently plague the islands.  Although not focusing on how 
the development of the rule of law might have been shaped as a result of colonial rule, 
the commission aptly outlined ten negative aspects of the present condition of Caribbean 
society which it attributes wholeheartedly to human rights violations associated with 
slavery.  The importance of these aspects as outlined by the commission is that it has 
strengthened the ideology that not enough weight was given to achieving justice in light 
of the transition, and as a consequence there remains the need to confront questions of 
restorative justice and reconciliation. A summary of the ten areas outlined by the 
Reparation Commission are:20  
(i) A full formal apology, as opposed to ‘statements of regrets’ which have been 
issued by some governments. In addressing ‘statements of regrets’ the plan 
explains that such statements “do not acknowledge that crimes have been 
committed and represent a refusal to take responsibility for such crimes”21 and  
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furthermore are “a reprehensible response to the call for apology in that they 
suggest that victims and their descendants are not worthy of an apology.”22; 
(ii) repatriation, pointing out the legal right of the descendants of more than 10 million 
Africans, who were stolen from their homes and forcefully transported to the 
Caribbean as the enslaved chattel and property, to return to their homeland; 
(iii) An Indigenous Peoples Development Programme; 
(iv) Cultural Institutions through which the stories of victims and their descendants 
can be told; 
(v) Attention to be paid to the “Public Health Crisis” in the Caribbean. On this point, 
the plan contends that the Caribbean has the “highest incidence of chronic diseases 
which stems from the nutritional experience, emotional brutality and overall stress 
profiles associated with slavery, genocide and apartheid”23; 
(vi) Eradicating illiteracy, as the plan contends that following the period of European 
colonialism, “in most parts of the Caribbean, the British in particular left the black 
and indigenous communities in a general state of illiteracy.” According to the 
plan, some “70 percent of blacks in British colonies were functionally illiterate in 
the 1960s when nation states began to appear.”24; 
(vii) an African Knowledge Programme to educate people of African descent about 
their roots;  
(viii) Psychological Rehabilitation, with the plan stating that “For over 400 years 
Africans and their descendants were classified in law as non-human, chattel, 
property, and real estate. They were denied recognition as members of the human 
family by laws derived from the parliaments and palaces of Europe. This history 





has inflicted massive psychological trauma upon African descendant 
populations.”; 
(ix) Technology Transfer for greater access to the world’s science and technology 
culture; 
(x) And debt cancellation to address the adverse financial position that faces 
Caribbean governments in the aftermath of slavery and colonialism in terms of its 
public debt and being faced with ‘fiscal entrapment.’ The plan states that these 
governments “still daily engage in the business of cleaning up the colonial mess 
in order to prepare for development.”25 
What the work of the Reparations Commission demonstrates is that the memory 
of slavery is not far removed from certain aspects of Commonwealth Caribbean society. 
As Beckles explains, “some persons living in the Caribbean today had grandparents and 
great- grandparents who were enslaved. Families continue to live with the memory of 
slavery and to experience life as the victims of slavery.”26 Brennan puts forward the case 
that the movement towards a claim for reparations is building momentum: 
It is argued that what we are witnessing is a global movement on reparations. These 
may be seen as peaceful and sporadic, that have different kinds of leaders and that 
involve West Indian governments, individuals, NGOs and members of civil society 
who work organically.27 
However, he goes on to highlight the fact that the mainstream media has been 
slow to bring the work of reparation activists to the forefront despite the development of 
a global movement calling for reparations. Accordingly, Brennan states:  
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An example of an individual pushing the reparations movement can be seen in the 
address delivered by Professor Sir Hilary Beckles of the CARICOM Commission, 
House of Commons, Parliament of Great Britain, Committee Room 14 on Thursday16 
July 2014. Here he presented an argument on reparations. There was no report in the 
general media about this even though Beckles represents CARICOM in the matter of 
reparations and discussed the global movement for reparations. The importance of 
this speech should not be ignored because, according to Beckles, it dealt with Britain 
wanting to shield itself from a past not just of the horrors of slavery, but racial 
apartheid and the colonial mess left behind for the West Indian governments to clear 
up.28 
Nonetheless, calls for restitution for historical injustice in the context of the slave 
trade had previously gained support from various facets of the international community. 
At the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance held in Durban in 2001, the then United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Torture, Theo Van Boven raised the question of reparations in connection with the 
slave trade during the 16th  to 19th  centuries and suggested in his final report that as a 
moral duty affirmative action be adopted as well as “an accurate record of the history of 
slavery, including an account of the acts and the activities of the perpetrators and their 
accomplices and of the sufferings of the victims....through the media, in history books 
and in educational materials.”29 Prior to this, the Regional Conference for Africa held in 
Dakar in 2001 held in preparation for the World Conference discussed in detail the issue 
of reparations as related to the slave trade, colonialism and apartheid. Its final report urged 
former colonial powers to issue an apology as a final outcome of the World Conference. 
The Dakar report declared that: 
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States which pursued racist policies or acts of racial discrimination such as slavery 
and colonialism should assume their moral, economic, political and legal 
responsibilities within their national jurisdiction and before other appropriate 
international mechanisms or jurisdictions and provide adequate reparation to those 
communities or individuals who, individually or collectively, are victims of such 
racist policies or acts, regardless of when or by whom they were committed.30 
Cunneen argues that there is an increasing acceptance internationally of the 
principle of reparations and that governments acknowledge and provide reparations to the 
victims of human rights abuses. There is growing literature which examines the 
significance of reparations for those suffering historical injustices as well as the links 
between reparations and restorative justice.31 Cunneen also argues that reparations “have 
significant potential overlap with the goals of restorative justice, and have been articulated 
as such for example in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.”32 
Former United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron has rebuffed demands for his 
government to pay reparations and to apologize for the role of Great Britain in the slave 
trade. Reparations campaigners greeted Cameron's visit to Jamaica in September 2015 
with public protest because of his non-apologetic position and it was widely reported at 
the time that Cameron's relatives benefitted from compensation payments made to former 
slave owners following the abolition of slavery.33 
From examining CARICOM’s case for reparations, which essentially is a request 
to revisit the past, an issue which arises is that of sentiments of ambivalence being a 
driving force behind a quest to materialize something akin to power, or perhaps an effort 
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to take control of a situation where certain aspects of societal development are existing in 
a historical vacuum. This ‘power’ in a sense would be restorative if its intent is focused 
on solidifying ownership and utility of the region’s development while being 
unencumbered by lingering legacies of the colonial. The reparations process would 
confront these prolonged legacies, and provide an epistemic basis for the region to 
achieve a paradigm which lends more legitimacy towards how normative rules are shaped 
in terms of rights based approaches. This, of course, would herald a shift from an existing 
framework which is weighed heavily by its Anglo-derived influence during the transition 
from the colonial to the post-independence period. A desirable outcome of a reparations 
process would be a change in the developmental narrative that would depart from 
hegemonic discourse which would have influenced the individual’s existential reality 
through processes such as religious conversions, how the education system was set up 
during colonialism, and how the legal and political systems were moulded. Of course, 
such objectives could also be achieved independent of a reparations process, with a 
suggested alternative avenue being a shift in focus towards ‘local knowledge’ which 
would enable decision makers to understand what are the local situations that need to be 
addressed and how this can be translated in the realm of public policy and the legal 
system. 
In terms of individual self-determination, some authors have argued that slave 
societies and by extension individual identities would have been shaped by the colonial 
experience. According to Lovejoy: 
Where one was born, and most especially on which side of the Atlantic, was a crucial 
feature of slavery. Whether an individual slave had been born into slavery or had been 
retained in a society and culture as a slave had an influence on status, identity and 
cultural autonomy. Those who had gained some familiarity with the culture and 
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society of their masters acquired a recognizable status distinct from a newly bought 
slave, whether in western Africa or the Americas.34 
An alternative view offered by Mintz and Price highlights the agency of slaves in 
being able to establish an identity while operating within oppressive conditions brought 
about by slavery. According to Mintz and Price:  
The Africans who reached the New World did not compose, at the outset, groups. In 
fact, in most cases, it might even be more accurate to view them as crowds, and very 
heterogeneous crowds at that. Without diminishing the probable importance of some 
core of common values, and the occurrence of situations where a number of slaves of 
common origin might indeed have been aggregated, the fact is that these were not 
communities of people at first, and they could only become communities by processes 
of cultural change. What the slaves undeniably shared at the outset was their 
enslavement; all – or nearly all – else had to be created by them.35 
 Similarly, Brathwaite writes of a concept of ‘creolization’ as taken to mean 
a cultural process which identified those individuals who were slaves and of African 
origin as having a distinct and separate culture which was in opposition to the dominant 
culture of Anglo and European origin. According to Brathwaite: 
Within the dehumanizing institution of slavery….were two cultures of people, having 
to adapt themselves to a new environment and to each other. The friction created by 
this confrontation was cruel, but it was also creative. The white plantations and social 
institutions….reflect one aspect of this. The slaves’ adaptation of their African culture 
to a new world reflects another.36 
In a sense, this hints at a form of discursive resistance if it were that individuals 
within slave societies attempted to shape their own identities irrespective of colonial 
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interference. The difficulty however with discovering utility brought about by indications 
of cultural formation and agency by those individuals is that the legal system presiding 
over the social structure was highly fragmented based on class differences. According to 
Clarke: 
The social structure was thus composed of three legal estates….whites with full civil 
rights, black slaves with virtually no rights in law – and fewer in practice, and an 
interstitial group of coloured people, of various phenotypes ranging from light brown 
to black, who were not slaves, but had only limited civil rights – they could neither 
hold public office nor vote.37  
With this historical dimension in mind, there is a strong claim by governments 
and policy makers within the Commonwealth Caribbean that residual effects of this class 
stratification still persist in the present-day environment, and that one way to address this 
and other legacies of colonial rule is through a process of reparations. In addition to the 
legacies of slavery which the region continues to grapple with, so too there exists 
economic and social legacies of the Westminster system which need to be deconstructed. 
4. Economic and Social legacies of the Westminster modelled System 
Following their independence, the Commonwealth Caribbean states would have 
naturally been in a transition phase and in a situation of making governance decisions as 
guided by the Westminster modelled system and the pre-existing colonial laws which had 
carried over. At this point, there would also be naturally the emergence of issues such as 
the extent of interplay between nationalism, capitalism and socialist ideologies existing 
alongside the Westminster modelled framework.  
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It can be argued that the Westminster ideals of separation of powers and the 
election of governments by the population are adequate safeguards to limit the abuse of 
state authority and promote democratic fairness. However, the socio-economic ideology 
surrounding a state’s arrangement according to such ideals have often been brought into 
question, particularly in relation to how comprehensive are constitutional approaches 
towards addressing its social objectives.  
The prevailing governance system contained within the Westminster framed post-
independence constitutions deeply reflected Locke’s liberalism in its separation of powers 
between the legislature, the executive and in the consensual nature of civil society whose 
majority vote would go towards establishing a government which would be able to 
provide legislation on their behalf. The exceptionally legalistic liberalism under Locke, 
as captured in his observation that “Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins…”38 would 
have also been captured by the Westminster system. Part of this would be the subjection 
by the rule of law to the will of another, as Locke explains that “freedom of men under 
government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, 
and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all 
things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, 
unknown, arbitrary will of another man....”39 
Locke attached much significance to the right of property, and in his Second 
Treatise he writes, “The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common 
wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their 
property.”40 According to Tamanaha, although Locke broadly used the term property to 
include life and liberty that individuals owned themselves, he primarily viewed property 
in the sense of possessions, with Locke’s state essentially being a society of property 
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owners.41 A substantial problem however with a governance system broadly reflecting 
Lockean ideals is the connection between Locke’s views of equality as it related to 
property and civil society. According to Strauss on Locke’s views on social equality: 
Equality, he thought, is incompatible with civil society. The equality of all men in 
regard to the right of self-preservation does not obliterate completely the special right 
of the more reasonable men. On the contrary, the exercise of that special right is 
conducive to the self-preservation and happiness of all. Above all, since self-
preservation and happiness require property, so much so that the end of civil society 
can be said to be the preservation of property, the protection of the propertied 
members of society against the demands of the indigent – or the protection of the 
industrious and rational against the lazy and quarrelsome – is essential to public 
happiness or the common good.42 
Locke’s model did not directly promote the protection of individual rights and the 
majority consent for legislation would essentially be the consent of property holders, 
which “was a sufficient safeguard of the rights of each, because he assumed that all who 
had the right to be consulted were agreed on one concept of the public good, ultimately 
the maximization of the nation's wealth...” 43  Accordingly, Tamanha views Locke’s 
liberalism as a bourgeois political theory, with his doctrine of property being directly 
intelligible today if it is taken as the classic doctrine of the spirit of capitalism.44 In this 
sense, the boundaries of certainty in terms of man’s relationship with property as it 
extends to individual rights should be considered together with what would be the 
constitutional objectives of the newly independent Commonwealth Caribbean states at 
the time. This brings to the forefront issues such as what ideology would the government 
pursue, and what shape the rule of law would assume to confront questions of political 
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arrangement, economics and social organization. In terms of political arrangement, this 
was to be dictated by the Westminster framed constitutions, in the traditions of the 
governance patterns of the former metropolitan. From this arrangement would also stem 
how the socio-economic aspects of the rule of law would be shaped as it relates to the 
consideration of property, and its influence on individual and collective certainty. 
From this notion, the Westminster propagated rule of law was rooted in a concept 
which sought preservation of bourgeois interests. Of this, Adam Smith commented: 
Laws and government may be considered in this and indeed in every case as a 
combination of the rich to oppress the poor, and to preserve to themselves the 
inequality of the goods which would otherwise be soon destroyed by the attacks of 
the poor, who if not hindered by the government would soon reduce others to an 
equality with themselves by open violence.45 
Montesquieu offered an interesting perspective that English culture and society 
complemented the liberal legal system in terms of operating within a system driven by 
economic interests, by stating that “The central feature of the English way of life, and a 
chief purpose of its constitution, is the free pursuit of commerce.”46 By Montesquieu’s 
views, the English were too busily engaged in enterprise to use governmental structures 
to oppress others, though they would recognize the opportunity to promote legislation 
which would further their own economic interest.47Accordingly, Tamanha observes, 
“This is bourgeois culture. In almost every relevant respect this society was contrary to 
the classical ideal of a society oriented toward virtue and the community.”48  
Where there is an absence of a constitutional approach geared towards social 
equality in the treatment of property, what this does according to Marx and Engels, is to 
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actually enable class antagonisms operating in favour of bourgeois property interests. 
Marx accused the liberal state’s construction of its rule of law as enabling a jurisprudence 
which was the will of the bourgeois class “made into a law for all.”49 Furthermore, 
according to Engels: 
As the state arose from the need to keep class antagonisms in check, but also arose in 
the thick of the fight between the classes, it is normally the state of the most powerful, 
economically ruling class, which by its means becomes also the politically ruling 
class, and so acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed 
class.50 
Conceptualizing the rule of law in terms of a model of law and society which is 
built around a market economy that promotes class antagonisms raises serious questions 
about its appropriateness and adaptability. Within this context it would be helpful to 
contrast a formalistic, functionalist perspective of the rule of law against a Hegelian 
dialectical backdrop to not only prove disconnects between the Westminster framed rule 
of law comprehensively addressing social equality, but also to show that going beyond 
formalism could lead to greater objectivity and enable access to a realm of comparable, 
if not greater logic. 
 
Escaping Formalism 
Essentially, the rule of law dictates that all individuals are subject to the legal 
system and all individual subjects are equal before the law. Therefore all Commonwealth 
Caribbean citizens are in principle granted equal capacity in terms of being the holders of 
rights as well as being subject to legal consequences depending on the nature of their 
actions. The individual, being a holder of rights, is therefore privy to some degree of 
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protection in the event that there is an absence of guarantee in relation to the enjoyment 
of these rights. Arising from this concept is a connection between the rule of law and its 
administrative purpose through legislative action. This is explained by Zolo: 
Thanks to the general nature of any legislative act, subjective situations falling within 
a given abstract legal figure are treated alike, namely in the light of the same 
normative principles and according to the same rules. Hence, the legal consequences 
of legally equivalent actions are the same.51 
The rule of law thus revolves around the constitutional commitment of 
acknowledging and granting rights which are the normative entitlements of those citizens 
subject to the constitution. According to Zolo: 
Going beyond notable differences in terms of philosophical reasoning and modes of 
legal protection – natural law doctrines versus legal positivism, universalism versus 
particularism, constitutional rigidity versus constitutional flexibility, and judicial 
review of legislation versus the absolute primacy of legislative power – different 
experiences of the rule of law are characterized by the constitutional commitment to 
guarantee individual rights, granting their holders the power to claim them on a 
judicial level, even against the state’s organs.52 
Linked to equality before the law is another characteristic of the rule of law, which 
is that it is meant to embody certainty of the law. Under the rule of law, the state commits 
itself to guarantee all citizens the possibility to, in principle, anticipate the legal 
consequences of both their behaviour and that of other members of society who they 
encounter. Therefore, all citizens must be provided with cognitive means which would 
allow them to anticipate the types of decisions affecting them which may be taken in the 
future by the state’s authority. From this perspective, the ‘certainty of law’ is a widespread 
social good, which is meant to strengthen individual expectations and reduce social 
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uncertainty. This process enables the state and its legal system to perform a ‘reduction of 
complexity’ so that any uncertainty of citizens in relation to the risk of the social 
environment is allayed. 53  The expected outcome is “a more stable, ordered and 
functionally economical social interaction.”54 Accordingly, Zolo writes: 
The specific contribution of the certainty of law – this reducing citizens’ insecurity 
towards legal risks – is the possibility for all citizens to confidently take care of their 
own business and to claim their rights, with good chances of success, with respect to 
both their social partners and political authorities. In order for the certainty of law to 
be implemented, citizens must above all be given the opportunity to know the law in 
force. They must not be doomed to ignorantia legis (ignorance of the law) as a result 
of the impossibility of knowing in advance and of interpreting with relative certainty 
the rules concerning them and applied by administrative authorities. Hence, laws must 
not be secret, and normative propositions must be clearly formulated and must not 
give rise to possible antinomies. Moreover, laws must not have a retroactive effect, 
especially in criminal matters, where the nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without 
law) principle must be upheld. Furthermore, since even the most absolute certainty of 
law may be frustrated by an arbitrary jurisdiction, the principle of the “natural judge” 
(a judge predetermined by law) must be upheld and, connected with such principle, 
ad hoc courts must be prohibited.55 
In terms of maintaining social stability therefore, certainty of law involves 
legislative power disassociating itself from causing normative instability, which may 
occur through redundant legislation, parliaments and governments altering the regulation 
of cases either frequently or unforeseeably in instances where they are not bound by  strict 
constitutional provisions. However, Zolo goes on to explain further that equal capacity 
through the rule of law does not necessarily mean that the rule of law equalizes citizens 
on the determinate of given factual or finalistic standards, and therefore there is a 
                                                 




challenge of achieving ‘substantial equality’ even though ‘legal equality’ may be 
achieved through the rule of law framework. Zolo distinguishes between ‘substantial 
equality’ and ‘legal equality’ by stating: 
Legal equality is not to be mistaken either for ‘substantial equality’ (in Western 
countries, such a generic expression mostly stands for some kind of equalization of 
economic and social conditions), or for the effective and equal enjoyment of the rights 
individuals formally hold. In fact, each individual is able to enjoy the same rights 
(freedom of speech, teaching, press, association, economic initiative, etc.) in different 
ways and scopes, and it is only with respect to his actual entitlement to such rights 
that he is treated equally with respect to other holders of rights. In many legal (not 
only factual) respects, property-owners are indeed different from the property-less, 
employees are different from self-employed workers, minors are different from 
adults, citizens are different from foreigners, and previous offenders are different from 
citizens without criminal records.56 
Furthermore, quite interestingly, not all governmental measures may operate 
within the scope of the rule of law. This is evidently the case when it comes to the 
interference of government in the economy and may amount to an arbitrary exercise of 
power. According to Hayek: 
We must now turn to the kinds of governmental measures which the rule of law 
excludes in principle because they cannot be achieved by merely enforcing general 
rules but, of necessity, involve arbitrary discrimination between persons. The most 
important among them are decisions as to who is to be allowed to provide different 
services or commodities, at what prices or in what quantities—in other words, 
measures designed to control the access to different trades and occupations, the terms 
of sale, and the amounts to be produced or sold….There are several reasons why all 
direct control of prices by government is irreconcilable with a functioning free system, 
whether the government actually fixes prices or merely lays down rules by which the 
permissible prices are to be determined. In the first place, it is impossible to fix prices 
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according to long-term rules which will effectively guide production. Appropriate 
prices depend on circumstances which are constantly changing and must be 
continually adjusted to them. On the other hand, prices which are not fixed outright 
but determined by some rule (such as that they must be in a certain relation to cost) 
will not be the same for all sellers and, for this reason, will prevent the market from 
functioning. A still more important consideration is that, with prices different from 
those that would form on a free market, demand and supply will not be equal, and if 
the price control is to be effective, some method must be found for deciding who is to 
be allowed to buy or sell. This would necessarily be discretionary and must consist of 
ad hoc decisions that discriminate between persons on essentially arbitrary grounds.57 
In addition to the operation of an economic system arguably outside the 
functioning of the rule of law in terms of guaranteeing certain rights, is the legal system’s 
struggle for capacity to address social subsystems as a result of the rule of law by its 
nature being slow to adapt to the evolution of the social climate. Zolo explains by stating: 
The process of differentiation of social subsystems compels the legal system to react 
to their rapid development by increasingly producing more specialized and particular 
provisions. Yet, law is a rigid and slow structure compared with the evolutionary 
flexibility of subsystems such as, in particular, the scientific-technologic and 
economic ones, which are endowed with a notable capacity of rapidly self-
programming and self-correcting. This brings about “law inflation”, which entails 
normative devaluation, redundancy and instability and, ultimately, law’s regulative 
inability. Not only is the number of legislative acts multiplied but their texts are also 
increasingly muddy and far too long, more and more loaded with technological 
expressions and cross references to other normative texts. The fragmentary nature of 
norms, the reference to “emergency situations”, the inclination to “programme” rather 
than regulate, worsen the tendency of a state’s legislation to lose the requirement of 
generality and abstractness, and to become more and more similar to administrative 
acts.58 
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By this analogy, the effect on citizens is that the application of formal equality 
through the rule of law may actually produce normative discriminations towards them, 
even though those citizens would be operating within legally equivalent, factual 
conditions. Therefore the legal system assumes that there are economic and social 
inequalities which the rule of law is not expected to reduce or altogether eliminate. By 
this rationale, in considering the epistemological nature of the rule of law, it is arguably 
more rational to build the rule of law by directing more emphasis towards its evaluative 
characteristics, and not the formalistic. Kaufmann for instance believed it essential to 
move away from an abstract system of forms towards a material order of contents and to 
move away from formal apriorism.59 Kaufman’s intention was to understand the real 
relationships (Dingbegriffe) behind conceptual relations (Relationsbegriffe).60 According 
to Kaufmann, it was necessary to go beyond the system’s formal and procedural levels in 
order to discover its objective traits which ought to give direction to the choices of judges 
and legislators.61 Kauffman explained that constraints on public power ought not to be 
merely formal, but instead need to be grounded on a material order which can determine 
the latter’s conditions “in a content-based manner”.62 
Kaufmann’s concept of ‘institute’ was advocated as a measure to overcome a 
purely normative analysis of the rule of law. The institute goes beyond being that of a set 
of norms, but instead a concept which came to life by its own principles, particularly in 
terms of being an expression of an objective order and a collection of logics “which 
judges, ordinary legislators, and the constituent assembly were bound to respect.”63 Under 
a formalistic approach however, limits and cross-checks would be destined to give way 
                                                 






to an inevitable arbitrariness of a given will.64 However, in a situation where normative 
limits were transcended, there emerged “principles, values, and forms of collective life 
(‘institutes’) that offered individuals the ultimate and indefeasible guarantee” against the 
absolutism of power, which formalism was unable to offer.65 The institute was therefore 
a substantial limit to the arbitrariness of power.66 This concept was not solely the creation 
of Kaufmann but was the outcome of the German historicist and organicistic tradition, 
and was connected with a concept of institution explored by Maurice Hauriou in the late 
nineteenth century.67 According to Hauriou, the legal order should be established within 
a context of social interaction where groups within the society were able to operate and 
develop.68 The word ‘institution’ in this context therefore meant any organized social 
group: “a group both demanding and protective towards its members, characterized by a 
given internal distribution of power and capable of lasting over time. It is within the 
institution’s social and legal ambit that the rules which determine the individual members’ 
duties and prerogatives are established.”69 The institution and not the state, was regarded 
as the original legal phenomenon where the state acknowledges a rich and diverse 
network of institutions that affects its historical development and still exists in situations 
where the state is operating at a point of utility.70 Hauriou’s reasoning is dualistic in the 
sense that the legal order is captured by a duality between ‘state’ and ‘nation’ and the 
nation does not simply exist because it is a component of the state, but instead it is a 
historical reality, visible and operating as an organized social body with a collection of 
established situations capable of uniting to counterbalance the government, and 
possessing an autonomous, legal substance. Accordingly, such parameters should define 
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the rule of law instead of it being static on the basis of an ideology of self-limitation 
espoused by a belief in state’s absolute authority, amounting to a kind of monism where 
one is unable to view anything beyond the state’s ambit From this, it can be gathered that 
individual rights should not be regarded as autonomous, absolute grants by the state, but 
instead derived from a societal institutional framework which would inform social and 
normative structures. 
By this reasoning, there is compelling grounds to claim that the historical 
narratives and formalistic approaches which shaped the rule of law in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean could be revised through an evaluative approach seeking to empower groups 
to generate the logic that would drive legal and administrative structures akin to 
Kaufmann’s ‘institutes.’ It is suggested that local knowledge can serve an important role 
in this process 
 
Discovering the Commonwealth Caribbean ‘self’ - Social benefits of local knowledge 
in revisiting sovereignty 
Local knowledge has been defined as “that publicly accessible knowledge of 
resource use, the access to which is limited to certain associations of people.”71 Access to 
local knowledge however does not need to be limited to small numbers of people, despite 
there actually being limited access to local knowledge. Barnett analogizes this concept to 
a football match: 
Although access to local knowledge is limited, it need not be limited to small numbers 
of people: 65,000 people can watch the same football game and have local knowledge 
of the game in progress. Millions more can obtain local knowledge of the game in 
progress while watching it on television. It may seem odd to describe such widely 
shared knowledge as “local,” but such knowledge is local in the sense that the billions 
                                                 
71 Randy Barnett, The Structure of Liberty - Justice and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 33. 
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of persons who are not watching the game in person or on television will not have 
knowledge of the game in progress, just as I have no knowledge of whatever games 
are at this moment being played before audiences in countless arenas throughout the 
world. In addition to having personal knowledge that I could not possibly have (for 
example, how much each is enjoying the contest), these audiences have local 
knowledge of a public event that I might in principle be able to know, but to which in 
practice I still lack access.72 
The concern here is that understanding of local knowledge remains abstract unless 
there is recourse to access. Concerning the rule of law, it is important that the values 
propagated by it are not expressed without access to local knowledge, but instead are 
relevant to the spatial social, cultural and political life of the nation. The contrary gives 
rise to the criticism of a rule of law being the product of rule by bureaucracy, which is 
essentially law dominated and absent of considerations to local circumstances. If this is 
the case, then can we in actuality regard ourselves as being sovereign? Girvan contends 
that the Commonwealth Caribbean experience as a product of colonization gave way to 
a type of post-independence nationalism which still harboured sentiments of inferiority. 
According to Girvan: 
Colonial education exalted the ‘civilising’ force and devalued the ‘native’; whether 
people, culture or knowledge. Individual success required assimilation of the culture 
and values of the colonizer. The local elites that succeeded colonial rulers, while 
nationalist in outlook, confronted a formidable legacy in the form of a psychology and 
culture of local inferiority that imbues the education system and the educated 
classes.73  
Here, Girvan raises an important issue of what does it mean to be sovereign within 
a post-colonial climate. A suggested retort is that the extraction of local knowledge to 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
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feed into institutional reform is arguably a component of what it means to be sovereign. 
According to Girvan, sovereignty is that which begins in the mind, with its meaning being 
the capacity of a society and its citizens to be able to think for themselves. With regard to 
this idea of sovereignty, Girvan goes on to state: 
We have been accustomed to conflate this notion with the possession of certain 
constitutional and juridical attributes by the nation-state. I see the need to begin a 
conversation about reconceptualising sovereignty in broader terms – terms such as 
‘policy space’ as employed in the recent discourse in the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the South Centre and other parts of the 
Global South. Terms such as the development of structures of people empowerment 
at the local and community levels. Food sovereignty. Energy independence. The 
endogenous capacity to manage and adapt to climate change. The capacity to secure 
your borders and your people. The ability to speak knowledgeably and convincingly 
in global fora; and to be taken seriously.74 
In terms of empowering local voices, Girvan’s sovereignty speaks to Athenian-
type democracies which he believes would be better suited to the societies of the small 
island Commonwealth Caribbean states.75 The role of regionalism in this process would 
be to design frameworks which would enhance individual state sovereignty and assist 
states in meeting their national objectives. Simultaneous to this is the concept of ‘shared 
sovereignty’ at the regional level which basically means the sharing of “selected attributes 
of constitutional sovereignty with regional partners so as to enhance the substantive 
sovereignty of each”76 particularly in areas such as national and regional security, food 
security, climate change and negotiations with external donors. These ideas of 
regionalism which encompass shared sovereignty and national sovereignty built around 
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a model of participatory democracy conflates against the working of the Westminster 
system. Girvan elaborates: 
Here again, there is the issue of form vs. substance. We are searching for a theory and 
practice of Caribbean democracy that break free from the shackles of 
Westminsterism. We need forms of political participation that privilege informed 
citizen engagement with the urgent issues of survival and with the kind of society that 
we wish to create. Forms that promote the building of social consensus across the 
cleavages of class, colour, ethnicity, gender, and political tribe.77 
Girvan goes on to highlight the view that the struggle for people participation in 
the democratic process continues to be a hallmark of Commonwealth Caribbean society, 
despite the Westminster system not being built to accommodate ideals such as local 
knowledge and community based participation. A historical synapse is elaborated by 
Girvan: 
The Caribbean labour movements of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s were a place where 
important debates on the future of Caribbean society took place. The preparation of 
the People’s Plan in Jamaica in 1977 was a remarkable exercise in popular 
participation. The first national conference of Community Councils in Jamaica, held 
in the late 1970s, showed the real possibilities for developing community-based 
organs of people power. The Grenadian Revolution gave rise to an exciting experience 
in community participation in the preparation of the national budget of the 
Government. The Caribbean women’s movements of the 1980s and 1990s have had 
a visible impact on national policy; and still do. All over the region, civil society 
activism is on the rise, campaigning for accountability and transparency in 
government, for constitutional reform, for responsible environmental stewardship.78  
It is arguable whether these people-centred participatory movements within the 
Commonwealth Caribbean have been borne out of an anti-Westminster struggle, but there 




is enough to indicate that a process driven by people-centred participation would be a 
viable alternative towards attaining institutional reform. Girvan refers to the Latin 
American experience in this area as one which would be able to inform the 
Commonwealth Caribbean and possibly bring about reform and changes in how 
sovereignty is perceived: 
Over in Latin America, exciting experiments in participatory democracy are taking 
place. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have convened citizens’ assemblies which 
have drawn up and approved new constitutions establishing organs of popular power, 
the rights of women, indigenous minorities, Afro-descendants, and social and 
economic rights including the right of women to be remunerated for unpaid household 
labour. There is no shortage of experiences from which we can draw.79 
In addition to the importance people participation in driving a sovereign system, 
there is also the issue of the role of local knowledge in re-visiting approaches to 
rationalization in decision making. Geertz for instance asks the question of whether ‘jural 
rules’ are actually effective in constraining behaviours or whether they merely serve as 
masks for rationalizations “for what some judge, lawyer, litigant or other machinator 
wants to do anyway.”80 In illustrating institutionalized law as distinguished from a rule 
of law administered through local systems, Geertz gives an example of varying processes 
of rationalization in classical Islamic and Indic law whose procedures although dissimilar 
were based on concepts seeking to rationalize certain behaviours against the backdrops 
of their perception of universal truths. He contrasts this type of rationalization with a rule 
of law which determines the fairness of justice by embodying legal realism, and states 
that the law should not be regarded as “a collection of ingenious devices to avoid disputes, 
advance interests, and adjust trouble-cases.”81 Geertz also advocates what he calls a legal 
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sensibility or a determinate sense of justice which targets a polarization between facts and 
law. He states: 
Put it this way, the question of law and fact changes its form from one having to do 
with how to get them together to one having to do with how to tell them apart, and the 
Western view of the matter, that there are rules that sort right from wrong, a 
phenomenon called proof, appears as only one mode of accomplishing this.82 
Interestingly, Geertz makes the claim that law is local knowledge, and that its 
conclusions should therefore relate to the management of differences, and not to the 
abolition of it.83  
It is suggested that crafting a rule of law which is built around local knowledge 
and native social needs as opposed to disposing various groups within the society into a 
system which subjects them to monistic sets of rules would be more suited to 
accommodating differences in identities and belief systems. In a sense, local knowledge 
may be regarded as something which transcends normative legal rules. Accordingly, it is 
also arguable that social actors function through various forms of local knowledge 
through which resonate types of practical knowledge that go beyond normative legal 
concepts. This would actually be ideal where the intention is an adaptable rule of law 
whose applicability is adjustable and able to recognize variations in any given factual 
situation. The challenge is that while some aspects of local knowledge might remain 
relatively constant, knowledge in itself is somewhat spatial and subject to the evolution 
of conceptual understandings. A framework to capture this type of dynamism possibly 
goes against the instrumental rationalities displayed by normative understandings of the 
law. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the Commonwealth Caribbean, both at a 
regional and national levels revisit the idea of what it means to be sovereign, especially 
in relation to its historical progression, rule of law development and social arrangement. 
Part of this process means that the region has to think historically and determine whether 
there is rationality in maintaining the overarching structures of legal, political and social 
order. The movement towards initiating a reparations process suggests that there is 
consensus to discover a point of restoration. However, the region must be careful to 
recognize that beyond a reparations process, there also exists a responsibility to confront 
existing discourse and determine its value and relevance in terms of how our legal system 
and the society actually functions. It is also suggested that there be a shift towards a 
system which conceptually and practically allows the rule of law to operate as something 
which is dynamic, adaptable and whose logic is able to access scenarios which are 
informed by local knowledge. Hegel’s dialectical approach has been applied to state the 
thesis that Westminster formalism and its version of the market economy is not 
appropriate in terms of relevance and adaptability. The antithesis has been considered that 
the rule of law in its current form attempts to justify the guarantee of certainty by means 
of law that is not secret, not retroactive and applied by defined authorities. In contrasting 
both the thesis and antithesis, a position of synthesis to solve the conflict discussed is 
arrived at whereby it is suggested as a solution the use of local knowledge in enabling a 





CHAPTER VI  
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AS AN ACTOR IN FACILITATING 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
Introduction 
This Chapter will discuss the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as an actor in 
facilitating the development of a more regional and localized rule of law in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, and its role in contributing to a framework which promotes 
legal certainty in the region. This is important in the context of the aim and objective of 
the thesis, as the issue of whether the CCJ is able to provide a measure of post-colonial 
‘certainty’ through its jurisprudence via a framework which addresses diversity and 
varied belief systems. In doing so, it will discuss the background and structure of the CCJ 
and identify certain distinctive characteristics of the court. It will also consider the 
perspective of the CCJ being a court rooted in the normative culture of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean as opposed to the London based Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council (JCPC). In exploring the potential role of the CCJ in development of the 
rule of law, the chapter also examines the debates that have surrounded cases on capital 
punishment as an illustration of the tensions between localised norms and international 
law. As such, it will discuss concerns about how domestic legislation permitting the death 
penalty will be treated by the court in light of judicial challenges to its constitutionality, 
as well as conflicts with state responsibilities to the international community arising from 
treaty obligations. Diverging attitudes towards adoption of the CCJ and the threat of 
politicizing of the court will also be examined. Overall, this chapter considers whether 
adoption of the CCJ by CARICOM Member States is pivotal in any movement towards 
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attaining a regional court which embodies principles of collective autonomy and self-
identity. 
1.  Background and Structure of CCJ 
The CCJ was established by twelve states1 in an action which sought to reinforce 
their independence from the United Kingdom and to provide CARICOM with a regional 
avenue for judicial recourse. By the ‘Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of 
Justice,’ 2  in July 2003 the English-speaking Caribbean states agreed to implement 
recommendations from a 1992 report by the West Indian Commission3 which called for 
a regional court. This commission comprised a collection of distinguished West Indian 
intellects, and was chaired by Sir Shridath Ramphal, a former Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth. Reflecting on a decision taken by CARICOM Heads of Government in 
1989, the West Indian Commission advocated the necessity of a CARICOM Supreme 
Court. It considered that the low number of appeals at the time being heard by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) was a result of a lack of access to the JCPC, for 
example, because of financial reasons.4 The Commission made the case that the need for 
a court “with both general appellate jurisdiction and an original regional one is now 
overwhelming - indeed it is fundamental to the process of integration itself.”5   
Following the formal agreement to establish the CCJ, the court itself was launched 
in 2005, with one of its objectives being to replace the JCPC as the final Court of Appeal 
for Commonwealth Caribbean states, in addition to resolving disputes between the 
Member States comprising CARICOM. In a landmark speech by Ramphal, a case for the 
                                                 
1 Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; Saint Kitts and 
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4 Ibid, 498-499. 
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CCJ was made essentially addressing the potential the court would offer for the region, 
while quelling the doubtful impressions of the court. On the need for a regional organ of 
judicial appeal, he commented: 
It is almost axiomatic that the Caribbean Community should have its own final court 
of appeal in all matters. I am frankly ashamed when I see the small list of 
Commonwealth countries that still cling to that jurisdiction - a list dominated by the 
Caribbean. Now that we have created our Caribbean Court of Justice in a manner that 
has won the respect and admiration of the common law world, it is an act of abysmal 
contrariety that we have withheld so substantially its appellate jurisdiction in favour 
of that of the Privy Council.6  
Addressing concerns that the judges of the JCPC were more competent than the 
prospects among CARICOM states, he argued that the region had “sent judges to the 
International Court of Justice, to the International Criminal Court and to the International 
Court for the former Yugoslavia, to the presidency of the United Nations Tribunal on the 
Law of the Sea.”7 The institutional design of the court does indeed suggest a certain 
distinctiveness as envisioned by Ramphal and the West Indian Commission. The structure 
of the CCJ has certain unique characteristics in terms of its selection of judges, funding 
and its dual functions as a court final appeal, and an interpreter of treaties. These will now 
be considered. 
 
Selection of Judges 
A unique characteristic of the CCJ when compared to other international courts is 
the selection process for its judges. Judges are appointed by a Regional Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission (RJLSC) 8 , while the President of the CCJ is selected by the 
                                                 
6 Sir Shridath Ramphal,  ‘Caribbean Judiciaries in an era of Globalization: The Paradox of Heritage 
and Hesitancy’ (public lecture, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, June 25, 
2009). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, art V(3) 
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CARICOM Heads of Government. 9  The idea of the RJLSC originates from those 
Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions which provide for domestic Judicial and Legal 
Services Commissions (JLSCs). This framework is intended to protect the CCJ from 
political interference and influence. The RJLSC comprises the President of the CCJ, who 
serves as its Chairman in addition to members selected from regional law associations, 
academics and civil society groups.10 Removal of judges is also controlled by the RJLSC, 
but is subject to defined parameters such as inability, illness and grave misbehaviour and 
is also done based on the advice of an independent enquiry tribunal comprising eminent 
jurists not necessarily confined to the region, who also hold or have held high judicial 
office.11 The President of the CCJ may also be removed on the same grounds as those 
applied to the CCJ judges and subject to the same procedure, with a recommendation then 
made to the CARICOM Heads of Government.12 At this stage, the removal would only 
be effective in the instance where a three quarter majority of the Heads of Government 
agree to it.13 This process for the appointment and removal of CCJ judges is a departure 
from the traditional method for the selection of judges to international courts, which 
usually involves governments nominating or electing the judges. The transparency of the 
traditional system has recently come under intense scrutiny, with the view that there may 
be some judges who are appointed “as a consequence of a highly politicised system, and 
who are not necessarily the best candidate.”14 States who have nominated judges from 
their own as well as other countries for positions in international courts have also been 
accused of ‘vote trading,’ a practice whereby one state would lend its support to nominees 
from other states primarily on the basis of political influence instead of judicial expertise. 
                                                 
9 Ibid, Art IV(6). 
10 Ibid, Art V(1) .  
11 Ibid, Art IX 
12 Ibid, Art IX (5) (1) .  
13 Ibid, Art IV (6). 
14 Afua Hirsch, ‘System for appointing judges ‘undermining international courts’’, The Guardian 
(London, 8 September 2010). 
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Human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch have cautioned against this practice, 
having stated in a memorandum to the International Criminal Court (ICC) that vote 
trading over ICC positions could produce the consequence of poorly qualified judges and 
a bench that would not be the most skilled and representative.15 
 
Funding 
Another distinctive mechanism by which the CCJ has sought to protect itself from 
outside interference is through the system which facilitates funding of the court. 
Financing of the domestic judiciaries across the region is achieved through annual 
subventions derived from national budgets. Generally, the judiciary would provide a 
projected budget and forward this for cabinet approval through the Attorney General. This 
practice does not always encourage confidence in the idea of an independent judiciary 
which is free from political interference, and is an arrangement which may invoke an 
erosion of public trust and confidence in the administration of justice. To address this 
uncertainty in the context of the CCJ, a different approach was established. Funding is 
secured by way of the CCJ Trust Fund, which was created to finance the CCJ in perpetuity 
to the sum of $100 million USD.16 The principal intention of this funding model is for the 
court to meet its expenditure through income generated from the fund17. Member states 
would therefore not be placed in a position to commit to periodic contributions in order 
to offset the operating expenses of the court. Administration of the trust fund is the 
responsibility of a Board of Trustees comprising persons selected from the various 
member states, and include distinguished financial professionals.18 
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To assure the expertise of those persons who would sit on the Board, Article VI of the Revised 
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund
19
 (TFA) states that the Board of 
Trustees shall consist of the following or their nominees: The Secretary-General of CARICOM; Vice-
Chancellor of the University of the West Indies; President of the Insurance Association of the 
Caribbean; Chairman of the Association of Indigenous Banks of the Caribbean; President of the 
Caribbean Institute of Chartered Accountants; President of the Organisation of Commonwealth 
Caribbean Bar Associations; Chairman of the Conference of Heads of the Judiciary of Member States 
of the Caribbean Community; President of the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce; and 
the President of the Caribbean Congress of Labour. In terms of addressing financial transparency, some 
of the functions of the Board according to Article VII of the TFA include evaluating the performance 
of the Fund; establishing with the approval of the members guidelines for prudential investment of the 
resources of the Fund; establishing with the approval of the members the financial regulations of the 
Fund; appointing an investment manager or managers to manage the investments of the Fund in 
accordance with the investment guidelines for the Fund; approving the annual report on the 
performance of the Fund for transmission to the members; approving the capital and operating annual 
budget of the Fund and appointing an external auditor. 
 
Dual Function of the CCJ 
What also sets the CCJ apart from other international courts is that the CCJ 
exercises a dual function, by being able to assume the role of either a court with ‘appellate 
jurisdiction,’ or ‘original jurisdiction.’ To explain this differentiation, firstly, in its 
appellate jurisdiction, it is the final court of appeal for CARICOM countries in criminal, 
constitutional and civil matters. At present, the only countries which have ratified the 
appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ are Barbados and Guyana in 2005, Belize in 2010 and 
Dominica in 2015. Jamaica attempted to accept the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ in 
2004, but the JCPC ruled in Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd. 
& Others v Marshall-Burnett and Another20 that the procedure which was being adopted 
to do this violated the Jamaican constitution, and the process instead required a 
constitutional amendment. Secondly, in its original jurisdiction the court acts as the 
dispute settlement body for the interpretation and application of CARICOM trade rules 
within the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas21 (RTC). The design of the CSME as created 
by the RTC is for the CARICOM region to function as a single and seamless economic 
                                                 
19 Revised Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund (12 January 2004). 
20  Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998)Ltd & Others v Marshall-Burnett and 
Another [2005] UKPC 3. 
21 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM 
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space which would facilitate four freedoms, namely the freedom of establishment, 
movement of CARICOM nationals, services and capital. The CCJ is given exclusive 
jurisdiction in all matters relating to the interpretation and application of the RTC. 
By structuring the CCJ in this way, developing such an indigenous systematic 
model should be considered a noteworthy milestone for the region in its efforts to cement 
its ownership of the court. The formation and comparative development of each arm of 
this dual structure may arguably reflect the region’s grappling with the progressive 
ideology of regional economic stability through solidifying the regional trade bloc and 
implementing the RTC against a “decolonization movement that has still not been 
completed,”22 as demonstrated by the slow progress by some states in abandoning the 
JCPC. As to where the priorities of the court lie in the context of its dual function, CCJ 
judge Justice Jacob Wit has commented that in addition to its appellate jurisdiction, the 
CCJ is “also (and foremost) an International Court” and the “immediate cause for the 
court’s existence lies in its pivotal role in building up the CARICOM Single Market and 
Economy.”23  In the sphere of its original jurisdiction the CCJ can be a catalyst for 
improving trade relations between CARICOM member states and providing a regulatory 
environment which would foster economic growth and development. The prospect of the 
region developing a body of law and judicial thought surrounding the RTC is an exciting 
one, and would also allow legal professionals from small island states an avenue to 
practice international law and by extension contribute to achieving an efficient regional 
single market and economy.  
Yet, despite these aforementioned distinctive characteristics of the CCJ model 
which suggest a real effort to carve out a regional judicial institutional framework that is 
fit for purpose to the Commonwealth Caribbean, its adoption is still to be confirmed 
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across the region because of the remaining option of access to the JCPC in those territories 
where it is still constitutionally allowed. Proponents of the CCJ have argued that the JCPC 
is too far removed from the Commonwealth Caribbean to understand the local conditions 
of the region, while its opponents have questioned the relationship between the CCJ and 
political institutions, with the suggestion being that the CCJ may be exposed to political 
pressure and public pressure brought about by political institutions. This political and 
public pressure is quite evident in terms of how the death penalty is regarded. The 
continued option of access to the JCPC in the Commonwealth Caribbean, whether it is 
disconnected from localized conditions and its approaches to the death penalty will now 
be discussed. 
2.  The Privy Council ‘Problem’ and clashes on the Death Penalty 
Historically, the JCPC was established in 1833 to preside over Appeals in those 
matters originating from the colonies of Great Britain, which at the time included 
Australia, New Zealand, the English speaking African countries, the Indian subcontinent, 
the West Indies and parts of South America.24 In the current climate, despite gaining 
independence from the former metropolitan, Commonwealth Caribbean territories have 
not collectively agreed on shelving recourse to the JCPC in favour of complete regional 
adoption of the CCJ. From a constitutional perspective, it has been argued that the use of 
the JCPC is hindering a process of decolonisation as the constitutional conversation is 
being carried out in a foreign voice, which would result in the discourse reflecting “a 
cluster of values, intellectual orientations and practices that carry a distinct British cast.”25 
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Further explaining this position, Sir David Simmons the Chief Justice of Barbados has 
stated: 
The independence of the states of the region will not be complete, is not complete, 
when our constitutions entrench a foreign tribunal as our final court of appeal. It is 
inconsistent with independence: it is an affront to our sovereignty and the sovereignty 
of independent nations. You may say this is an emotional argument, but these 
psychological considerations are important and the symbolism is not to be 
discounted.26 
An often cited decision of the JCPC which is used to advance the claim of a 
disconnect between the JCPC and its understanding of Commonwealth Caribbean society 
is its decision in Lennox Phillip and Others v DPP27. This matter concerned an attempted 
coup d'etat by an Islamic revolutionary group in Trinidad and Tobago, where the Prime 
Minister and other Members of Parliament were held hostage, but an agreement was made 
between the group and the Prime Minister allowing them be pardoned for their actions if 
they released the hostages and brought the confrontation to an end. Following this, the 
state attempted to prosecute members of the group for treason, murder and various other 
offences which were allegedly committed during the insurrection. It was argued by the 
state that the pardon lacked validity as a result of the circumstances by which it was 
brought about. Despite the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal confirming the validity 
of the pardon by a 2-1 majority and the JCPC agreeing with its validity, the JCPC went 
on to decide that the state was not in a position to prosecute members of the group as this 
would amount to an abuse of process.28 This decision faced widespread criticism within 
Trinidad and Tobago and the Commonwealth Caribbean by the general public and jurists 
alike, with the JCPC having been accused of encouraging the making of deals with 
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insurgents. For instance, former president of the CCJ, Michael de la Bastide in 
considering the JCPC’s ruling in Phillip, expressed his dissatisfaction with the judgment 
by stating that the JCPC’s decision was neither equitable nor just considering that “114 
insurrectionists today walk the streets free from prosecution for their crimes against the 
society and their assault on the democratic process of the nation.”29 He further implied 
that a final appeal court based in the Caribbean would have adopted a different approach. 
While there has been an active debate in the Commonwealth Caribbean either 
supporting or rejecting the JCPC, the JCPC itself has never argued for maintaining its 
position of judicial oversight. Facing criticisms of being a colonial remnant, a foreign 
voice adjudicating on legal matters arising from foreign cultures and judicially legislating 
for the region, the JCPC has indicated that countries are entitled to remove themselves 
from its jurisdiction once this is done in accordance with constitutional procedure. In 
Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd & Others v Marshall-Burnett 
and Another,30 the JCPC stated: 
It must be understood that the board, sitting as the final court of appeal of Jamaica, 
has no interest in its own in the outcome of this appeal. The board exists in this 
capacity to serve the interests of the people of Jamaica. If and when the people of 
Jamaica judge that it no longer does so, they are fully entitled to take appropriate steps 
to bring its role to an end. The question is whether the steps taken in this case were, 
constitutionally, appropriate.31  
Following his installation as the President of the Supreme Court of England and 
Wales in 2009, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, made several public comments to the 
extent that British judicial resources were being strained because of JCPC appeals 
originating from the Caribbean, expressing his discontentment that Britain's best judges 
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had to be allocated to Caribbean matters. Commenting on the time spent by the Supreme 
Court of England and Wales on JCPC appeals, he was quoted in the Financial Times as 
saying, “It is a huge amount of time, I personally would like to see it reduced. It’s 
disproportionate.”32 On 24 September 2009, the BBC addressed the Financial Times 
interview with Lord Phillips, and quoted a public commentator who stated that the 
practice of Britain’s best judges being required to spend a significant amount of their time 
presiding over overseas appeals largely from the Caribbean on business was “of no 
interest to anyone in the United Kingdom” and a “minor public scandal.”33 What these 
comments also bring to the forefront is the financial implications to the United Kingdom 
in allowing the JCPC to continue. The writers of the BBC report referred to statements 
made by the former Governor General of St. Kitts and prominent Caribbean jurist, Sir 
Probyn Innis, who remarked that a demand for payment from services provided by the 
JCPC would “shake them (Caribbean governments) out of the denial that seems to affect 
us in the Caribbean.”34 
Yet, despite these concerns, the JCPC has not been entirely displaced. Geoffrey 
Robertson, who has represented a number of appellants in death penalty appeals from the 
Caribbean has described the profound sense of dislocation he experienced when 
appearing as counsel before the JCPC, stating: 
One side of the amphitheatre is taken up by rows of law books, the other has high 
windows overlooking Whitehall. The parade of black taxis and red buses passing Big 
Ben reminds the visitor that he or she is located precisely at the epicenter of what was 
once the British Empire. What is bizarre, however, is that the concentrated legal minds 
in this room must all imagine they are in another country … This is a court which is 
jurisprudentially orbiting in space, landing one day in Antigua, another in Trinidad.35  
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It is in this context that the CCJ is regarded as embodying an institution which 
closes the circle of independence and represents the sunset of British rule36. It represents 
a parting with the region’s former imperial metropolis, which is still intertwined with its 
rule of law, thereby being an ever present aspect of political and social life from the times 
of colonialism.37 The movement towards adopting the CCJ has borne with it the notion 
that the JCPC is an unnecessary remnant of a colonial period where the rule of law had 
been tailored to protect the economic viability of a plantation economy built on slave 
labour and the slave trade. There is also concern over the practicability of British jurists 
sitting in a London court deciding on judicial matters arising from a region whose socio-
economic and political dynamic bears stark resemblance. What appears to be a growing 
sentiment for an arguably delayed discourse on judicial self-determination ironically 
taking place decades after independence has led to the region slowly grappling with a 
change of direction in how its legislative affairs are governed. Events over the past two 
decades such as the public debacle of disagreements between the JCPC and particularly 
the governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago on approaches towards the death 
penalty as well as signals from the Supreme Court of England and Wales have indicated 
that the opportunity for the CCJ to cement its role has to be capitalized on.  
 
The death penalty dilemma 
Even before the CCJ commenced it operations, it was branded by critics as a 
‘hanging court’ or one which was specifically being established to preserve the practice 
and continuity of capital punishment in the Commonwealth Caribbean.38 The effect of 
this was to place the court in a position of having to not only institute its authority in the 
realm of administering the RTC, but also one where it needed to indicate its position on 
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the death penalty in light of international human rights standards weighed against regional 
constitutional provisions allowing for capital punishment. The issue of the death penalty 
mainly dominates the discussions surrounding the CCJ from the perspective of the general 
public. A 2008 study conducted by the CCJ Court Protocol and Information Officer 
indicated that although 73 percent of the people interviewed in Trinidad and Tobago heard 
about the CCJ, only 22 percent knew that the court had two jurisdictions, with the majority 
unaware of the court's original jurisdiction.39 Most of the respondents favouring the CCJ 
replacing the JCPC indicated their expectation that the CCJ would be a ‘hanging court.’40 
Political messages encouraging enforcement of the death penalty has translated into 
widespread public opinion favouring death by hanging. The prevalence of violent crimes 
and gang warfare in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago has also greatly influenced the 
position of the general public, with a 2008 poll taken in Jamaica in 2008 indicating that 
as a consequence of crime rates, 97 percent of the population supported the death 
penalty. 41  Jamaica has also voted against United Nations Resolutions A/res/62/149, 
A/res/63/168 and A/res/65/206 which have called for a moratorium on the use of the death 
penalty, with a view to its abolishment.  
The CCJ has attempted to void the perception that it is an institution which would 
find favour with the death penalty. The President of the CCJ, Sir Dennis Bryon has 
indicated to the Antigua Observer newspaper that, “We are a court of justice and we will 
be dealing with the law as it exists and the constitutional rights of our citizens as set out 
in our respective constitutions.”42 Sir Bryon held firm to the position that it would be the 
law and not politicians that would be responsible for determining the use of the death 
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penalty by the CCJ.43 His position was evident in the CCJ ruling of Attorney General v 
Boyce44 where the CCJ, although stating that its role was neither to be bound by, nor 
ignore the jurisprudence of the JCPC, confirmed that it was tasked with re-examining 
JCPC precedents and outlining the approach that it would take in addressing similar 
issues.45 In addressing the death penalty in Boyce, the court acknowledged the merits of 
the JCPC death penalty jurisprudence in its effort to ensure necessary procedures to afford 
the fundamental human rights had not been violated.46 In light of this however, the court 
also acknowledged that the Constitutions of many Commonwealth Caribbean states 
retained capital punishment, thereby creating a dilemma as judges are not entitled to 
change this practice, despite whatever personal views they might hold on the death 
penalty. 47  What the JCPC death penalty jurisprudence had done was to create a 
paradoxical situation by its rulings in Pratt and Morgan v Attorney General for Jamaica48 
when read together with its rulings in Neville Lewis v The Attorney General49 and in 
Thomas v Baptiste50. In Pratt, it was established that a delay of more than five years in 
carrying out the execution of a person on death row amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. In Lewis and in Baptiste, the JCPC took the position that in the event where a 
state ratified a treaty which granted the convicted person the right to petition an 
international body, his sentence was required to be suspended until the petition was 
decided. Therefore, where the process of petition exceeded a period of five years, any 
potential execution would amount to inhuman and degrading punishment as decided in 
Pratt. In explaining this paradox, the CCJ was successfully able to dispute its label as a 
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‘hanging court’ while indicating the need to carve out its own jurisprudence from existing 
law. 
The Pratt decision was met with a tremendous backlash, with Jamaica having to 
commute the sentences of 105 prisoners, Trinidad and Tobago 53 prisoners and Barbados 
9 prisoners, all of whom had already been on death row for five years.51 Local Courts of 
Appeal were also forced to put other matters on hold and instead focus on determining 
appeals within a two-year deadline, which was the timeframe stipulated in Pratt for 
domestic appeals. After the domestic appeals process was completed, Pratt allowed for a 
further eighteen months for the completion of petitions before international bodies such 
as the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR). Prior to the JCPC's decision in Pratt, there were 
no instances of either the UNHRC or the IACHR completing any appeals within the 
eighteen-month timeframe. Practically, appeals were taking two to three times longer than 
eighteen months to be completed and defence lawyers soon recognised that by initiating 
the international human rights appeal process, it was possible that their clients would 
stand a chance of their sentences being commuted to life imprisonment. This situation 
was brought to the attention of the JCPC in Bradshaw v Attorney General of Barbados,52 
where representations were made by the Government of Barbados for the five-year period 
as outlined in Pratt to be extended, taking into consideration how long petitions before 
the IACHR and UNHRC were taking in reality to be completed. Alternatively, it was 
submitted that the five-year period should not take into consideration the time taken by 
the IACHR and UNHCR to conclude petitions. The JCPC however rejected these 
submissions, and suggested that the government would be in a better position if it had 
expedited the domestic appeals process. 
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It was from this background that renewed calls for adopting the CCJ were being 
made by local politicians, who cited interference from the JCPC in the execution of 
legislative functions. Sir David Simmons lambasted the position of the JCPC on the death 
penalty as “a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin guise of 
constitutional interpretation.”53 Former Jamaican Prime Minister, P.J. Patterson during 
Parliamentary debates focusing on the CCJ made his case for the CCJ by stating that the 
JCPC was wrongly forcing judicial legislation by virtue of their decision in Pratt and 
other death penalty cases. Speaking in the context of advocating Jamaica's adoption of 
the CCJ's appellate jurisdiction, Patterson stated: 
How, as an independent nation, can we countenance judicial legislation? This is not 
about the flexing of political muscle. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
ruling in a line of cases beginning with Pratt and Morgan, in the early part of the last 
decade, have amounted to judicial legislation.54 
In a sense, the regulation of the death penalty is more of an argument which ought 
to focus on the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature and what 
would be the agreeable way to treat with law allowing for capital punishment, balanced 
against the protection of human rights. Yet, the CCJ was unfairly placed in the spotlight 
by politicians who chose to criticize the JCPC on the grounds of perceived judicial 
interference in matters to be decided by the legislature. For those opposing the CCJ and 
it death penalty jurisprudence, the view follows that if constitutional interpretation is a 
means of expressing a state’s constitutional identity, then the JCPC being the interpreter 
of the constitution would allow a former coloniser to continue to define its collective 
identity.  
An important issue which emerges from the death penalty discourse is whether 
the exercise of judicial discretion by a group of judges who are physically and culturally 
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removed from the Commonwealth Caribbean countries would be appropriate as they are 
essentially making decisions of public policy. The CCJ itself in David Lachana A/C 
Lachana, Sadonel Devi Lachana v Cooblal Arjune & Tara Ajune55 made its claim as an 
autonomous, indigenous court by stating: 
Their Lordships are both geographically and culturally far removed from the countries 
that still retain the Privy Council as their final appellate court. They are, quite 
understandably, unfamiliar with local situations and customs. The difference with our 
Court is obvious. We are a regional Court and thus much closer to home as it were. 
Our closeness to the region and our greater familiarity with its social and cultural 
dimensions make it easier for us to descend into the facts of the case.56  
Former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, Justice de la Bastide has argued 
that those who are entrusted to make decisions on the rule of law ought to have an intimate 
knowledge of how the society functions as they would be better informed about that 
society’s needs, and would be subject to the highest forms of accountability as a result of 
being a member of that society.57 On this basis, supporters of the CCJ have claimed that 
the court would “empower regional jurists to give effect to regional standards and values 
as the laws of the region are interpreted and applied.”58 In considering the regional climate 
at present, it is easy to claim that current regional standards and values would firmly 
establish a pro-death penalty position. However, this should not be taken to mean that the 
CCJ is a pro-death penalty court. What should be facilitated is an environment for the 
CCJ to determine what would be best for the society at the existing moment of its history, 
while also taking into consideration international standards on human rights norms in 
light of governments seeking to protect their legislative and political agendas.  It is worth 
considering that although there was a shift in the legal norms which governed capital 
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punishment following the Pratt decision, there was no accompanying shift in the general 
attitude of the public. Commonwealth Caribbean governments appear to be trapped in a 
situation of conflict between domestic commitments to the death penalty and international 
human rights commitments. Regional governments and the general public continue to 
favour the death penalty as the best deterrent for violent crime. According to a former 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, the existence of 
capital punishment was a necessary feature for Caribbean participation in human rights 
systems. According to Maharaj, it was on this basis that: 
Commonwealth Caribbean States organised their domestic legal and administrative 
procedures in capital cases and it was on this understanding that Trinidad and Tobago 
accepted the right of condemned prisoners to petition the international human rights 
bodies.59 
In Boyce, the CCJ took the position that the JCPC decision in Pratt raised 
tremendous concern amongst the governments and members of the public in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. This concern emerged as a consequence of the radical nature 
of the decision in Pratt, the apparent stringency of the time period it stipulated and the 
unpreparedness of the authorities to systematically cope with the consequences of the 
decision. According to the CCJ in Boyce, the Pratt decision disrupted national and 
regional justice systems – “Its effect was that, in one fell swoop, all persons on death row 
for longer than five years were automatically entitled to have, and had, their sentences 
commuted to life imprisonment.”60 The CCJ while not explicitly overruling the JCPC in 
Boyce, instead took the view that a reasonable time limit ought to be placed on the length 
of time for appeals to be conducted.61 Had the CCJ completely overruled Pratt, the 
fledgling court had the potential of facing an international backlash from governments 
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who opposed the death penalty and international human rights organisations, and its 
credibility would have come under intense scrutiny. 
What is troubling is that there appears to be confusion as to what is the indicative 
standards of human rights in the region when it comes to the rule of law and the death 
penalty. According to Antoine, the jurisprudence of the JCPC is swayed by international 
decisions, even if these conflict with local sentiments. Antoine views the JCPC decisions 
on the death penalty as reflecting standards emanating from the UNHRC and the 
European Court on Human Rights (ECHR). She states that whatever the validity of the 
UNHRC and ECHR decisions on capital punishment, what is in doubt is whether the 
JCPC made a correct assessment of West Indian societal norms on the issue instead on 
relying on its “own distaste for capital punishment.”62 Yet, the JCPC in Henfield and 
Farrington v AG of the Bahamas63 commented: 
Their Lordships are conscious that the conclusion which they have reached … may 
cause some concern among those responsible for the administration of justice. They 
are very much aware of the problems in certain countries in the Caribbean which have 
given rise to unacceptable delays in execution, which in their turn have inevitably led 
to the establishment of the principle in Pratt.64 
From this passage, there is clear indication by the JCPC that there are problems 
which it is aware of in terms of the effective administration of justice, so as to prevent 
undue delays in the carrying out of the death penalty. It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that such a situation becomes a human rights concern when justice cannot be administered 
in a timely manner because of localized problems in the criminal justice system, as well 
as uncertainty caused by conflicts in the approaches of international law, and municipal 
law towards the death penalty. Bascombe, who views human rights standards in the 
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Caribbean as being absent or comparatively lower than normative Western standards, 
argues that it is important for the CCJ to play a role in the development of “a regional 
system of protection of human rights that ensures that these rights are open to all.”65 
However, he disagrees that the Privy Council is too far removed from the Commonwealth 
Caribbean to provide access to justice by contending that this would mean that human 
rights protection by means of the Inter American Court of Human Rights or the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights is also too far removed from the region.66 Instead 
he contends that from a localized level, domestic legal systems should be able to look to 
the CCJ to provide normative guidance on the recognition of human rights standards.67 
Accordingly, Bascombe explains:  
The law can and must be instrumental in the formation of a just and egalitarian society 
that embraces all....Governments in the Caribbean have a moral and constitutional 
duty to create societies that are socially and economically just. This would include 
free access to justice (as per the CCJ) as well as protection from the state. Recognising 
the necessity of human rights standards through the CCJ would serve to unite 
Caribbean people by placing their rights at the heart of the local legal system.68 
In addition to political and public pressure derived from the death penalty issue, 
the CCJ has also faced the challenge of gaining the trust of the public as previously 
mentioned. This matter of how the CCJ should respond to pressure from political 
institutions and their campaigners would next be considered. It will also be discussed how 
the CCJ through certain key judgments have contributed to the development of the human 
rights jurisprudence in the region, as well as the general clarification of the rule of law in 
other areas. 
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3. The CCJ and Rule of Law Development in the face of Political  pressure 
and Public uncertainty 
A recurring feature in the political discussion on the importance of the CCJ is the 
issue of public trust in the institution. The issue has been raised as to whether the CCJ 
deserves public trust, with a lack of trust having the effect of compromising the courts 
legitimacy. Public trust for the CCJ has been slow to come about, with surveys in Trinidad 
and Tobago indicating that the majority of respondents held the quality of the JCPC in 
greater regard than that of the CCJ.69 Negative public attitudes towards politicians and 
those in positions of governance continue to bring to the forefront a sentiment that the 
CCJ can be manipulated by politicians. CCJ judges have been considered as products of 
an untrustworthy political environment, and therefore by extension the institution of the 
CCJ would not hold that regard of trustworthiness. This sentiment may be compounded 
by the reality that just three countries have accepted the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ, 
despite the court existing for a period of ten years. The CCJ has come under particular 
attack in Trinidad and Tobago, with a former senator Wade Mark conveying in the Senate 
the already existing view that the CCJ was a political tool in the hands of politicians.70 
According to Mark, the JCPC was a “buffer between the masses and a marauding band 
of potential oppressors, dictators and power hungry megalomaniacs.”71 Mark’s views are 
akin to a line of thought which suggests that what the CCJ is doing is merely replacing 
an independent judiciary with a politically dependent one. The notion that the court would 
be better than the CCJ in its ability to consider regional culture, values and circumstances 
was also met with objection by former leader of the Jamaican opposition Edward Seaga, 
                                                 




who commented that this approach would mean there would be diminished consideration 
for universal values.72  
The issue of conflict between the CCJ and stakeholders, such as political 
institutions is no doubt one which can result in adverse situations which can disrupt 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the court. One such example is the effect of public 
opinion on the court, which might be influenced by political institutions. Pressure directly 
from political institutions can also be brought about because of competition for 
institutional power.73 ‘Political power’ has been defined by Weber as the possibility of 
one actor in a social or political relationship to be in a position to deliver his own will 
against resistance, notwithstanding the basis on which the possibility rests. 74  Weber 
suggests that power enables the actor to have its own way, even where there is the 
prospect of others being opposed to the actor’s decision.75 The manner of response by the 
CCJ to external institutions is therefore important for protection of its institutional 
autonomy. Hatzopoulos considers how responsive should a court be to political 
institutions and suggests that there is basis for a negative response.76 An important ground 
for this conclusion is founded on the doctrine of separation of powers: 
Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois and the idea of separation of powers, today still 
constitutes the single most important legacy of the French Revolution to modern 
democracies. It is true that the radical separation envisioned by French revolutionaries 
has been watered down in order to accommodate the complex needs of modern states: 
the executive power increasingly encroaches into the legislature’s domain, and 
occasionally also performs (quasi) judicial functions. US executive agencies offer a 
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prime example of (a limited) departure from Montesquieu’s ideas. European 
governments often dispose of extended legislative powers as does the EU 
Commission by virtue of the EU Treaties (in areas such as competition and state aid 
law) or by delegations given to it by the EU legislature (the European Parliament and 
the Council – although delegated powers are typically subject to strong comitology 
obligations). This notwithstanding, the principle of separation of powers remains the 
orthodoxy, especially in relation to Courts and the delivery of justice.77 
In the context of the European Union (EU), the doctrine of separation of powers 
forms the EU’s principle of institutional balance. This principle directs EU institutions to 
act within the strict confines of their competencies without impeding other institutions - 
“In other words, the legislature should be legislating and the Court should be judging – 
without interfering with one another.” 78  Furthermore, responsiveness to political 
institutions would jeopardize the court’s role in its protection of individuals from 
maladministration, its protection of fundamental rights and its pursuance of the integrity 
of its institutional and constitutional role.79 Responsiveness to political institutions can 
also erode the institutional legitimacy of the court, and can open up the court to attacks 
of being partisan to certain Member States, or commercial entities or interest groups. 
Nonetheless, in discussing the EU system, Dehousse identifies four avenues by which a 
court can have interaction with political institutions, namely as an agenda setter; as a 
policy innovator; in its course of performing a legitimate function and as a catalyst for 
Community legislation.80 Essentially, these avenues brings to the forefront the Court’s 
role as an “initiator of interaction.”81 
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According to Höreth, Courts actually benefit from the perception of them being 
politically neutral.82 As such, he states: 
It is widely assumed that courts operate in a solely legal environment in which there 
is no place for politics and no place for their own political interests. As a result, the 
largest advantage highest or constitutional courts have vis-à-vis the actors of the other 
branches of government is their (putative) neutral nature and trustworthiness of their 
decisions. This is even the case with decisions that address highly salient and 
politically contested issues. Whenever there is a horizontal conflict between political 
actors of the two other branches of government, it is to be expected that the Court 
have no interests that coincide with those of one of the conflicting parties.83 
Although, Höreth’s reference considers the court in a domestic system, the same 
principle can be applied to the CCJ, and ideally domestic governments and the CCJ would 
want to strive for a mutually beneficial relationship. Adoption of the court should suggest 
that regional governments have placed enough trust and confidence in its neutrality, and 
consequently, the court should avoid judgments which are political in nature, as this 
would actually undermine its authority. What would be important is for the CCJ to follow 
an objective of case law coherence. Case law coherence is arguably connected to values 
such as fairness and integrity and allows for an unencumbered operation of the rule of 
law as arbitrary decision making would be avoided. This would also encourage the self-
responsibility of the court. As Shuibhne states:  
Fundamentally, when the Court makes interpretative choices, it should explain and 
rationalize those choices - especially when it departs from the law established in its 
previous decisions. The converse idea of fragmentation conveys the breakdown of 
legal coherence. It also captures the related ruptures that occur: not only in the case 
law substantively but also in the underpinning values and in institutional confidence, 
which can in turn lead to a breakdown of institutional trust. Importantly, 
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fragmentation is not about difference per se. Instead, it gives us a mechanism to 
establish when and why difference is not justifiable.84 
Another issue that has been explored by commentators is whether the CCJ does 
in fact represent a unified regional identity, and whether such an identity does in fact 
exist. The notion of a common Caribbean identity has been dismissed by the argument 
that different diasporic movements have resulted in the presence of varied identities. The 
CSME is yet to allow the unrestricted movement of all persons within the region, and 
strong national identities have meant that persons moving from one island in the 
Caribbean to another have been met with anti-immigration responses. In 2013, thirteen 
Jamaicans were denied entry into Trinidad and Tobago on the same day,85 and as recent 
as October 2014, three Jamaicans who were not allowed to enter Trinidad and Tobago 
claimed that they were forced to sleep on the airport floor and denied access to food and 
bathroom facilities.86 These acts were met with anger by Jamaica, whose citizens in turn 
called for a boycott of Trinidadian imports. Essentially these occurrences have put the 
operation of the CSME under intense scrutiny, and encouraged nationalist sentiments 
instead of a collective regional identity.  
Alternatively, the development of local jurisprudence may be more relevant to 
each island state than the development of a regional jurisprudence. Of course, this would 
mean that each national judiciary would need to undertake responsibility for its own 
jurisprudential development, therefore avoiding the CCJ by establishing national courts 
of final appeal. Although CARICOM attempts to function as a single custom union to 
solidify its economic well-being in a global context, the reality is that national identities 
vary across the region. Again it is Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago who have mooted 
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the idea of localized final courts of appeal. Within this context former Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago Kamla Persad-Bissessar stated that the argument for embracing the 
CCJ was not about justice, but that the country wanted to be a sovereign and independent 
nation.87 The basis of ‘sovereignty’ also fuelled the views of former Jamaican Prime 
Minister Bruce Golding, who commenting on the possibility of a national court of final 
appeal replacing the JCPC, stated that he believed Jamaica had the judicial experience 
and maturity for this to happen.  Of course, establishing such a court at this point would 
undermine the existence of the CCJ, and not auger well for its future operation and public 
confidence.88 Accordingly Kocken and van Roozendaal state: 
Within the frame opposing the CCJ it was argued that the development of local 
jurisprudence is better left to the Caribbean state’s own national judiciaries. This is in 
line with the internal notion of sovereignty and identity, which emphasizes the 
differences within the Caribbean. Thus the point is made that the CCJ judges do not 
have, cannot have, the sense of Caribbean identity needed for the development of a 
distinctive Caribbean jurisprudence. It has been emphasized by others that next to 
national identity it is global identity that counts: either the PC (Privy Council) should 
be replaced by a national final appellate court, or the PC should stay.89 
Despite this assertion, the argument will be put forward that the CCJ has the 
institutional autonomy to shape regional legal norms through its decision making, and 
that this process is already underway. Reference will be made to certain landmark 
decisions to demonstrate this claim. 
                                                 




4. Shaping regional norms through the Court’s decision making  
The CCJ is in a position to shape regional legal norms where it assumes the role 
as an actor vested with responsibility for the jurisprudential of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. In such a role, the CCJ bears with it the institutional influence to address 
questions of the legal identity of the Commonwealth Caribbean. The court’s construction 
of the law can be arguably linked to having the effect of providing a normative framework 
from which the region’s legal identity can be affirmed. This is an enormous responsibility 
as the court in its decision making would be prompted to not only deconstruct national 
legal systems, but also to consider things such as historical influences on the rule of law, 
as well as diasporic and international influences.  
The CCJ has attempted to invoke cultural change from its rulings which have 
addressed public accountability and good governance. In Florencio Marin and Jose Coye 
v The Attorney General of Belize90, the Attorney General brought a claim for the common 
law tort of misfeasance in public office against two former Ministers of Government. It 
was alleged that during their terms in office they arranged for the transfer of fifty-six 
parcels of state land to a company beneficially owned and/or controlled by one of them. 
The Attorney General further claimed that the company paid a significant sum below 
market value for the land, and that the transaction was undertaken deliberately, without 
lawful authority and in bad faith, thereby resulting in a loss of public revenue. 
Traditionally, a claim in tort for misfeasance involving public officials would be extended 
only to private citizens or classes of persons, but the CCJ in Marin upheld the decision of 
the Belize Court of Appeal that the tort could extend to an action initiated by the Attorney 
General. Until Marin, there had never been any instance in a Commonwealth Caribbean 
jurisdiction where the state had attempted to use this cause of action against public 
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officials abusing their powers for personal financial benefit.  The CCJ found that there 
was no “sufficient reason to deny the logic of the developments in the tort of misfeasance 
in public office which have in this case converged with the evolution of the corporate 
nature of the State in the law of torts.”91 The CCJ’s influence on the shaping of the judicial 
landscape also appeared evident in its statement that extending the scope of the tort “may 
well portend the welcome emergence of a new matrix of causes of action hitherto frozen 
in their historical crypts and now animated by judicial imprimatur.”92 The CCJ in Marin 
practically made available another avenue to address corruption and misuse of public 
resources, in addition to avenues usually used such as disciplinary action, dismissal from 
office, anti-corruption legislation, criminal prosecution or civil litigation for breach of 
trust or breach of fiduciary duties. From its decision in Marin, the court has made a 
commendable stance in how it views standards of public accountability. 
Again, the CCJ in Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission93, the 
court addressed the issue of corruption and mismanagement by public officials. In this 
case, the court indicated its role in upholding the rule of law as it relates to accountability 
in its statement that:  
By signing and ratifying the Revised Treaty and thereby conferring on this Court ipso 
facto a compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty, the member states 
transformed the erstwhile voluntary arrangements in CARICOM into a rule-based 
system, thus creating and accepting a regional system under the rule of law. The rule 
of law brings with it legal certainty and protection of the rights of states and 
individuals alike, but at the same time of necessity it creates legal accountability. Even 
if such accountability imposes some constraint upon the exercise of sovereign rights 
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of states, the very acceptance of such a constraint in a treaty is in itself an act of 
sovereignty.94 
The CCJ in made its first pronouncement on the law governing free movement of 
persons within the CSME in its landmark judgment of Shanique Myrie v Barbados.95 
While under colonial rule, persons residing in the British West Indies were able to move, 
live and work in any of the Caribbean islands, although there is indication that no legal 
right existed to freedom of movement as demonstrated in Margetson v Attorney General 
of Antigua96 where the Court of Appeal of the West Indian Associated States decided that 
a citizen from Montserrat had no legal right to land and residence in the nearby island of 
Antigua. Leading to the establishment of the original Treaty of Chaguaramas (1973) 
(TC),97 restricted movement had become an established characteristic of the post-colonial 
Commonwealth Caribbean. The TC provided that: 
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as requiring, or imposing any obligation on 
a Member State to grant freedom of movement to persons into its territory, whether 
or not such persons are nationals of other Member States of the Common Market.98  
However, the Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the 
Advancement of the Integration Movement (1989)99 and the Report of the Independent 
West Indian Commission (1992) 100  recommended a return to the practice of free 
movement and focus on removing barriers to the free movement of skilled persons and 
professionals. The passage of the RTC in 2001 further redefined the regional integration 
framework, with Article 45 speaking to the objective of free movement of all Community 
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nations and Article 46 on the free movement of skilled Community nationals. Building 
on the scope of Article 45, it was agreed at the CARICOM Heads of Government 
Conference in 2007 that all CARICOM nationals should be entitled to an automatic stay 
of six months upon arrival in order to enhance their sense that they belong to, and were 
able to move in the Caribbean Community, although being subject to the rights of 
Member states to refuse undesirable persons entry and to prevent persons from access to 
public funds. 
The CCJ in Myrie considered the matter of a Jamaican woman, Shanique Myrie 
who had visited Barbados in 2011, with the purpose of spending time with friends. She 
was detained and interrogated by Barbadian immigration authorities, who suspected her 
of transporting drugs. A degrading and intimate search was conducted on her person, 
following which she was placed in a cell overnight and then returned to Jamaica the 
following day. The CCJ held that that by effect of the 2007 decision of the Conference of 
Heads of Government, Myrie was permitted to travel without restrictions to Barbados, 
despite Barbados not having enacted legislation to implement the 2007 decision.  The 
court decided that the community treaty does not require that Member States enact a 
binding Community decision into domestic law in order to create at the Community level 
legally binding rights and obligations. Instead states would be required to give domestic 
effect to such a decision subject to their own relevant constitutional procedures.101 Where 
these constitutional procedures require domestic legislation, then the legislature must be 
involved in order to give municipal courts the authority to adjudicate those rights and 
obligations at the municipal level.102 The CCJ further stated that in lieu of enacting new 
or amending old legislation this objective may in certain circumstances be accomplished 
administratively or even judicially in cases where the Constitution or the existing 
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domestic legislation leaves room for so doing.103 The CCJ also held that the behaviour of 
the Barbadian officers who detained her and then proceeded to conduct an intimate search 
on her while repeatedly insulting her in addition to placing her overnight in a holding cell 
in the airport constituted a serious violation of her human and fundamental rights. The 
CCJ in Myrie appeared to have shifted from a prior strategy of legal diplomacy to one of 
assertion directed at expanding the jurisdiction of the court and transforming CARICOM 
from a collection of sovereign states to an autonomous political community. In addressing 
the decision of the CCJ in Myrie, Justice Anderson observed that Myrie may well serve 
as a catalyst to facilitate the expansion of the RTC rules addressing freedom of movement 
beyond that of employment or other economic activity, and as a consequence: 
contribute to the further evolution of that nascent virtue of ‘Caribbean identity’ which 
has already taken root in the field of education through the University of the West 
Indies and sport via the ‘exploits’ of the West Indies Cricket Team.104 
The CCJ however faces obstacles to any assertion of CARICOM law being above 
the law of Member States. A prime example is the Constitutions of those Member States 
which claim superiority over other law, and that where there is a conflict of laws, then the 
Constitution would prevail. Using the Constitution of Barbados as an example, Section 1 
states:  
This Constitution is the supreme law of Barbados and, subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution, if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution 
shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.105 
Interestingly, this approach is taken by the English-speaking CARICOM Member 
states, and echoes the dualist common law perspective, where international and domestic 
law are treated as separate and independent systems of law, with each having supremacy 
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in its own areas of operation. Yet, within CARICOM there exists those countries such as 
Suriname which prescribe to a monist doctrine, adopting the position that both domestic 
and community law are integrated and that where there is a conflict of laws then 
international law would prevail over domestic law. Another apparent obstacle is that 
based on Article 240 of the RTC, the RTC appears to subject itself to the decisions of 
national legal systems to the extent that legally binding rights and obligations would not 
be created until relevant constitutional procedures. This article states that decisions of 
competent Organs taken under this Treaty shall be subject to the relevant constitutional 
procedures of the Member States before creating legally binding rights and obligations 
for nationals of such states. However, as seen in Myrie, the prima facie subjection of 
Community law to national law may not directly apply where there are no contrary 
provisions in the Constitution or legislation.  
Sitting in the capacity of its appellate jurisdiction in Boyce, the CCJ also held that 
a treaty which was ratified but unincorporated could still be able to give rise to certain 
legitimate expectations. 106  In Boyce, the CCJ stated that the principle of legitimate 
expectation would apply in balancing the competing interests of a person on death row to 
pursue a petition to the IAHRC and that of the state to refuse to await the conclusion of 
the IAHRC determination.107 The Boyce, judgment suggests that the CCJ finds favour 
with the proposition of a jurisprudential shift away from dualism where the outcome is 
the advancement of international human rights norms. Accordingly, it was stated in Boyce 
that the proliferation of international treaties has transformed individuals into “active 
players on the international plane pursuant to treaties entered into by their 
Governments”108  even if the treaties are yet to have basis within the domestic legal 
system. The court further explained: 
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Put in stark terms, by ratifying the treaty, the Executive has thrown to the condemned 
man, fighting for his life to be spared, a lifeline, albeit one that perhaps offers only a 
slim chance of rescue. The real issue facing judges is this: As the man is about to 
grasp this lifeline, is it fair for the Executive, which placed it there in the first place, 
to yank it away? Is it enough for the court then merely to explain to the man that 
unincorporated international treaties form no part of domestic law; that he has derived 
no ‘right’ from the mere accession of his Government to the treaty; that the Executive 
does not have to await the determination of his petition by the international body 
before executing him, even though the report of that body, if it were available, would 
have to be considered by the authority responsible for exercising the prerogative of 
mercy and might persuade that authority to spare his life? Those are the haunting 
questions that cause judges much discomfort.109 
Aaron, in his observations on Boyce, suggests that the framing of the above 
passage of dicta by the CCJ “seems to suggest an underlying resentment on the part of 
the judges that their court was being asked to enforce dualism strictly and ignore the 
practical implications of doing so.”110 The CCJ Boyce thus made the determination that a 
strict application of dualism would produce an outcome which “seems oddly out of step 
with the modern trend of employing legal concepts for giving effect to, rather than 
frustrating, generally accepted notions of what is fair and humane.”111 On this point, 
Aaron further comments: 
That a new court, which should be predisposed to erring on the side of caution in its 
first major judgment, was willing to acknowledge the need for a new approach to the 
interpretation of unimplemented treaties, speaks to the momentum pushing courts 
away from the traditionalist’s view of dualist theory. It is clear from the outset of their 
judgment that President de la Bastide and Justice Saunders wished to send the 
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message to governments that they should not expect courts to apply dualism strictly 
where doing so would undermine individual rights.112  
The indication of non-adherence to a strict dualist tradition by the CCJ arguably 
carries with it a proposition that domestic courts within the Commonwealth Caribbean 
legal system can use unincorporated treaties as interpretive aids in their construction of 
domestic law.113 However, the point of contention with the suggestion of this approach 
by the CCJ is that the court might be exposing itself to the same criticism that it is trying 
to resolve by a lose construction of dualism, that is, undermining the function of the 
legislative arm of its member states by way of judicial activism. Indeed, the risk is that 
the court might be misconstrued as having the unencumbered authority to direct domestic 
courts based on the values which are deemed to be preferred by the CCJ. Haynes instead 
suggests an approach whereby the CCJ combines teleological approaches “with other 
legal arguments based on the wording of the instrument, legislative history, comparative 
law as well as legal contexts.”114 
The CCJ has also made several other important judgments during the duration of 
its term thus far. In Romeo Da Costa Hall v The Queen,115 the court considered the human 
rights violation of excessive pre-trial detention. In this matter, the CCJ considered a 
matter where the state withdrew an indictment for murder after accepting a plea of guilty 
of causing serious harm with intent. The trial court took into account two of the years the 
prisoner spent on remand when calculating the sentence and the CCJ ruled that although 
a court does have discretion, the general rule is that time spent on remand should be 
considered, but there were certain exceptions such as where the court concluded that the 
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defendant deliberately attempted to expand this time, and where the entire or part of the 
pre-trial custody was not related to the offence that the prisoner was being sentenced for. 
Addressing the jurisdiction of Guyana, which has a hybrid land law system 
comprising a mixture of the English common law and Roman-Dutch law, the CCJ was 
able to give clarity to several important doctrinal issues arising from Guyanese land law. 
In Ramdass v Jairam and Others,116 the CCJ was able to clarify and state definitively that 
equitable interests in immovable property are not recognized in Guyana, and therefore 
cannot be acquired. In Toolsie Persaud Ltd. v Andrew James Investments Ltd. and 
Others,117 the CCJ brought clarification to the law of adverse possession as it relates to 
Guyana by deciding that it was possible to acquire title to state land through adverse 
possession where the claimant showed a sufficient degree of physical control and custody 
of the land in addition to an intention to exercise this custody and control on his own 
behalf, and for his benefit. Furthermore, in Lackram Bisnauth v Ramanand Shewprashad 
and Rajwattie Bisnauth 118  the CCJ attempted to provide guidance on principles 
addressing the acquisition of prescriptive title to land under the Guyana Title to Land 
(Prescription and Limitation) Act, 60:02. 
As previously discussed, the CCJ, being an exclusively new court with 
autonomous and final jurisdiction, is not bound to prior decisions from other courts, 
including authoritative courts such as the JCPC. This rule is maintained even where 
previous JCPC decisions originated from the same jurisdiction that a CCJ matter which 
is being heard originates. As mentioned, in Boyce, the observation was made that the CCJ 
will consider very carefully and respectfully the opinions of the JCPC in matters from 
states which still accept the Privy Council as their final court. Haynes argues that some 
of the CCJ’s most recent decisions in its original jurisdiction capacity suggest an 
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increasing trend towards judicial restraint as indicated by its adoption of a teleological 
approach.119 Considering the domain of treaty interpretations, Haynes explains: 
Historically, three schools of thought have generally been associated with the 
interpretation of treaties: (i) the ‘intentions of the parties’ or ‘founding fathers’ school; 
(i) the ‘textual’ or ‘ordinary meaning of the words’ school; and (iii) the ‘teleological’ 
or ‘aims and objects’ school. While each of these schools invariably present their 
respective strengths and concomitant challenges, the teleological approach, which has 
its sphere of operation almost entirely in the field of general multilateral conventions, 
seems to be the Caribbean Court of Justice’s (CCJ’s) preferred approach.120 
The teleological approach referenced by Haynes speaks to interpretation based on 
a perception of the spirit of the treaty instead of the letter of the treaty.121 It assumes that 
where there is any case of doubt, the legislative provision has to be interpreted in a manner 
which has consistency with the goals and purposes which are either implicitly or explicitly 
derived from a legal rule, or set of rules.122 This approach was demonstrated by the CCJ 
in Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v Guyana123 where the appellants, being 
private entities involved in the production and distribution of cement, sought special leave 
to appear before the court.124 The appellants request was founded on their allegation that 
Guyana was in breach of Article 82 of the RTC which provides for the establishment and 
maintenance of a Common External Tariff (CET) by Member States on any cement 
imported from third states.125 While Guyana admitted its suspension of the CET, its 
Attorney General claimed that the applicants had no locus standi to initiate proceedings 
before the CCJ as they were not State Parties to the RTC, and that they had failed to 
satisfy the conditions established by the RTC for the institution of proceedings by a 
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private entity.126 The CCJ disagreed, and granted the parties leave, adjudicating that it 
was sufficient enough for the applicants to be incorporated or registered by way of the 
domestic legislation of the member state. The CCJ’s conclusion was founded on the basis 
of a teleological interpretation of Article 222 of the RTC,127 which in the court’s view 
was to be broadly constructed when deciding whether an applicant qualifies as having 
both a natural and juridicial right to sue a state party. Accordingly, the court observed:   
In interpreting the RTC the Court does not intend to place undue reliance on a literal 
approach. Reliance on the text of a treaty to the detriment of its object and purpose is 
contrary to the rule expressed in Article 31 of the VCLT and does not accord with the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.128 
On this point, the court went on to quote a passage from Aust: 
Placing undue emphasis on the text, without regard to what the parties intended; or on 
what the parties are believed to have intended, regardless of the text; or on the 
perceived object and purpose in order to make the treaty more ‘effective’, irrespective 
of the intentions of the parties, is unlikely to produce a satisfactory result.129 
In arriving at its decision, the CCJ referred to the preamble of the RTC to 
determine its object and purpose, and explained that the contracting member states of 
CARICOM are intent on “transforming the CARICOM sub-region into a viable 
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collectively of States for the sustainable economic and social development of their 
peoples”130 and that because the CSME is principally private sector driven, this would 
mean that private entities possessed adequate standing to appear before the court. 
Furthermore, although not expressly stated in the RTC, the court held that the rights and 
benefits under the treaty may be derived or inferred from correlative obligations imposed 
upon member states.131 
 Haynes however warns of certain dangers of a teleological approach, 
stating that whilst the CCJ should be commended for the use of this approach to resolve 
normative disputes arising from the context of CARICOM legal systems, the argument 
exists that a linguistic or textual approach to legal interpretation should remain the 
primary approach.132 The basis for this is the argument that one of the functions of law is 
to reduce uncertainty and to provide solutions where there is a conflict of values.133 
Furthermore, coherence and uniformity in law can be achieved through the textual 
approach, as well as “fundamental constitutional and politico-moral values including 
formal equality, legal certainty, legal stability and the predictability by citizens of the 
probable mode of application of legal norms.”134  
However, according to Conway, when legal text is unclear, then recourse to legal 
traditions, or originalist interpretation can be able to provide assistance to the 
understanding of the legal problem.135 Conway elaborates: 
Relying on legal traditions increases the degree of legal certainty and predictability, 
all the more so if such interpretation becomes characteristic in a legal system so that 
the expectation of participants in the system is that legal tradition provides a point of 
reference when the law is, on a purely textual reading, less certain, i.e. there is a 
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feedback effect in the establishment of an originalist interpretative framework. In EU 
law, for example, legal traditions from a majority of Member States can be identified 
clearly through comparative research.136 
As the CCJ is still in its early stages of its operation, there is still the opportunity 
for further observation on the evolution of how it adjudicates on conflicts between the 
legal traditions of the region, localized legal traditions and international norms. One legal 
tradition which generally has a shared heritage across the region is that of the written 
constitution. According to Lord Diplock in Hinds v R 137 , the written constitution 
embodies: 
….what is in substance an agreement reached between representatives of the various 
shades of political opinion in the state as to the structure of the organs of government 
through which the plenitude of the sovereign power of the state is to be exercised in 
future.138 
The CCJ therefore has an important function in how it adjudicates on 
constitutional principles. Historically, these constitutions had been borne from the 
struggle by the people of the English speaking Caribbean to achieve political and legal 
independence. The constitutional arrangement represents a social contract built on natural 
law principles translated into a positivist framework, and with an authorship belonging to 
the people of the region. It is regarded as a foundation for determining the basic norm, as 
legal norms are tested against its provisions. In essence, the constitutional process is one 
which ought to facilitate self-determination, and therefore the CCJ holds the significant 
responsibility of interpreting and constructing its provisions. It is within this context, an 
argument for the sovereignty of the CCJ serves to be persuasive justification for a 
departure from the JCPC. According to McIntosh, this sovereignty would mean that the 
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CCJ is performing acts of self-determination for the region, thereby defining the 
Caribbean Polity.139 
 This notion of self-determination through the CCJ can also be materialized 
through its right of authorship, as its provision of constitutional interpretation has the 
potential of being a catalyst for new legal scholarship emerging from the region. Legal 
practitioners in the English speaking Caribbean heavily rely on English constitutional law 
books, but jurisprudence emanating from the CCJ would now allow for the writing of 
authoritative texts which are more region specific. Furthermore, the CCJ interpreting and 
enforcing the RTC and the constitutional and legislative provisions of the region would 
contribute to the success of the CSME in a social and economic sense, especially by 
offering a steady platform for the operation of the rule of law and the safeguarding of 
democratic governance.  
Despite any progress made by the CCJ in establishing itself as a final court of 
appeal, full adoption of its original and appellate jurisdictions continue to be slow. The 
court has arguably struggled to comprehensively attract CARICOM member states as 
well as a substantial caseload.140 As Cabatingan explains, the legal history of the region 
is instead dominated by the JCPC, with its “long and illustrious past and a seemingly 
unending future.”141 In considering how to confront this hindrance, Cabatingan explains 
that the CCJ’s case for adoption would hinge on the court’s dedication to creating an 
indigenous jurisprudence which would demonstrate “the final step on the long road to full 
independence.”142 Cabatingan however remonstrates that where the CCJ is perceived as 
associating its existence “too closely to the stubbornly persistent colonial reminder”143 of 
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the JCPC, this could result in the court undermining its foundational elements. Likewise, 
she sees an existence which is too closely associated with regional integration as also 
harming the CCJ’s prospects “since these endeavors have not, for the most part, enjoyed 
success or support amongst the populations they were designed to serve.” 144  The 
challenge for the CCJ according to Cabatingan is staying clear of a colonial past while 
having to “face its own pastlessness and confront its own precarious future.”145 Compared 
to the wealth of jurisprudence generated by the JCPC, the CCJ “has had limited time to 
establish a sufficient body of precedent, settle its procedures, or create its customs of 
practice.”146 Accordingly she contends that the CCJ’s public reputation is one of novelty 
instead of continuity, as well as one of change instead of stability, and this has hindered 
its adoption: 
Novelty, notably, is frequently met with foot-dragging in the Caribbean, 
where many often speak of changes in law as “harmonization” rather than reform and 
think of the timeline for change as happening over “generations” rather than years. 
Thus this Court, where everything is new and presently being made, has been met with 
more suspicion than it has with celebration and has enjoyed solitude more so than 
authority.147 
In addition to the previously mentioned sentiments expressed by Cabatingan, it 
should also be considered that at the level of the public, a certain belief system needs to 
be at work, which would constitute to the public legitimization of the court’s authority. As 
Derrida explains, “the authority of laws rests on the credit that is granted them. One 
believes in it; that is their only foundation. This act of faith is not an ontological or rational 
foundation.” 148  By this measure, the authority of law does not rest exclusively on 
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demonstrating the building of trust, but instead by some type of ‘myth’ whose rhetoric 
helps to generate and establish beliefs about the law, from which authority is derived. In 
considering this notion however, it would be difficult to combine the fundamental 
doctrines of the CCJ with eschatological functions often associated with persuading the 
public belief system to signal its favour with a particular law-making institution. Instead 
it is suggested that the catalyst for comprehensive adoption of the CCJ would arguably be 
a better appreciation of the CCJ’s sui generis nature, “just as the Caribbean spirit is a thing 
unto itself.”149 There ought to be a greater understanding that:  
The CCJ has the authority to represent a Caribbean people because it was 
borne from the very same Caribbeanness that constituted those people; it has the 
authority to determine cases in the present because it is thoroughly saturated in this 
Caribbeanness; and it has the authority to determine the future of the Caribbean 
because it is and always has been the manifestation of Caribbeanness.150 
This ‘Caribbeanness’ that Cabatingan describes arguably evidences the perpetual 
temporality of the CCJ as a Caribbean court, and such narrative has a more profound focus 
in terms of acceptance of the Court’s authority.151 
 Alternatively, Maharajh contends that CARICOM member states may be 
delaying a departure from the jurisdiction of the JCPC “for fear of scaring away foreign 
investors who may not yet have confidence in the legitimacy or power of the CCJ.”152 
Nonetheless, he asserts that a slow process in the growth and adoption of the CCJ can be 
favourable to the court. He draws comparison to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
which he notes, “moved slowly, waiting eleven years before it attempted to increase its 
regional authority and taking rare incremental steps over the course of several decades 
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after that.” 153  Maharajh notes that this is evidenced by the CCJ not advancing 
controversial goals that might heavily conflict with the views of contracting parties, while 
also not taking “any steps back from the foundation that was laid”154 by the JCPC. In this 
regard, Maharajh notes the failure of the South African Development Community 
Tribunal (SADCT), which he felt “stepped too far too quickly, provoking member states 
under its jurisdiction in only its first year of operation.”155  He instead suggests that 
CARICOM states are afforded the opportunity to “wait until they are comfortable enough 
with the court to cede jurisdiction to it.”156 This, he believes, would allow for a better 
understanding of the operations of the court.157 He contends that this type of growth is 
similar to what was experienced by the ECJ, “where only a few states signed on to the 
EU and ECJ, with the rest joining slowly as time progressed.”158 
Conclusion 
In the form of the CCJ, the Commonwealth Caribbean region has the opportunity 
to lay claim to a native regional court in accordance with its establishment by CARICOM 
Member States as an act of collective autonomy and self-identity. Arising from this 
experience is the possibility of clarification, guidance and potential harmonization of how 
fundamental rights and freedoms as articulated in the regional constitutions are to be 
interpreted. Trust in the court would bestow on it the confidence in assuming  the 
responsibility of guiding the region to a common position on current controversial matters 
which may need judicial clarification at a regional level, such as the fixed death penalty 
and its protection from challenges of constitutionality via the application of general and 
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partial savings law clauses; attention (or lack thereof) regarding laws to guarantee the 
protection of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual or Transgender (LGBT) persons; a position on the 
legality of abortion and the possibility of relaxing cannabis laws in the region, particularly 
in light of Jamaica’s decision to legislate for decriminalization, establishment of a medical 
marijuana industry and allowance of members of the Rastafarian faith to cultivate 
cannabis on designated lands.159 
The CCJ in its original jurisdiction has the potential of building a legal stability 
and regional rule of law, and is a key player in carving out a specific legal identity for the 
region. Member States, corporate entities and private persons may utilize the court by 
requesting adjudication on disputes generated by the operation of the CSME. The 
potential for economic and social growth and development is therefore favourable, as a 
strong regional judicial system would positively appeal to foreign investors seeking 
assurance that commercial disputes would be settled by an independent and responsive 
adjudicating body. While it is no certainty that the full adoption of both the appellate and 
original jurisdiction of the CCJ would automatically improve the delivery of justice, what 
should be embraced is that the court being a creation of CARICOM, would reflect and 
understand certain Caribbean values in a way which may not be achieved by a court 
located outside of the region.  
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CONCLUSION  
The overarching issue that this thesis has set out to consider is whether there exists 
a specific Commonwealth Caribbean legal identity which has emerged from a post-
colonial revision of the inherited Westminster-framed legal framework. This linked to the 
objective of the thesis to contemplate the notion that the region needs to arrive at a 
position of post-colonial ‘certainty,’ as such, requiring careful consideration of how 
existing legal norms address diversity and differences in belief systems, particularly in 
areas such as land rights, family ties and generally how equality is understood in terms of 
its social and economic dimensions. This thesis concludes by suggesting that attempts to 
revisit the Westminster modelled framework have been slow and thus by extension, the 
expression of a Commonwealth Caribbean legal identity is restricted to the extent by 
which the framework has adapted to become relevant to regional conditions. The problem 
of a lack of a proper foundation for the Westminster modelled constitutions in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean in terms of relevance is a suggested systematic flaw. The 
suggestion is made that there is the need to reconsider how legal relationships are defined 
between the state and non-state actors, as well as amongst non-state actors in terms of 
how rights are created and granted. As such, the conclusion will be put forward that a 
shift to a system allowing for decentralised governance, with the state’s role being a 
facilitator of transactions would allow for a more dynamic rule of law which better caters 
to differences in ideals and belief systems. Concluding suggestions will also be made 
regarding a change in the Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional approach to social 
justice in the economic domain. This will be followed by final thoughts on how land and 
property rights should be approached. It is also suggested that in certain spheres, 
Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems have provided resistance to international law 
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and international human rights standards, particularly in terms of the death penalty 
jurisprudence, as discussed in Chapters I and VI. A concluding thought on the value to 
Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems of international law as a decentralised legal 
system will also be conveyed, with final contemplation on the future challenge of 
constitutional globalization. 
1. Lack of Proper Foundation for the Westminster System 
As analysed in this thesis, the lack of proper foundation for the implementation of 
a Westminster modelled system across the Commonwealth Caribbean makes the process 
of constitutional reform more difficult. The rushed colonial imposition and post-colonial 
transfer of the constitutional system without questioning its overall foundation makes any 
reform potentially flawed. As analysed in Chapter V, the link between local knowledge 
and post-colonial ‘certainty’ is an important missing ingredient calling for the need for a 
process of historical ‘truth discovery’ in order to fully grasp what it means to be 
sovereign, and to determine whether there is rationality in maintaining current governance 
structures. One of the fundamental problems relates to the dominant formalism of the 
Westminster system which undermines the understanding of diverse belief systems. A 
change to approaches which focus more on diversity was suggested and also that there be 
a system which facilitates a dynamic and adaptable rule of law which is able to access 
scenarios that are informed by local knowledge. O’Brien describes the problem of the 
unsteady constitutional foundation in the following passage: 
Thus, by the time of their independence most of these former colonies had been self-
governing for little over a decade, and in some cases even less. Their Independence 
Constitutions, which were the product of negotiation between the main political 
parties and the Colonial office, had, in some cases, been prepared in great haste and 
with very limited opportunity for public consultation. Such was the desire by all the 
parties concerned for independence to succeed, that it was simply assumed that the 
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Westminster model, which provided the blueprint for these Independence 
Constitutions, could be adapted to meet the needs and demands of these post-colonies. 
The empirical evidence upon which this assumption was based was, however, limited, 
to say the least.1 
He goes on to explain that although the political leaders within the region might 
have been familiar with the institutional aspects of the Westminster system and its offices, 
“it was still too soon to know whether those institutions and offices could be successfully 
replicated for example, in some of the very small islands.”2 Furthermore, it was not 
known whether “the conventions, understandings, habits or practices upon which the 
Westminster model is based, and which had been evolving in Britain over a period of four 
centuries, would take root, let alone flourish when transplanted to Caribbean soil.”3 For 
Best, difficulties that the region has experienced in terms of its governance did not arise 
because of the Westminster framed constitutions becoming more localized, but instead 
the problem was also one which innately existed at the time of adoption.4 Writing on the 
foundational problems in Trinidad and Tobago, Best comments that “by the time the 
transfer of power was at hand in Marlborough House in 1962, legitimacy had become less 
a product of the constitutional or even political arrangements and more a property of 
‘doctor politics’ and maximum leadership in the competing communities.”5 On this point, 
Chapter V advocated a departure from the discursive norms shaped by past colonial 
authority, and suggested the empowerment at a grassroots level of those persons and 
groups who are in discursive resistance where their beliefs and traditions are not afforded 
legal system protection. This type of empowerment is suggested as being necessary as 
                                                 
1 Derek O’Brien, The Constitutional Systems of the Commonwealth Caribbean: A Contextual Analysis 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 34. 
2 Ibid, 35. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Lloyd Best, ‘1970 and 1990: Recurring Crises of Political Legitimacy’, in Selwyn Ryan and Taimoon 




there exists as a possibility the threat of government not being accountable to those 
persons in discursive resistance.  
 According to Treisman, government accountability exists to the extent that 
citizens can obtain precise information on its performance, and remove poorly performing 
incumbents from office. 6  This understanding of accountability as a constitutional 
principle also provides a negative dichotomy. For example, policies might be enacted that 
favours the majority, and therefore the government is accountable to the majority when it 
comes to upholding the policy. Policies might be based on values which promotes the 
norms of the majority, in effect dismissing, or even criminalizing the views of the 
minorities. There is also the possibility that the choices of a local minority might conflict 
with that of a national majority, and this would mean that the government is not 
accountable to the local minority because they have been unsuccessful in their vote. A 
demonstration of this dilemma is given by Treisman, who writes: 
Suppose that the majority nationwide favours legal abortion throughout the country, 
but in one-third of the local districts a majority favours a ban. Listening to the 
nationwide majority would mean legalizing abortion nationwide; listening to each 
local majority would mean banning abortion in one-third of the districts. These 
outcomes obviously make different sets of citizens happy. One might argue on moral 
grounds about which majority has a right to make decisions on this issue. But it seems 
reasonable to say that under centralization (which favors the nationwide majority) and 
decentralisation (which favors the local majorities) government is equally accountable 
– just accountable to different majorities.7 
The problem is that within the Westminster modelled system, competition at the 
central level for political power suggests that politicians will promote the narrative of the 
majority in order to secure votes. As a consequence of this practice, individual autonomy 
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of certain segments of the society is compromised if the ontological assumption is made 
that a free society exists when the understanding of social realities, whether scientific or 
based on ethical perspectives, is enabled only where there is an unencumbered 
individualistic orientation.8 Accordingly, Barry states: 
...spontaneous individual activity accidentally maximises social well-being more 
effectively than any deliberate, rationalistic plan could....and it is said that in a moral 
sense the attempt to abridge that individual autonomy by coercive activity, of which 
that by the state is the most prevalent, destroys the ‘separateness’ and identity of each 
person and makes him a means to be used for the ends of some social or collective 
entity. Of course, in the latter argument the autonomy of the individual must be 
bounded by rules and the pursuit of personal goals constrained by ‘law’ and ultimately 
morality: the general argument is that such law and morality should be limited to 
enforcing the equal right of each individual to pursue his own interest.9 
The suggestion however, is not one for enforced egalitarianism to guarantee 
individual preservation, but instead for the allowance of participation in processes which 
can have productive outcomes both to the individual and society. Instead, the tradition of 
the Westminster system is one which conceptualizes moral perfection in relation to the 
sacrifice of personal values at the expense of the values of others. The system urges a 
type of morality “which obliges self-restraint not merely in those areas which require us 
to recognise the rights of others but also in actions which lead to purely self-fulfilment 
even though they do not abrogate or abridge such rights.”10 The centralized legal system 
borne from moral persuasion is potentially dangerous to individualism as moral positions 
“do not convey information about the world but merely express the personal preferences 
of the utterer.”11 Friedman intrepidly qualifies this perspective in his claim that economic 
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and social disputes between men take place as opposed to fundamental differences in 
basic values, as differences in this area are “about which men can ultimately only fight.”12 
In this regard, it is suggested that there ought to be a re-thinking of legal relationships 
between state and non-state actors, as well as amongst non-state actors when it comes to 
constitutional and legal system protection.  
2. Re-thinking Legal Relationships 
Chapters IV and V discussed the link between legal formalism and capitalism and 
suggested that morality is excluded from the decision making process in the situation 
where a formalist legal system is designed to protect capitalism, at the expense of 
materializing justice. What Commonwealth Caribbean states need to consider is the 
possibility of the rule of law being shaped by way of the legal personality of the state 
conflicting with that of other actors, for instance, the growth of the corporate actor and its 
legal personality. In what is considered to be a classical analysis of corporate structures, 
Berle and Means discuss the threat of the legal identity of the state when confronted with 
the legal identity of the modern corporation: 
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power 
which can compete on equal terms with the modern state – economic power versus 
political power, each strong in its own field. The state seeks in some aspects to 
regulate the corporation, while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, 
makes every effort to avoid such regulation. Where its own interests are concerned, it 
even attempts to dominate the state. The future may see the economic organism, now 
typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly 
even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization. The law of 
corporations, accordingly, might well be considered as a potential constitutional law 
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for the new economic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming the 
aspect of economic statesmanship.13 
Thus, there is a danger of an emerging and dominant threat of constitutionalism 
of the economic sphere designed to protect corporations which have pursued favourable 
rules. Where this is the situation, it may be hypothesised that the state in the social realm 
would now become more concerned with finding ways to secure the overall collective 
good of the public, instead of creating specific rights to protect specific groups based on 
a particular type of characterization. For example, the state would become more active in 
matters such as facilitating access to markets for citizens regardless of group distinctions, 
or ensuring environmental security and sustainability. To qualify a state’s agenda to 
pursue the provision of general public goods, there is the argument that there is a problem 
of social morality being translated into rules which create rights for specific groups 
because this would mean the creation of rights based on perceptions, or anticipation of 
social conflict. As Koskenniemi explains: 
Social morality cannot, however, be translated exhaustively into rights language. Such 
language is based on an ideal of individual autonomy that perceives social conflict in 
terms of interpersonal relationship...abstract personhood and the conception of 
individual rights that goes with it cannot address the sense of injustice that arises, for 
example, from structural (economic/social) causation or from the sense of belonging 
to an oppressed minority. But also in many other contexts, posing the normative issue 
in terms of individual rights fails to grasp its social meaning. To take an example from 
Joseph Raz: I may own a painting by Van Gogh. Nonetheless, I may have a duty not 
to destroy it even if nobody has a correlative right. The value of art, in this case, cannot 
be expressed in rights language – just as little as, for instance, the value of a clean 
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environment in a conflict concerning the carrying out of a contract for a large 
industrial project.14 
Accordingly, a concluding suggestion of this thesis is that in order for there to be 
an evolution as to how rights are understood, the legal process needs to be revisited in 
terms of legal categorizations and legal relations. There is arguably a type of legal fiction 
in the assumption of a vertical relationship between the state and all other actors, and in 
the assumption of a horizontal relationship amongst all other personalities categorized as 
non-state actors. The fiction is that citizens, corporations, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and all other non-state entities are assumed to exist in the same 
space with a common identity and with equality, and this assumption informs much of 
the theory and the practice of law.15 A consequence of this arrangement is the creation of 
a conflict within the system itself as the idea emerges that there should be equality 
amongst all horizontally located actors specifically when it comes to establishing a 
relationship of trust in their vertical affiliation with the state. Actors on the horizontal 
plane, are in fact, not equal because of variations in their influence on economic and 
political power. It is instead proposed that a system is developed whereby less weight is 
placed on the vertical relationship, and more importance on the relationships between 
horizontal actors. A shift to emphasis on horizontal relationships would provide an even 
platform allowing for reciprocity in the decision making process, as well as a framework 
which facilitates the representation of values that reflect the diversity of the region. This 
is not to say that legislatures and courts have not limited the scope and influence of 
horizontal actors in their ability to negatively affect each other because of power 
imbalances. However, re-visiting how legal relationships are defined between state and 
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non-state actors, and amongst non-state actors at the horizontal level would allow insight 
into more secure ways of discovering and guaranteeing qualified rights.  
 In relation to re-visiting how legal relationships are defined, relying on 
several elements that have been examined throughout the thesis, it is possible to envisage 
a more Caribbean theoretical model of local decentralised communities which may be 
established by virtue of characteristics such as common local knowledge or collective 
similarities will be also suggested.  
 
State Decentralisation as an Alternative to the Westminster modelled System  
 To re-define legal relationships to foster a dynamic legal system allowing 
a more dynamic integration of Caribbean informal institutions and customs, there might 
be a need to dismantle the horizontal relationship between state and non-state actors by 
establishing a relationship brought about through decentralised governance. In defining 
‘decentralisation,’ according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): 
Decentralization, or decentralizing governance, refers to the restructuring or 
reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between 
institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the 
system of governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national 
levels.…Decentralization could also be expected to contribute to key elements of 
good governance, such as increasing people’s opportunities for participation in 
economic, social and political decisions; assisting in developing people’s capacities; 
and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability.16 
Proponents of decentralisation view the ‘centralized’ system as one where power 
is usually obtained at the ‘centre’ and controlled by the few in positions of authority, and 
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therefore individuals, communities and organizations that are removed from the centre 
“do not have authorities, discretion, or exercise control over their own affairs.”17 Instead, 
they are “either recipients of policies and programs from the centre, or merely instruments 
for carrying out the centre’s plans and directives.”18 By this view, the centralized power 
is not capable of effectively observing and understanding diverse realities which are 
situated outside of its immediate confines, and as a consequence imposes rules and 
controls which are potentially counterproductive and demeaning.19 Where this is the case, 
the Institute of Public Administration of Canada suggests that the “centre loses sight of 
what and who is to be served, becoming more interested in the means than the ends, 
because the means are more familiar.”20 
 Decentralisation is not an absolute alternative to centralization but instead 
complementary roles of state and non-state actors should be analysed in order to 
determine the most effective methods to accomplish desired objectives. Based on the 
discussions in this thesis, there is the overall sentiment that the Westminster modelled 
framework has generally not displayed dynamism in allowing Commonwealth Caribbean 
legal systems to guarantee the security of relevant rights to non-state actors in terms of 
protecting diversity. As a concluding thought, it is suggested that a legal system borne 
out of a decentralised governance structure could prove to be a valuable reform initiative. 
This type of system also has the potential of better ensuring that there is no dominant 
legal identity which would treat other identities as inferior. The importance of this is that, 
as discussed throughout the course of this thesis, the legal identity of the state can 
undermine other legal entities, despite those other legal entities being credible and 
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relevant to certain segments of the population based on their historical and cultural 
histories and evolution.   
 
Re-thinking the constitutional promise of social justice  
 In considering the values contained within the preambles of 
Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions, Bulkan explains: 
Caribbean constitutions solemnly affirm and espouse certain values, notably among 
these being freedom, democracy, social justice, human dignity and equality. These 
values have been enshrined in preambles, and breathe life into the substantive 
provisions. They have been repeatedly invoked and enforced by the courts.21 
Bulkan references Lord Bingham who was “easily the judge to have succeeded 
Lord Diplock in terms of his command of Caribbean jurisprudence”22 as affirming that 
Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions “were meant to usher in a new political order, 
one promoting values of social justice, inclusionary democracy and human dignity – all 
values that are incompatible with substantive inequality and the existence of irrational 
status distinctions.”23 Bulkan further explains: 
Fundamental rights, then – or at least those that promote the values of fairness, 
equality, political participation, human dignity and the rule of law – are emphatically 
a part of the identity of Caribbean constitutions, central to their values and the goal of 
perfection as envisaged in the Guyana model.24 
In terms of Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions, social justice considerations 
are therefore an important component in the pursuance of fundamental rights. To give an 
explicit example, the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago states that its citizens are to: 
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respect the principles of social justice and therefore believe that the operation of the 
economic system should result in the material resources of the community being so 
distributed as to subserve the common good, that there should be adequate means of 
livelihood for all, that labour should not be exploited or forced by economic necessity 
to operate in inhumane conditions but that there should be opportunity for 
advancement on the basis of recognition of merit, ability and integrity...25 
It is suggested however is that there needs to be a revised construction of, and 
framework for social justice that addresses matters such as the equality of human dignity 
and the oppression of certain groups within the society, but more along the lines of justice 
which allows for unhindered market participation. Social justice as a constitutional 
guarantee arguably does not take into account certain economic consequences when it 
comes to centralized redistributive state policies. The argument against the constitutional 
understanding of social justice is that it is incompatible with orthodox market economics 
and consequently counter-utilitarian as it assumes a distinction between production and 
distribution.26 The economic theory is that income which is distributed to the factors of 
production such as wages for labour, interest on capital, or rent represents what is required 
in order for these factors to be at a point of optimal employment.27 This means that there 
is “no ‘social pie’ which is available for distribution in accordance with some external 
criteria...”28 Accordingly, Barry states that any attempt to redistribute based on social 
justice criteria “must inevitably distort the signalling process of a market economy and 
thus prevent an economic optimum being reached.”29 According to Burke, proponents of 
social justice “tend to downplay the significance of the discipline of economics, and even 
to reject it altogether as immoral.”30 However, “basic concepts of economic science, such 
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as the law of supply and demand or the concept of marginal utility, are neither morally 
good nor bad but simply express the logic of human interaction...”31  
It is suggested that protection from coercion as a feature of social justice would 
allow for the possibility of free competition, whereas economic protection “from the 
voluntary actions of the market is a contradictory protection as it has the effect of 
rendering the ‘protected’ person less economically productive and less capable of 
competing.”32 Hence, the objectives of a just society could be achieved through principles 
of non-discrimination in terms of market participation, and constitutional protection 
should be focused on this outcome. As was previously discussed in the idea of the limited 
state, the state in a decentralised system acting as a facilitator of transactions would be 
acting unfavourably to itself if it seeks to limit the market participation of minority groups 
or discriminate against persons with non-traditional belief systems from market 
participation. 
To illustrate this point, if an individual desires a particular good, he/she would be 
able to achieve utility if he/she is able to purchase that good. However, if that individual 
is unable to purchase the good because of a restriction on his/her ability to do so, utility 
in this particular instance would not be achieved, and it would be one less sale for the 
shop. If there exists no barriers to market participation, and therefore the individual is 
able to obtain the good, then both the individual benefits and the shop owner benefits. 
But, instead of this process being facilitated through a redistribution of wealth, it is 
suggested that the state, in the role of a facilitator of transactions would be able to benefit 
from a triadic system whereby it facilitates contracts between communities based on 
matches made that are informed by a record of metrics such as skill and reputation. In this 
system, the state would obtain certain incentives such as fees from facilitating 




transactions because it will be using its resources to make matches between communities 
in terms of what would be the most efficient transaction to enter into, and with whom. So 
the person wanting to go to the shop to purchase a particular good can be incentivized by 
the state to participate in the entire ecosystem because other than the individual’s desire 
to go to the shop, the state, by encouraging the individual to participate in the market will 
obtain benefit. By incentivizing all individuals within the state to participate in the 
exchange of their skills, goods and services for reward, it is suggested that what this 
encourages is a Hegelian transition of the individual from a state of consciousness to 
absolute consciousness. This would conceptually mean that consciousness which is 
informed by objects external to it and which exists at the level of the individual’s desires 
or will (such as the desire to make a certain purchase from the shop) are capable of being 
transitioned to absolute knowledge where the individual is now able to develop a 
cognitive attitude through an unrestricted dialectic process (in this instance, unrestricted 
and state incentivized market participation) from which he can discover how he can best 
use his skill to obtain a medium which can be used to make his purchase. In explaining 
further, Stern states that there exists the interpretation that: 
what underpins the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness is not a shift 
from realism to idealism, but from theory to practice, where in theorizing we have a 
‘detached’ view of the world, and so abstract from our position as subjects in the 
world, whereas in practical activity we act on the world and so put ourselves as 
subjects at the centre of things.33 
By this measure, it is therefore suggested that Commonwealth Caribbean 
constitutions ought to place greater emphasis on the objective of unrestricted access of all 
individuals to participation in economy and society with the state facilitating and 
encouraging exchange through providing incentives. The individual would be able to use 
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incentives as a way to improve his skills and reputation within the entire ecosystem when 
it comes to the exchange of goods and services.  
3. Land and Property Rights 
 Chapter III which addressed access to land and tenure security gave the 
example of the ‘Sou-Sou’ land movement in Trinidad and Tobago as a grassroots 
movement for landless communities to pool resources together to purchase land. It also 
discussed that this project, despite being identified by UN Habitat as an innovative project 
for the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, became unsustainable because of 
a lack of state co-operation and encouragement. Instead of providing incentives for the 
programme from which the state could have benefitted, the government of Trinidad and 
Tobago made no concession in their refusal of the granting of formal title to the 
communities as the lands purchased were designated for agricultural and not residential 
use. This was despite the lands belonging to failed estates, which were being sold at a 
reduced price. Chapter III also discussed ‘Operation PRIDE’ in Jamaica, where that 
country’s government attempted to encourage the pooling together of community 
resources through a self-help programme which would allow for the improvement of 
community infrastructure. The government incentive offered would be a land settlement 
policy framework for those persons who the programme targeted, namely those persons 
who were unable to participate in the formal land market. By incentivizing project 
participants, the hope was that sustainable communities would be developed through 
participation which allowed for the growth of resources and as a result, the improvement 
of community infrastructure. However, the project failed due to allegations of corruption, 
government mismanagement and overall poor policy design and implementation. 
Unfortunately, both the ‘Sou-Sou’ land movement and ‘Operation PRIDE’ were 
unsustainable because of a lack of government incentive for the former, and in the later, 
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the failure of the Jamaican government to provide a solid platform to properly facilitate 
the project.  
 What the aforementioned projects also bring to the discussion is the point 
that while there are legal rights derived from obtaining formal land title, there is generally 
a lack of legislative protection in the absence of formal title. As Gilbert observes, in 
“many countries, access to rights over lands are often stratified and based on hierarchical 
and segregated systems where the poorest and less educated do not hold security of land 
tenure.”34 This is no different in the Commonwealth Caribbean. As discussed in Chapters 
I and III, control of lands in the Commonwealth Caribbean had historically been used as 
instruments of colonization and oppression during the era of slavery, and as a 
consequence, informal systems of land use remain as a legacy of this era.  Chapter III 
demonstrated however that certain rights, for instance, usufructuary rights, can arise from 
informal or customary land possession. As a concluding thought on this point, it is 
suggested that the creation of rights from customary or other types of informal land use 
needs to translate into the ability of individuals or communities to either obtain formal 
title, or legal recognition which would permit them the use of the resources of the land 
without encumbrance, for their economic or social benefit.  According to Bonfiglioli:  
The general principles behind this approach are that the persons or groups most likely 
to suffer from the misuse of natural resources are those with the greatest incentive to 
use resource rights to prevent environmental damage, and that community 
organizations can establish effective access rules and mechanisms for monitoring and 
enforcing the cooperative management of forests, land, livestock or water.35 
Furthermore, on the point of benefits of land rights, Gilbert explains: 
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Regulations and policies governing land rights are often at the heart of any major 
economic and social reform. Land rights play a catalytic role in economic growth, 
social development, and poverty alleviation.36 
In essence, securing market access to persons who are excluded from the formal 
system of land titling would mean that that they would be able to securely leverage the 
resources of the land, where the use of the land as a form of livelihood is desired. As 
Gilbert states, there is “a strong link between use, access to, and ownership of land on the 
one hand, and development and poverty reduction on the other.”37 Gilbert makes the case 
for land rights as a fundamental human right that would not only provide economic 
security, but also preservation of culture and identity: 
As traditional access and ownership rights for women, minorities, migrants and 
pastoralists are ignored or reduced....these populations are increasingly claiming that 
their land rights are part of their fundamental human rights. Under the banner land 
rights are human rights, they are claiming that land represent not only a very valuable 
economic asset but is also a source of identity and culture.38 
In the absence of security of legal recognition, there is the possibility that persons 
who are not part of the formal system would be subject to the possibility of the 
unregistered land being obtained by more powerful interests.  
 De Soto advocates the importance of property rights in promoting 
economic prosperity and alleviating poverty by presenting the view that poor persons lack 
“easy access to the property mechanisms that could legally fix the economic potential of 
their assets so that they could be used to produce, secure, or guarantee greater value.”39 
In the absence of rights which allow property to be used for economic efficiency, there is 
therefore the problem of ‘dead capital.’40 The argument is that the economy could be 
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constrained, for example, by the absence of secure title rather than by the absence of 
wealth because the legal environment would not be supporting the possibility of illiquid 
wealth being pledged as a collateral bond.41 While there are instances where property 
might have non-market value to its holders, the argument is for legal system support in 
the event that the holder of the property decides on using it in the market. The challenge 
however for Commonwealth Caribbean states, especially regarding those areas where 
informal rules may be relatively strong, is to understand how non-institutional practices, 
such as informal cultural norms might affect or modify the establishment of formal 
property rights as they are currently understood. For example, in the area of family law, 
if it is assumed that private property rights are strongly and clearly established, and “the 
formal institution of such property rights grants entitlements to the family, to the head of 
the household, or to women and men,”42 there is also the likelihood “that this formal 
arrangement will be heavily affected”43 by cultural frameworks. Once this is understood, 
the next step would be to arrive at a position of harmony so that the informal system 
would be able to operate in a space where it has the protection of formal law and solutions 
are found for conflicts which do not overall pose a threat to the rule of law. The difficulty 
however is translating informal systems into a technical legal regime which affords 
protection but at the same time maintains the autonomy of the informal system.  
 Regarding the preservation of localized practices, formal rule of law 
recognition and protection of informal systems in terms of property rights may also be 
considered as adding value to the suggestion of a decentralised governance system. This 
is because, other than the concession of the state facilitating transactions by non-state 
actors if they chose to use their property for economic activities, the social and economic 
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construction of informal property regimes at a localized level will not solely be 
determined by the centralized body. The state would have the policy choice of 
incentivizing the individual to use his property at market if this fits in with broader 
economic state objectives. However, at the same time, the individual has the choice of 
remaining in the ‘informal’ space and knowing that its boundaries are not only 
recognised, but have not been compromised by state actors due to the state’s pursuance 
of wider policy objectives. In fact, decisions on property rights will not be a reflection of 
political authority but instead will be devolved to local actors who are more familiar with 
local conditions. Decentralisation would arguably protect non-state actors from a ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ as legal system recognition of their claims to localized property rights 
based on informal systems would be assured, instead of being negated by more powerful 
actors. Instead, in a sense, a new commons is created in that the benefits of resources, for 
example, are specifically designated to local actors. As Di Gregorio, Dohrn and Meinzen-
Dick state: 
As in the case of....natural resource management (such as forestry, fisheries, water 
management), so also in the case of land tenure there has been growing recognition 
of the limitations of state capacities of delivering services, especially in rural areas. 
Not only are the costs of providing services in many rural areas very high, but state 
institutions often lack the local knowledge needed to be effective. This has prompted 
a search for ways to supplement state capacity by involving local people, often 
through decentralisation or devolution programs.44 
However, they also suggest that the process is not always straightforward: 
.....getting that local involvement is not always easy. First, central authorities have 
often been reluctant to transfer real authority to local bodies, which reduces the 
incentives and effectiveness of the latter. Second, there is some ambiguity and 
contention regarding whether the appropriate local bodies are outposts of government 
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departments, locally elected councils, chiefs or other customary authorities, newly 
constituted user groups, NGOs, or even private firms. The local institutions that are 
selected are not always forthcoming to pick up the additional costs for their 
participation, and it generally requires a substantial state investment of time, 
personnel, and funds to set up the partnerships between central and local institutions 
and build their capacity to carry out their expected roles in land tenure reform.45 
Nonetheless, decentralisation is still suggested as an important avenue in the 
securing the benefits of localized resources to local institutions. As suggested by 
Bonfiglioli, the international community is also increasingly accepting the principle of 
the devolution of rights to local actors, with the World Bank recognizing that “the highly 
centralized institutional structure that characterizes many government administration 
systems can lead to losses in effectiveness of development investments and policies.”46 
4.  Potential of International Law as a decentralised system and the challenge of 
Globalization of Constitutional Law 
 Throughout the course of this thesis, the suggestion has been made that 
Commonwealth Caribbean states look to international norms to guide domestic law, 
particularly in terms of controversial issues such as land rights, the death penalty and 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights. As a concluding thought, it is 
posited that in revisiting the social contract in terms of the legal relationships of state and 
non-state actors, Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions ought to recognise the value of 
international law as a decentralised body of law and international legal norms in shaping 
municipal jurisprudence. This section will consider the importance of individuals as 
subjects of international law in making the concluding suggestion that its decentralised 
nature can add to the sustainability of local communities and customs. It is also suggested 
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that Commonwealth Caribbean states need to carefully consider the issue of the 
globalization of constitutional law, and consider whether a modern day neoliberal process 
will actually compromise localized participants in terms of their involvement in the 
economic system. 
 
Value of decentralised international law to the individual and localized 
communities 
The origins of international law suggest a limited role for private individuals or 
firms.47 Where individuals or private entities feel aggrieved by a foreign government, 
typically they are required to access an international forum for dispute resolution through 
their government.48 This was reflective of the positivist doctrine of international law 
which ascertained that the private individual could not directly be a subject of 
international law because the system is based on the common consent of individual states, 
and not individual human beings. Therefore, international law was one which governed 
the international conduct of the state, and not of the individual. 49  By the positivist 
doctrine, the rights and obligations of the private individual existed within his own 
country or another country in which he might be residing in. It is within this space that 
the individual could, for instance, sue and be sued, or commit crimes and be punished 
according to the provisions of private and municipal law.50  In terms of the ‘realist’ 
perspective of international law, Reus-Smit explains: 
What marks it off from the law of the nation-state is its decentralised character, the 
fact that international law’s legislative, adjudicative, and enforcement procedures 
operate without a central authority. Ignoring altogether the centrality of customary 
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law and opinio juris, realists stress that states are only bound by rules to which they 
have consented, that it is states who judge the fit between the law and their actions, 
and that it is states who must be relied upon to enforce their own compliance.51 
However, there has arguably been a shift away from the traditional positivist 
approach, with the major landmark being the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal which 
held that crimes against international law “are committed by men, not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.”52 According to Janis, the Nuremberg trials did not take 
place in isolation, but instead “had a profound influence on other elements of modern 
international law.”53 Janis suggests for instance that Nuremberg had an “important impact 
on the formulation and implementation of the 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”54 
It is suggested that the customary development of international law lends 
legitimacy to the claim that it is of value to localized communities in their rule of law 
development. The argument is that international law would have evolved through its 
customary nature in a way which would also understand the development process that 
local communities would be experiencing in terms of their relationship with custom. 
Consider for instance, the customary development of international law as a decentralised 
process. Its customary characteristics would have emerged through the non-coordinated 
interactions of actors, with each actor seeking to advance its interest. As time progresses, 
and in the course of interaction, “welfare-maximizing norms beat out inferior ones.”55 As 
Kontorovich observes: 
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In the beginning, an issue exists that must be resolved one way or another. A series of 
interactions between group members allows for testing of various possible behaviors. 
Indeed, the behaviors are not chosen from a menu, but may be invented by the parties 
based on their view of the best way to deal with a situation—or they may even be 
randomly chosen. Because behaviors are chosen in the context of a consensual 
interaction between members, self-serving or opportunistic behaviour will be rejected 
by one party or the other. What will be left is a range of behaviors that might plausibly 
increase joint welfare. Of these, the behaviors that most increase the joint surplus of 
the parties to an interaction will be chosen more often than those that do not.56 
However, advocating a decentralised system where local communities are guided 
by international norms and have the constitutional protection to do so, admittedly means 
that there has to exist the trust that the rules of the international system are, in fact, 
adaptable enough to recognize and protect localized interests according to international 
standards. There is also the issue of the international norm clashing with localized 
community and political interests, as is the case with administration of the death penalty. 
As Novak elaborates: 
The abolition of the mandatory death penalty throughout the Commonwealth 
Caribbean was a striking success of the incrementalist litigation strategy pursued by 
human rights activists working toward the goal of total abolition. By bringing 
petitions before the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, these advocates succeeded in building up a persuasive body of death 
penalty jurisprudence under international treaty obligations. National courts of appeal 
and eventually the Privy Council, the court of highest appeal for most countries of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, drew from this persuasive jurisprudence in a series of 
constitutional challenges that led to the dramatic restriction of the scope of the death 
penalty in the region. This success came at a cost. Because of wide public support for 
the death penalty as a result of increasing crime rates and the colonial underpinnings 
of the Privy Council appeals process, these strides toward death penalty abolition had 
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the appearance of being externally imposed by Britain, the former colonial power. 
The result was the creation of a new Caribbean Court of Justice as a regional court of 
final appeal, though the Court has thus far adhered to the parameters of the Privy 
Council’s earlier judgments.57 
Novak’s discourse raises an important issue of how the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(CCJ) would continue to treat with the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council (JCPC) in terms of the application of international norms. On this point, it 
would appear that the CCJ has already integrated international human rights norms, and 
indicated its willingness to be guided by international precedents as was discussed in 
chapter VI. As such, in recognizing the decentralised nature of international law and its 
value to the CCJ, Lord Gifford has stated, “...no one should imagine that the CCJ will 
reverse the decisions of the Privy Council. Those decisions were based on a consensus of 
authority from courts around the world, and the CCJ has already shown that it respects 
that consensus.”58 As also discussed in Chapter VI, the CCJ jurisprudence currently 
indicates a willingness to allow private entities with adequate locus standi access to 
appear before the court.  
 
The challenge of globalization of Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional law 
According to the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), globalization:  
is usually defined primarily by reference to the developments in technology, 
communications, information processing and so on that have made the world smaller 
and more interdependent in very many ways. But it has also come to be closely 
associated with a variety of specific trends and policies including an increasing 
reliance upon the free market, a significant growth in the influence of international 
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financial markets and institutions in determining the viability of national policy 
priorities, a diminution in the role of the state and the size of its budget, the 
privatization of various functions previously considered to be the exclusive domain 
of the state, the deregulation of a range of activities with a view to facilitating 
investment and rewarding individual initiative, and a corresponding increase in the 
role and even responsibilities attributed to private actors, both in the corporate sector, 
in particular to the transnational corporations, and in civil society.59 
It is suggested that globalization is a double movement in the sense that it can 
either be driven ‘from above’ or from a grassroots level. Top-down neoliberal 
globalization can be actually counterintuitive to more simple classic economic liberalism 
where the individual is empowered at a localized, or national level to have the unrestricted 
choice and ability to participate in the economic market.  Doyle and Gilbert explain the 
dangers of the concept of neoliberal globalization in stating: 
Associated with the free and largely unregulated movement of capital is the potential 
for speculation on a scale greater than the total value of goods traded in the global 
economy. The objective and outcome of this speculation is not necessarily to increase 
general living standards or productivity but rather to maximize individual financial 
gains. As recent experience has shown in the context of the global financial crisis, this 
speculation has the potential to destabilize the entire global economy.60 
It is in this arena that the CCJ as an international court would have an important 
role to play in the protection of local actors from the harmful effects of neoliberal 
globalization, as well as to empower local actors through recognition of their economic, 
social and cultural rights. Caserta and Madsen suggest that the dual structure of the CCJ 
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is one which has the possibility of lending to a fusion between globalization and 
decolonization: 
The CCJ’s unique double jurisdiction—original over Community law and appellate 
over other civil and criminal matters—underscores the complex sociopolitical context 
and transformation of which it is a part. Whereas the CCJ’s original jurisdiction over 
the RTC suggests a new, more judicialized approach to Caribbean integration, the 
Court’s appellate function is intended to repatriate to the Caribbean the development 
and control over the common law. This combination of globalization and latter-day 
decolonization is fundamental for understanding the Court’s authority.61 
It is hoped that the CCJ as a decentralised regional court is able to ensure through 
its jurisprudence that the decolonization process provides resistance to neoliberal 
globalization favouring powerful actors at the expense of less powerful individuals and 
communities. However, constitutional reform in itself remains a responsibility of each 
individual Commonwealth Caribbean state and as discussed in Chapter VI there is always 
the likelihood of political institutions opposing the CCJ on policy decisions that conflict 
with the policy objectives of the political institution, despite the policy contradicting with 
international norms.  
5. Future stability or future exploration? 
Commonwealth Caribbean states, with the exception of Guyana, have remained 
“remarkably faithful”62 to the Westminster modelled system of governance. By means of 
the discussion throughout the thesis, the outcome is evidenced that despite an ongoing 
regional rhetoric promoting constitutional reform, the fundamental institutional structures 
of Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions largely remain unchanged, and revisions 
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modest.63 The need to strengthen and revitalize democracy is credited as a recurring 
theme of the discussion, particularly in terms of “participation, legitimacy, accountability, 
local governance and the people’s constituent power.64 Notwithstanding calls for reform 
across the Commonwealth Caribbean, and within this thesis, the fact remains that 
Commonwealth Caribbean societies are comparatively stable in terms of not experiencing 
revolutionary threats to democracy, and its constitutions have not experienced low life 
expectancy as compared to other countries in the Americas.65 There is also no threat of 
inter-state violence, nor any disputes that have resulted in substantial diplomatic fallouts. 
To some, democratic stability might be sufficient indicator of the success of the 
Westminster system, and the rule of law. Yet, the problem of a lack of comprehensive 
reform process to ensure a constitutional and rule of law framework tailored to the 
region’s localized needs continues to exist. This lack of reform “marks the region out 
from the rest of the postcolonial world where rapid constitutional reform has been taking 
place...”66 By advocating the revisiting of current rule of law norms, this thesis has largely 
attempted to make the case for self-determination – at a regional level, at an institutional 
level and at a more localized, community-centred level. In terms of considering the 
objective of examining a process of post-colonial ‘certainty,’ it has discussed threats to 
self-determination in terms of the legacies of the region’s colonial past and its legal 
manifestations, economic designs, and globalization. It has also made the concluding case 
for constitutional revision based on decentralisation as an avenue by which actors at a 
grassroots level can be able to drive a “bottom up” economic revolution. It is hoped that 
in the future, all actors subject to the rule of the law in the Commonwealth Caribbean are 
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given all necessary legal protection allowing them to freely participate in society, and the 
economic system. Only then might it be the case that these actors are able to successfully 
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